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ABSTRACT 
 
This doctoral dissertation proposes a fuller, more inclusive account of practice than that 
which dominates current discourse on organizations, which typically turns upon 
occupations, professions and jobs as manifestations of publicly recognized roles or 
functions within organized activity, established as a function of prescribed divisions of 
labour and the application of skills and techniques, and assumes that people interact in the 
ways that their assigned roles and functions are planned to work as interrelated parts of a 
shared task. The approach here is a reflexive process akin to what Lévi-Strauss 
characterizes as ‘bricolage’, using ready-to-hand materials linking narrative, literature and 
argument, adding pieces iteratively in an open-ended building process over the course of 
the dissertation. The reflexive process entails (a) the act of writing narratives (derived 
from the author’s own management experiences in the private, public and voluntary 
sectors) so as to produce insights and themes of interest in relation to the broader theme 
of practice; and (b) readings of certain key works of the literature on organizations and 
organized activity (including Sarbin and Allen, Denzin, Wiley, Collins, Elias, Mead, 
Habermas, Stacey and Mintzberg) so as to expose practice-related themes relevant to the 
construction of an alternative account which proposes the following: (1) Practice in 
organizations is communicative in nature and entails the enactment of roles. 
Conventionally, enactment is taken to mean that the role-incumbent meets expectations 
set by decision-makers and premised on conformity to preset structures within a 
metaphorical organizational space. In an alternative account of practice, however, 
enactment can be more accurately framed as a dialectical process of co-emergence of role 
and organization by virtue of the local social interaction of the persons involved. (2) In 
active life the mutually-exclusive emergent process and the spatial organizational 
metaphor necessarily co-exist. Reframing role enactment opens a path to new 
understanding, such that role enactment and practice thus become problematized in that 
practitioners can be seen as holding a paradoxical position of some considerable 
relevance to practice. Today’s predominantly objectivist management thinking primarily 
stresses accountability for the communicative interaction of others within the 
organizational space. The reflexive processual approach contests the adequacy and 
exclusivity of this position, because managing as an emergent practice is more 
comprehensively communicative and open-ended. (3) The co-presence of both the 
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objectivist and emergent accounts thus requires the manager paradoxically to hold both 
these views of role and organization at the same time in his or her experiences of 
managing. As paradox cannot be resolved, it is instead taken up by the manager-
practitioner by virtue of the reflexivity central to all processes of communicative 
interaction. (4) It follows that acknowledging processes of enactment and the centrality of 
reflexivity in the practice of managing and bringing that to the attention of managers and 
management educators will enhance how managing sophisticated cooperation is 
understood and carried out. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This document constitutes my dissertation in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Professional Doctor of Management from the Business School of the 
University of Hertfordshire in Hatfield, UK.  Its title, ’Practice as Role Enactment: 
Managing Sophisticated, Purposive Cooperation‘, indicates the themes that motivated 
this research effort and the area a contribution to knowledge may have been made.  I shall 
argue that practice in organizations entails the enactment of roles, in which the 
practitioner paradoxically acts in conformity with structures (and strictures) of the 
objectified organization and his or her own designated role, while at the same time 
engaging freely in independent action through complex processes of relating.  With 
specific reference to the practice of managing, this paradox is never resolved in 
experience but is instead taken up in action by the practitioner in the reflexive processes 
inherent in all communicative interaction. 
My active life, which constitutes the context of this dissertation, largely consists of 
managing and participating in improvizational, and oftentimes opportunistic, emergent 
coalitions or groups attempting to carry forward equally emergent endeavours.  While 
this formulation of what I do may seem to be anecdotally about me, I believe this to be in 
fact a description of a widespread, recurrent experience in organizations, one that often 
goes unrecognized as a legitimate strategy for actors in organizations moving into new 
territory, especially given the inherently fragile nature of organizational structure in the 
face of new initiatives.  What is particular and unusual in my active life is that it 
explicitly follows a trajectory that is often ignored in conventional descriptions of 
managerial roles and activities.  However, reflecting on what at first sight may seem an 
exceptional set of experiences can offer some illuminating insights into the field of 
management in general. 
Throughout my adult life I have maintained a changing portfolio of engagements, paid or 
unpaid.  At the time of writing I am engaged in an arc of activities that included heading 
the development of a large real estate project in downtown Montreal, Quebec; chairing 
the board of directors of a Canadian charity that sends volunteers to work with partners 
overseas in local community and economic development projects; leading an urban 
redevelopment project steering committee; sitting on the board of directors of an 
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environmental non-governmental organization in Toronto, Ontario –the list could go on.  
Each of these activities is a full practical engagement in its own right, taken up in relation 
to others as one or more have ended, or just added to my portfolio opportunistically.  
There is thus a constantly changing breadth and diversity of activity ongoing, all 
contingent on me, the person acting socially. 
I often refer to this range of my involvements as my ‘active life’.  The discussion of the 
active life was notably taken up by Thomas Merton (Palmer 1990), who had set out to 
tame his compulsion for intensive action through recourse to spirituality.  Palmer himself 
(1990: 3) writes about his own active life as ‘citizen, parent, writer, teacher, 
administrator, community organizer’, taken altogether.  In a similar vein, the notion of a 
‘portfolio’ career has been introduced by Handy (2001) as part of the loosening of long-
term employment structures. 
Palmer calls attention to the role of spirituality in attaining a healthy, grounded active 
life.  Handy is concerned with new patterns of working lives.  My quest here is not 
spiritual, nor is it about altered structures of viable work; rather, as I believe my mode of 
active life is not acknowledged within mainstream views on practice, my quest is to 
arrive at a fuller, inclusive account of practice, reconfiguring management and 
organizational discourse by expanding the conception of practice to take into 
consideration one’s active life as lived.  In viewing the account of this quest, the reader 
may expect to see many disregarded aspects of managerial practitioners’ experiences 
come into view. 
Staying the course has not been without its challenges.  There were many stops along the 
way where it was tempting to digress and delve more deeply into themes related to the 
specific way I do things in my particular world of activity, as the groups of people with 
whom I am involved struggle to find their way forward in uncertain and often indefinable 
situations.  Some might say that inserting myself into such enterprises, and in a certain 
role, is what my ‘practice’ really is; and indeed a study of doing so might have been a 
valuable contribution.  But this would have meant focusing on forms of activity as 
practice – the very thing that caused me discomfort in the first place – while my 
contention is that this is an incomplete account of practice at best. 
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Bourdieu talks about doxa, ‘the sum total of all theses tacitly deposited on the hither side 
of all inquiry’ (1977:168), the universe of the undisputed and undiscussed, the thinkable 
versus the unthinkable, the universe of orthodoxy or dominant discourse; all that is taken 
for granted – the self-evident.  When there is a crisis of knowledge or the occurrence of 
an unexplainable incident, that which seems self-evident no longer is so:  inquiry then 
opens up, bringing the non-discussible into discussion, the unarguable into argument. 
In the context of the present inquiry, doxa is all that is not recognized as practice in what 
people do in their active lives. To take up this non-recognition is a crucial purpose of my 
study.   I have always refused to constrain my action in the world within singular career 
and organizational conceptions, resisting the hegemony of dominant organizational 
views, which try to reduce what one does to a name or a title.  With regard to practice, 
this reductive view of course raises issues of personal recognition and identity.  I have 
chosen not to focus on such issues, preferring instead to examine the subject of practice 
more broadly. 
The way practice is regarded and discussed most often refers to publicly observable 
behaviours, and takes for granted that these behaviours align themselves with pre-existing 
roles and organizational structures: ‘[V]oluntary human association always and 
everywhere implies interdependence ...and divided labour . . . To attain the common goal, 
or complete the common task, each actor necessarily performs a different portion of the 
common effort’ (Kemper 1972: 742).  In other words, practice in organizations is 
commonly regarded as taking place within a paradigm of explicit roles or functions in 
some kind of organizational or social setting, more often than not prescribed by the 
division of labour performed by individuals in the production of goods or services. 
It is not surprising that this way of perceiving the person in the organization came to 
dominate organizational thinking.  Elias (2000) suggests that within the civilising process 
of the Western world, regimes of power on the path toward statehood needed to be 
sustained by knowledgeable people acting in defined and coordinated roles, which 
became increasingly differentiated as the size and scope of these regimes grew.  Marx 
(Burkitt, 1991) held that centralization of the means of production produced ever-greater 
refinement in the division of labour required for production processes and that people 
were constrained to fit into the requisite categories.  For Foucault (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1983), the rise of social professional disciplines developed in response to the state’s 
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increased control and confinement of the bodies and bodily functions of the populace (for 
example, asylums, prisons, schools, clinics, prostitution), requiring ever more 
differentiated expertise in the techniques of confinement and control at the same time as 
supplying the research settings necessary to develop that expertise on the part of certain 
individuals. 
Once it is taken for granted that there must be a tidy fit between the way people function 
alone and together and how organizational structure, society and the economy work, 
scientific research avenues in that vein open up.  An interesting example attempted to 
develop means to predict which occupational groups an individual might enter, and 
‘analyzed the impact of various personality and taste factors (16 in number) on the 
occupational distribution (5 in number) of workers.  Those factors were found to have 
strong effects that were generally consistent with a well functioning labour market sorting 
individuals into those jobs that most closely satisfy their individual utility functions’ as 
captured by differences in personality and tastes (Filer, 1986: 423).  Earlier research 
quoted in Filer posits that people choose their role within the division of labour or labour 
market according to a cost-benefit calculation (explicit or intuitive) of greatest gain over 
the duration of their anticipated and presumably predictable working career. 
Numerous other accounts link work, practice and occupation, on one hand, and learning 
and the formation of identity and personality on the other.  Wenger (1998) describes 
practice as a process by which we experience the world and our engagement with it as 
something meaningful.  It is a process that can be defined as the pursuit of enterprise and 
attendant social relations, and is a process of constant learning.  Career theory, according 
to D. T. Hall, defines a person’s career as ‘the individually perceived sequence of 
attitudes and behaviours associated with work-related experiences and activities over the 
span of a person’s life’ (see Weick and Berlinger 1989: 313). 
At one extreme, we match men and jobs where ’the optimal career outcomes for both the 
individual and the organization can best be facilitated through the congruence between 
the individual’s characteristics and the demands, requirements, and rewards of the 
organizational environment’ (Betz et al. 1989: 26; see also the discussion of the ‘portfolio 
career’ in Handy 2001).  At the other extreme, ‘career improvization within the self-
designing organization’ (Weick and Berlinger 1989: 313) produces the ‘boundaryless’ 
career in the ‘boundaryless’ organization (Weick 2001: 205-223), where careers and 
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organizations are co-enacted in ‘a sort of recursive relationship between agency and 
structure’ (Burgi et al. 2005: 82). 
The preceding accounts of practice and careers are indicative of mainstream thinking. 
That they contain little or no account of the local intersubjective processes that actually 
occur between people acting in organizational settings is an omission of some 
importance.  
Overview of this dissertation 
The work presented in this dissertation took place over three years while I also 
maintained a full portfolio of activities and engagements.  It involved producing a series 
of four research and writing projects, interspersed with meetings of the entire cohort of 
students and faculty of the University of Hertfordshire D.Man. programme, and of a 
learning group (made up of three fellow students, a faculty supervisor, and myself).  
During these meetings we critiqued and debated the themes and ideas in each other’s 
work.  Each project took the form of a paper that included a reflective narrative of current 
organizational life experiences, identifying themes relevant to the research topic and 
conducting research in the relevant literature.  Once satisfactorily completed, the paper 
was added to a portfolio intended to comprise a dissertation, with the addition of a 
synopsis and concluding remarks. 
From one project to the next, inquiry opened up and directions took hold as themes arose 
and were dealt with in the research process.  My first project was a reflection on the 
influences leading to my current practice; it was then that my intention became to 
develop a more inclusive account of practice itself.  Accordingly, in the second project I 
took up the theme of practice more explicitly through a narrative account of several 
activities going on in my life at that time.  Reflection on these experiences showed that 
continual interaction with others was central to my own action, whatever the different 
settings and purposes at any given time.  Although this may seem rather obviously true of 
any managerial activity, the recognition prompted me to reconsider practice in terms of 
experiences of seeing, feeling and thinking in organizational settings.  Practice develops 
over time involving interactive processes of engagement in activity itself, and cannot be 
reduced to visible, public behaviours.  It follows that understanding the lived experience 
of such interactive processes in practical situations may shed new light on practice and 
the discourse of practice.  
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In the third project, my narrative concerned a group’s attempt to make good on the full 
potential of a perceived but as yet indefinable real estate development opportunity. My 
role in the process was as convenor, instigator and conductor.  Writing the narrative 
brought into view the presence of emotions in an interactive context that was not 
explicitly emotional.  I discovered that the issue for practice here was not the personal 
experience of emotion itself, but rather emotionality – the process of experiencing 
emotion (Denzin, 1984) as a constitutive aspect of interaction.  I sensed a strong link 
between emotionality and engaging meaningfully in action in the world, where 
emotionality may be examined for what it can reveal about the quality of engagement 
itself. 
I refer to the ebb and flow of emotionality, due to its relationship to engagement, as the 
liveliness of group process as experienced by the people involved in a shared 
undertaking. The emotionality that underlies the liveliness of engagement is necessary for 
groups grappling with uncertainty (large or small) to move forward.  But this same 
emotionality makes the process fragile, and vulnerable to conflict.  Not only is it difficult 
to achieve a fine balance within any group, but it also seems paradoxical that fragility 
should be necessary for robust forward movement or innovation.  Here a question arises 
regarding the role of the manager as the one who must often instigate, convene and 
conduct group processes dealing in uncertainty or novelty, which conversely can produce 
uncertainty and novelty where none is expected.  My active life places me in such 
situations, where I become a subject of interactional dynamics as embodied experience.  
When I participate in lively interaction, while seeking to ensure that it remains lively in 
order for movement to occur, I sense my own engagement and fragility. 
The fourth project produced the insight that my experiences of practice had in one way or 
another always to do with enacting a role or roles in coordinated, organized human 
activity.  Reflecting on the theory of role enactment in view of my lived experience 
allowed me to notice a problem in how role enactment is accounted for in the theory.  
Specifically, conventional role theory as presented by Sarbin and Allen (1968) is 
consistent with the concept of division of labour, in which prescribed roles are assigned 
in order to complete necessary tasks.  By contrast, reflection on experience in 
organizations and collaborative engagement instead shows that enactment entails 
complex emotional intersubjective processes.   
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Given this difference, I explored three distinctly different ways of thinking about the 
individual and the social, – and by analogy the role and the organization:  processes of 
communicative interaction (Stacey 2003); micro-sociology and chains of micro-
interaction rituals (Collins 2004); and the self as a structure in society (Wiley 1994).  
Stacey’s account in particular points to two apparently mutually exclusive ways of 
thinking about people in organizations: positivist and structuralist (spatial) versus 
emergent and self-organising (processual). 
Both these two seemingly opposed ways of thinking must be taken seriously, as both are 
present in thought, action and experience at every turn in organizations.  Yet the fact that 
they continue to co-exist suggests that they cannot, practically speaking, be mutually 
exclusive; rather they are co-present as part and parcel of life in organizations, creating a 
tension in role enactment.  Role enactment, then, is problematized as constraining 
practitioners to embody the meaning of this tension in moment-by-moment interaction. 
In the synopsis of this dissertation I seek more fully to understand role enactment as 
problematized by reflecting on the practice of managing, referencing the work of Henry 
Mintzberg as exemplifying the current state of mainstream management thinking.  I argue 
that Mintzberg’s account of management practice remains to be completed by a further 
account of the manager as an actor in settings of sophisticated cooperation.  Here, 
managing can be seen as engagement in the social act, and as such is inherently reflexive 
and paradoxical (Mead, 1934).  I conclude then that the paradox of ‘managing 
sophisticated cooperation’ is never definitively resolved but is actually lived in the social 
interaction of managing. 
I end the dissertation with a concluding reflection. 
Reading this dissertation 
The organization of this document reflects the way my thinking actually developed over 
the course of the research.  Each of the four projects has somewhat of a stand-alone 
character, though of course they are linked thematically. This presentation is the most 
transparent and straightforward way for me to present and defend what I regard as my 
particular contribution.  The order of the projects and the unembellished relation of each 
to the others are important for the reader to appreciate my final position. 
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The six sections that follow consist of a discussion of methodology, the four projects and 
finally a synopsis of my thinking.  Each section on a project concludes with a brief 
commentary on its relation to the other projects, and how I think it advances toward a 
final position.  While there is a strong temptation to use these commentaries to make 
sense of the project retrospectively (Weick, 2001) in the context of the overall thesis 
(which is apparent now but was not so when the project took place), I have tried to avoid 
rationalization and self-justification.   
The organization of this dissertation has a specific purpose.  With the benefit of this 
introduction as well as the description of the methodology to follow, noting the themes 
and arguments of each project helps in understanding the subsequent projects.  This 
approach is especially pertinent inasmuch as I do not represent this dissertation in the 
form of one unitary arc of argument.  Its organization reflects a position I hold deeply to 
the effect that my total contribution is to be found as much in the sum of all that is written 
here as in any one set of conclusions or synopsis. 
Finally, I should point out that the language of this dissertation is expressed in two 
voices.  One voice is analytical – the structured voice of inquiry and argument. The other 
is the voice of reflective narrative, which yields the themes that become the object of 
inquiry, reflecting thoughts or inner conversations as they occurred.  In these passages, 
the tone of the text is relatively informal, and personal anecdotes are used to illustrate 
points; at times the overall effect may be somewhat impressionistic. 
But the reader need not expect the two voices always to be radically distinct from each 
other.  All text, insofar as it is the writer’s interpretation of his or her own intentions, is 
rhetorical and requires interpretation by the reader.  The interpretive nature of text 
equally extends to the analytical parts of the dissertation, which are by their very nature 
argumentative, ‘open-palm thinking’ rather than ‘closed-fisted’ problem-solving 
scientific thinking (Billig 1991:39).  As argument, they form a developmental narrative of 
the thinking process wherein the dialectic of opinion and truth plays itself out so as to 
arrive at a credible truth claim.  Thus the analytic voice may not be radically different 
from the voice in the narratives, since analysis too is a narrative, albeit of a different kind. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
The thesis presented in this dissertation is an account of practice that was developed 
during my research programme as described above.  Its argument was formed by pulling 
together materials and a palette of insights and perspectives either already known to me 
or which became known as I explored different themes that also appeared during the 
course of the work.  As is most often the case with my practice, I did not proceed with a 
static vision of the end result in mind from the beginning.  My thesis developed through a 
reflexive dialectic process. 
The following description of the methodology employed in my research is organized in 
five parts: ontology, reflexivity as a methodological approach, ‘bricolage’ as method of 
inquiry, narrative writing instead of interrogation of data, and validity and 
generalisability of my thesis. 
Ontological position 
The emergent character of my thesis reflects a particular ontological position.  
Throughout the research the emphasis has been on organizations and our experiences in 
organizations as processes of human relating, where persons are looked upon as social 
beings through and through (Mead 1934; Elias 2001).  The individual and the social are 
considered to be socially constructed facets of the same communicative processes of 
interaction, where the dualism of ‘the individual’ and ‘the social’ is eliminated in favour 
of groups and individuals dialectically forming and being formed by each other (Elias 
2001; Dalal 1998; Burkitt 1991; Stacey et al. 2000).  Stacey and Griffin (2005) have 
termed such processes complex responsive processes of relating, comprising acts of 
communication, relations of power and the interplay of peoples’ choices arising in acts of 
evaluation.   
The regard for organizations and our experience in organizations as processes of human 
relating represents an ontological shift from the dominant view of organizations as 
autonomous ‘individuals’ acting within a positivist, systemic or structuralist conception 
of social reality.  Such a shift to what is a social constructionist ontological position is 
necessary, given my stated aim to achieve account more fully for the nature of practical 
experience in organizations than dominant accounts of practice actually do. The dominant 
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ontology is dualistic with regard to the social and the individual, taking the individual to 
be an autonomous agent acting upon the world of groupings of other autonomous agents 
on the basis of privately held frameworks of motives, intentions and values.  Maintaining 
the dualism of the individual and the social would necessarily require a reversion to the 
notion of practice as being the application of preset capabilities by individuals as 
preformed autonomous units interacting algorithmically within systems or structures – 
which is precisely what my work seeks to challenge. 
Reflexivity as a methodological approach 
The D.Man. is a professional degree.  The basis of research is one’s own practical 
experience.  In studying experience, two main approaches are possible.  One is to 
separate the knower from the object of study, putting the researcher in the position of an 
observer who relies on accounts or reports of experience, which then form the object of 
interpretation.  From this objective or outside position, one cannot know what the subject 
is experiencing, and the knowledge created is somewhat partial.  The other approach is to 
know experience from within (Shotter 1993), joining the knower with the object of study 
into one knowledge proposal.  In the case of my research, there is a direct correlation 
between myself as the knower – and the object of study – and an account of practice 
inclusive of my own. 
The methodological approach suited to connect subject and object is reflexive research 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000; Ellis and Bochner 2000; Schön 1991; Steier 1991).  
Reflexivity calls on researchers to position themselves within the process of reflection by 
thinking about how the research is acting back on them and how this in turn is affecting 
their research: ‘There is no one-way street between the researcher and the object of study; 
rather the two affect each other mutually and continually in the course of the research 
process’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 39).  
In reflexivity, not only are researchers conscious of their effect on the research process 
and its reflection upon them, but they are also self-aware, recognising their own presence 
in the themes and interactions that are the object of study, and incorporating that in the 
research.  Reflexivity thus requires paying attention to the processes of knowledge 
production, the contexts of those processes, and the involvement of the knowledge 
producer (Ibid.: 5 – 6).  Reflexivity is central to my method of inquiry. 
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‘Bricolage’ as a method of inquiry 
In the case of my research presented in this dissertation, the processes of knowledge 
production are my practice itself and my reflection on experiences of practice, while I am 
practicing.  It seems logical to me that my research programme would be yet another 
experience of practice.  In other words, I conduct research and create knowledge in very 
much in the same way as I engage in my everyday active life. 
I have described what I do as participating in and often managing fragile emergent 
coalitions: embarking on endeavours, of course with an agreed direction of travel, but 
with an uncertain outcome drawing on resources which I typically know already from 
experience, combining them in processes which are inherently emergent and interactive 
in nature, towards a goal which becomes defined in process of the very action the group 
is undertaking.  Moreover, I appropriate new and widely varied knowledge, practices and 
materials within each experience, and these too affect the direction and the outcome of 
the experience itself.  As the group proceeds, progress is evaluated explicitly or implicitly 
according to the situation.  As milestones are reached, often only recognizable as such 
once they are in view, each one in its turn adds to the result still emerging, which can 
only be recognized fully in hindsight at any given point.  Some call this way of going 
about getting things done ‘muddling through’, creating ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ (Vaill 
1991; Weick 1995), or ‘emergent strategies’ (Mintzberg et al. 1998); but I experience it 
as something altogether more complex and substantive. 
My work in this programme progressed as a series of successive engagements in the form 
of projects.  Within each project and from one project to the next, avenues of inquiry 
opened up in the course of the project, instigated by the writing of a narrative in some 
instances, and in others by exploring themes in the literature I was reading at that time.  I 
could not have considered these avenues until reading and putting ideas on paper in the 
first place, having them scrutinized by faculty and learning group colleagues, debating, 
reflecting, self-reflecting and re-reflecting continuously, and then trying out new or 
alternative ways of seeing and arguing.  The work became about developing elements 
which together would either constitute the account of practice I was seeking to create, or 
at least point to further avenues of inquiry. 
As I moved through each project cycle, writing narratives on current ordinary practical 
experience called up themes.  These themes led to conversations with colleagues and 
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professors as well as to selected readings that augmented other basic literature on 
interactive processes and systems theory. Reading entire works in depth to understand 
whole arguments made known to me similarities as well as differences among theorists 
writing on the same subjects or interpreting the same theorists, providing insights which 
later became useful because they were known. Writing about the more significant of 
these works within the dissertation then became an exercise in reflexive reading, in that 
the writing about whole arguments brought into view themes and linkages that led in new 
directions and which I may have glossed over otherwise. 
Once committed to my portfolio, each paper captures the intense, reflexive process of 
investigation and discovery, the identification and deliberate formulation of insights 
adding to, rounding out and possibly contradicting the account up to that point.  Each 
project adds to an edifice of knowledge emerging over time.  But this edifice does not 
have a fixed end state realising some utilitarian purpose; and there is a constant risk that it 
may become unstable with the addition of a new piece –  or end up serving no purpose 
whatsoever.  Finally, because each project reflects a process of research and discovery 
and is not a mere compilation  of findings, it may contain information, insights and other 
material that may become useful only later on, rather than within the particular project. 
I call this method of inquiry ‘bricolage’, a term I have adapted from Lévi-Strauss.  The 
‘bricoleur’ is one who puts to use instruments, materials and practices ‘not known as a 
result of their usefulness; they are deemed to be useful or interesting because they are 
first of all known’ (Lévi-Strauss 1967: 9). 
The ‘bricoleur’ is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but unlike 
the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw 
materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project.  His 
universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do 
with ‘whatever is at hand’, that is to say with a set of tools which is always finite 
and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current 
project. . . . The set of the ‘bricoleur’s’  means cannot therefore be defined in 
terms of a project. (Ibid.: 17–19). 
The bricoleur may be a problem-solving do-it-yourself make-doer, like Harper’s 
character Willie, who builds a sort-of operating tractor from left-over bits of metal, 
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lawnmower parts and other scrap lying around in his yard, most of which was never 
intended to be put to use mowing a lawn (Harper 1987).  Willie is capable of such an 
endeavour because he knows what a tractor is, has all the necessary knowledge of how 
one works, has a wide variety of tools and is quite handy.  Notice that Willie may not be 
trying to find a new way to mow a lawn, but is being very innovative and practical in his 
use of existing materials to create an object that will do the job.  Of course this does not 
preclude Willie from inventing or making discoveries along the way. 
Lévi-Strauss also points to a middle ground between the scientist and the bricoleur: that 
of the artist who is ‘both something of a scientist and a bricoleur’.  By his craftsmanship 
he constructs a material object which ‘is also an object of knowledge’ (Lévi-Strauss 
1967: 22).  For example, the artist as painter ‘is always mid-way between design and 
anecdote, and his genius consists of uniting internal and external knowledge, a ‘being’ 
and a ‘becoming’, in producing with his brush an object which does not exist as such and 
which he is nevertheless able to create on his canvas’ (Ibid.: 25).  The result – a painting, 
a sculpture, a song – once recognized by others, is an object of knowledge. 
Within the worldview of the bricoleur (and Levy-Strauss’s artist), experience has priority 
as a way of knowing.  The bricoleur knows because he or she acts and has acted.  Active 
life is pursued through the use of instruments, materials at hand and practices 
appropriated through experience, often in innovative and creative ways. As engagements 
occur and progress, more instruments, materials and practices are developed and 
appropriated, still without a specific project or utility in mind, but which can be later put 
to use in novel combinations and increasingly complex purposive situations. (On the 
creative use of social practices see also Bourdieu 1977.) 
Denzin and Lincoln point to another important characteristic of the bricoleur: an ability, 
when considering a problem, to shift between or combine several different perspectives 
without being intransigently tied to any one.  The theoretical bricoleur ‘reads widely and 
is knowledgeable about many different interpretive paradigms . . . that can be brought to 
any particular problem.  He or she may not, however, feel that paradigms can be mingled 
or synthesized.  That is one cannot easily move between paradigms as overarching 
philosophical systems denoting ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies.  They 
represent belief systems that attach users to particular worldviews.  Perspectives, in 
contrast, are less developed systems and one can more easily move between them.  The 
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researcher-as-bricoleur-theorist works between and within competing and overlapping 
perspectives and paradigms’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 6). 
Narrative writing instead of interrogation of data 
Given bricolage as a method of inquiry, what becomes of the interrogation of data as a 
component of the research process?  Reflexivity, as we have seen, shifts the very nature 
of data interrogation from the qualitative interpretation of texts or accounts of 
experiences looked upon objectively, in favour of a reflexive process of examining 
experience from within. 
Consider, for example, a research experiment conducted by Schön and Bamberger 
(1991).  The object of the experiment was to observe two subjects attempting, without 
speaking to each other, to create a tune with five bells, all visibly identical but each 
having a different sound.  During the experiment the researchers observed their subjects 
through a two-way mirror, noted their observations and then interpreted what they had 
seen in order to theorize as to the processes the subjects must have been following to 
achieve the observed results. In a reflexive approach, by contrast, the researchers 
themselves would have gotten on the other side of the mirror, as it were, and engaged in 
the activity themselves.  They could then have taken their own experience seriously 
(Stacey and Griffin, 2005), examining it for themes and insights relating to lived 
experience from which theories could then be developed and explored.  Such a reflexive 
approach offers a type of access to experience which in an objectivist, empirical 
paradigm of inquiry can only be attempted through interpretation of the researchers’ 
observations and perhaps accounts by the subjects themselves. 
Nonetheless, in order for a reflexive and experiential method to work in practice, 
experience must be brought into view and subjected to inquiry.  This entails the writing 
of reflexive narrative accounts of personal interactive experiences, wherein one’s self 
necessarily also appears and becomes an object of one’s own examination by the act of 
writing and reflecting on the account. 
A narrative is ‘a symbolic representation of a sequence of events connected by subject 
matter and related by time; any set of events that can be sequenced and related can be 
narrated’ (Weick 1995: 128 ).  Furthermore, narrative, in the words of Paul Ricoeur , is 
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more than ‘simply adding episodes to one another; it also constructs meaningful totalities 
out of scattered events’ (see Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000: 93).  
Weick (1995) suggests that we notice events or occasions because of their meaning to us 
in our memory of them.  Denzin, on the other hand, stresses the ‘epiphanies’ represented 
by problematic interactions, which ‘alter how persons define themselves and their 
relations with others.  In these moments, persons reveal personal character. . . . 
Epiphanies open up the world to interpretation’ (Denzin 1989: 14–17).  It is true that 
epiphanies and memorable, noticeable interactions have the benefit of making the 
dynamics of events more acutely visible and probably easier to articulate.  All this, 
however, is not a sufficient reason to write about an experience, unless that experience 
pertains to the usual course of practice and thus is relevant to the overall research 
endeavour.  Moreover, given bricolage as my method of inquiry, the experiences that 
should be accepted are those that lie ready to hand; they should not be sought after 
selectively, or experimentally contrived. 
In the research presented here, the narratives portray everyday interactive experiences, 
which are explicit and ordinary, and which yield up themes which then become objects of 
reflection in the course of research and writing. Reflection on the narratives and the 
identification of themes forming the object of research and argumentation signify that 
these narratives are not ‘raw data’ to be analysed or interpreted as would be the case in 
objectivist research methodologies.  Instead it is the very process of writing, as well as 
reflecting on the experiences involved and the narratives themselves, that points to 
themes and targets for further inquiry. 
The personal nature of these narratives caused me to notice, in the course of writing, that 
a fork in the research path presented itself on several occasions: one branch leading 
towards introspective self-analysis (why was some particular theme or another important 
to me?), the other leading to a reflection as to the meaning of such themes to my research 
topic.  I consistently chose the latter route. 
For example, in my third project, the theme that emerged from my reflection concerned 
the emotional reaction I experienced in one particular meeting.  This reaction may have 
been due to my sensing, in the moment, a lack of recognition of my role and contribution.  
From this insight, I could have explored the theme of recognition, potentially leading to 
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inquiry into questions of identity and survival. But the fact that such recognition is an 
important issue for me personally was not relevant to my developing an alternative 
account of practice in organizations.  Instead, I was drawn to explore the role of 
emotionality in maintaining engagement in group interaction as fundamental to practice. 
My method thus distinguishes between reflexivity and self-analysis. 
Finally, the content of any narrative or story necessarily recounts what we notice 
retrospectively within a period of time intentionally bracketed out of a flow of experience 
without beginning or end (Weick 1995).   There is therefore a danger of resorting to 
sensemaking, by choosing theories and themes for purposes of self-justification or 
rationalization of past experience (Weick 2001).  Is my doctoral work about 
sensemaking, retrospective self-justification or rationalization?  I would argue that it is 
not.  First, I believe I avoided a sensemaking pitfall by choosing not to be self-analytical.  
Second, the reflexive nature of the examination of chosen experience is intended to 
identify themes which form the object of further research and reflection, looking forward 
(not backward) towards developing an argument in defence of a position to be recognized 
as generalisable knowledge.  It may also make sense retrospectively, but sensemaking is 
not its purpose. 
Validity and generalisability 
Having pointed to reflexivity as my methodological approach, described and named my 
method of inquiry as bricolage, and explained the use of reflexive narratives, what sort of 
account of practice do I then expect to produce? My account is not a unitary arc of 
argumentation attempting to prove a theory; rather it is the outcome of a process of 
bricolage: a solid-enough edifice, apt to receive future additions.  The value and success 
of the outcome can only be evaluated after the fact.  A less-than-positive outcome is 
certainly a possibility, though this need not disqualify the work done, as long as there is 
due reflection on the reasons for such an outcome.  Not all research is guaranteed 
successful results, especially when ‘there are no self-evident, simple or unambiguous 
rules or procedures, and that crucial ingredients are...judgement, intuition, ability to “see 
and point something out”’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 248). Evidently, then, 
evaluation and judgment have a place within my research process.   It remains finally to 
ask: how does the qualitative and reflexive nature of my research methodology, which 
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eliminates the objectivity of subject-object dualism, warrant validity and generalisability 
of the research? 
Ellis and Bochner (2000) deal with questions of validity and generalisability.  In 
reference to her own practice of autoethnography, defined as the reflexive study of one’s 
own group or culture (Denzin 1989; italics are mine), and particularly the use of personal 
narratives, Ellis writes: 
It depends on your definition of validity. I start from the position that language is 
not transparent and there’s no single standard of truth.  To me validity means that 
our work seeks verisimilitude . . . it evokes in readers a feeling that experience 
described is lifelike, believable, and possible. (Ellis and Bochner 2000: 751)  
Any attempt to produce a demonstrably true representation of a reality is unachievable 
within the paradigm of reality as constructed, and the lack of such correspondence does 
not invalidate the research.  Accordingly, because it is my own experience that 
constitutes the empirical basis of my research, validity would be warranted if am really 
doing what I say I am doing in my active and interactive life with others, and if there is 
verisimilitude in my narratives – what Lather (1993) calls ‘a world we already seem to 
know’.  A further warrant of validity is achieved through the conversational encounters 
which take place in learning group meetings and with faculty, where it may be argued we 
achieve a high degree of what Alvesson and Sköldberg, citing Habermas, refer to as 
‘communicative rationality’: 
Communicative rationality . . . denotes a way of responding to (questioning, 
testing in conversation, and possibly accepting) the validity claims of various 
statements.  A high level of communicative rationality thus signifies that 
perceptions are being based upon statements which are intelligible, that the 
statements reflect honesty and sincerity, that the statements are true or correct and 
that they accord with the prevailing norms. (Anderson and Sköldberg 2000: 118-
119) 
Habermas (1984) also maintains that validity of a truth claim obtains according to 
rationally motivated agreement, which flows from clear, rational argument, over 
competitive validity claims, recognized among the participants as being criticisable.  In 
other words, here we have people of a particular hermeneutic community (in this case 
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management thinkers) who share a definition of a situation and who (given what we think 
we know)  pursue a manner of argumentation that entails the push-and-pull of sometimes 
competing criticisable knowledge claims.  Validity of the truth or knowledge claim then 
obtains upon the reaching of an agreement that it does so. 
Through the doctoral programme of study, class members and faculty spent much of our 
time together examining the argumentability and criticisability of the respective validity 
claims we were making. We were engaged continually with each other in processes of 
interaction and exchange, requiring agreement on a shared definition of our situation as 
co-participants in the programme and in our smaller learning group regarding each 
others’ work.  Like Habermas (1984), I believe that these lived processes within the 
doctoral programme add support to a valid claim to be making a contribution to 
knowledge. 
Finally, there is the question of generalisability.  There seem to be two orders of 
generalisability.  The first is the generalisability of one’s personal account of experience, 
and this is covered by Ellis: 
Our lives are particular, but they are also typical and generalisable, since we all 
participate in a limited number of cultures and institutions.  We want to convey 
both in our stories.  A story’s generalizability is constantly being tested by readers 
as they determine if it speaks to their experience or about the lives of others they 
know. (Ellis and Bochner 2000: 751) 
The second order of generalisability refers to the research results themselves, and is to be 
found in the very form the research takes.  Alvesson and Sköldberg posit three aspects of 
research dealing with the form of research: creativity, links to other research, and 
presentation and argumentation.  In their view, creativity is triggered by the fusion of 
seemingly disparate phenomena joined together into one knowledge proposal.   By being 
acquainted with material from several essentially different fields, and by undertaking 
‘many pronged readings of existing research, which would include not only criticism but 
also attempts at finding new and fruitful facets’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 252), 
research taps into the ‘social fund of knowledge’ (Elias 1987b).  The need to engage in 
empirical studies in order to make an interesting contribution to knowledge is thus 
obviated.  From there on, if the presentation and argumentation avoid the pitfalls of pure 
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rhetoric and solipsism, and are conversationally vetted as suggested by Habermas’s 
(1984) theory of argumentation, then it would be safe to say that generalisability would 
obtain. I believe that my research meets these requirements. 
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PROJECT ONE: 
A REFLECTIVE NARRATIVE ON PRACTICE 
 
 The little girl had the making of a poet in her who,  
being told to be sure of her meaning before she spoke, said: 
‘How can I know what I think until I see what I say?’ 
– Graham Wallas  
Introduction 
This paper, as the first of four sequential projects forming the body of my dissertation, 
was intended to begin reflection on themes that were to become the object of inquiry in 
subsequent reading, large and small group discussions, and projects. For me it 
represented a beginning of consciousness regarding the significance of the reflexive 
nature of the programme.  At the beginning of the paper, there is an early reflection on 
the use of narrative writing in the context of the D.Man. program, which has also been 
discussed in the preceding section on methodology. 
Understanding the starting point  
In writing this paper, I feel I have embarked on an exercise in emergent self-awareness. I 
am reminded of the little girl quoted in the epigraph, except that for me it would say: 
‘How can I know what I think until I see what I write?’ 
In the course instructions, the problem statement for this first project of the D.Man. 
programme read as follows: 
[Write a] reflective narrative weaving together the influences and experiences 
that inform your current practice in organizations. 
This should show how the questions that are beginning to shape your enquiry 
have emerged in your life and work and how you are beginning to think about and 
illustrate these in light of your experience in the programme. 
As in most problem statements, this one required some unpacking before pushing ahead 
with text that would risk rambling on in search of a productive course. The unpacking 
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exercise was useful. It singled out some key concepts that were embedded in the 
statement of the problem and needed some consideration before commencing writing.  
First of all, this paper is to be reflective. In research, the terms ‘reflective’ and ‘reflexive’ 
are often used more or less synonymously, with ‘reflexive’ connoting a particular, 
specified instance of reflection (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2000: 5–6). For the purposes of 
my work, ‘reflective’ may denote showing ourselves to ourselves, and ‘reflexive’ may 
denote our being conscious of ourselves as we are seeing ourselves (Steier 1991). This 
paper sets out to do both. 
Second, it is to be a narrative: ‘a symbolic representation of a sequence of events 
connected by subject matter and related by time; any set of events that can be sequenced 
and related can be narrated (Weick 1995: 128). A narrative consists of more than simply 
adding episodes to one another; it also constructs meaningful totalities out of scattered 
events, as a sequence of episodes and a significant configuration of these episodes 
(Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000:93). 
As a ‘reflective narrative’ therefore, this paper sets out to be a personal account of 
experiences arranged in a meaningful configuration, in which I take account of my action 
and interaction with others, while remaining conscious of my thinking in the writing of 
the account. 
Third, it engages the notion of practice in organizations. For me, this notion proved to be 
provocative, because I am unable to say just what my own practice is. While I can 
describe factually what it is that I do on any given day, it is not clear how this constitutes 
my practice. Wenger (1998) describes practice as a process by which we experience the 
world and our engagement with it as something meaningful.  For Wenger, practice is a 
process that can be defined as the pursuit of enterprise and attendant social relations, and 
is a process of constant learning. This description is helpful to some degree, but I sense 
that I will have to discover first hand just what practice actually means to me. So this 
paper is necessarily one of discovery – of making some sense of what I do in terms of 
practice.  By ‘discovery’ I mean the detection of how my practice has been constructed 
over my working life and of what specifically does it consist. 
A talk given by faculty member Professor Patricia Shaw during the first residential 
module of the programme, opened up a plausible approach to writing this paper. In her 
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talk, Shaw demonstrated the use of narrative to explain to people what she actually does 
as an organizational consultant. Insisting on how typically the use of shorthand references 
to professions, roles or titles are reductive to the meaning of her practice, she maintained 
that she can only convey effectively what she actually does by telling stories – putting it 
into a narrative as it were. Listening to Shaw’s account of this approach in action, I found 
an insight I needed to get started;  reading her book, Changing Conversations in 
Organizations ( 2002), I was able to see more fully how she uses narrative as a 
methodology to advance her thesis that change in organizations occurs within day-to-day 
conversations.  My approach to doing this project therefore has been to recount life 
experiences in narrative form, and in the process spot cues as to what I should investigate 
further. 
A narrative approach of course presents some difficulties. Every lived experience 
necessarily entails an ongoing history; yet only rarely can such a history be framed with a 
‘beginning’ and an ‘end’. Typically, each experience arises, occurs and carries forward in 
the flow of life at the time. Nor is a given experience ‘about’ just one thing; all strands of 
my life are present in every experience at every moment. When we consider our 
experience in private, these difficulties do not appear to be great and our thought seems to 
flow easily. It is the writing about experience which proves to be challenging, because 
our account must always be drastically simplified in order to be comprehensible and be 
taken seriously by others. 
In order to construct the following account, therefore, I did much as Weick (1995) 
describes in his account of the process of making sense. I ‘noticed’ experiences because 
of emotions that they aroused at the time they occurred and still do in the thinking of 
them. As Weick suggests, it became clear as I proceeded that such experiences must be 
singled out of a continuum of life composed of overlapping and intermingling 
experiences, which do not have a beginning or an end but must be framed as if they did in 
order for us to understand and discuss them in everyday language. There was therefore a 
risk that my account would be reduced to simplistic forms of linear occurrence, losing 
much of the true complexity of lived experience in the process. The only way to deal with 
this was to reflect on my account as it was developing and at the end of it. 
The following narrative contains a number of stories of experiences from my life and 
work, which together I will often refer to as my ‘active life’.  In writing it, as I singled out 
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noticeable experiences chronologically, I imagined them fitting into a story pattern: a 
call, struggles, transformation and return. This seems to be a particularly useful way to 
view certain types of experiences as well as to present the information in some 
comprehensible form, because it takes ‘a sequence of episodes’ and places them in a 
‘significant configuration’. It goes beyond ‘adding episodes to one another; it also 
constructs a meaningful totality out of scattered events’ in the form of an account of life 
(Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000:93). The resulting totality can then be explored for its 
own meanings, and inasmuch as it reflects my practice, will allow me to make some 
sense of it. Therefore I have chosen to organize my account in this way. 
The call to practice 
I have been trained as a professional architect. This in itself explains little, since I had 
chosen architecture in the beginning solely as an interesting field to study if I was going 
to go to university at all. In fact, I only practiced architecture as such for a few years after 
graduation, before moving, in my late twenties, into the broader field of real estate work. 
When the move into real estate actually took place, I was very involved with the 
Montreal downtown Sports and Community Centre. I was active as a volunteer physical 
education instructor, and I also did some committee work. As a result of my involvement, 
I was invited to sit on a committee to oversee the renovation of the physical education 
facilities of the branch. Also on this committee was a person whom I shall call ‘Mark’, 
who was about ten years older than I was (I was then in my late twenties). Mark had 
founded his own real-estate company (specializing in office leasing), and was making his 
mark as a leader in the Montreal business community. 
One morning after a committee meeting, Mark gave me a lift to my office. On the way, in 
the course of our conversation I mentioned to him that I was unhappy with my current 
situation at work. Mark immediately said: ‘Look, I have all kinds of corporate property 
owners asking me what they should do with their properties. I often don’t know how to 
respond, so I could certainly use some help. Why don’t you come over and work with 
me?’ An hour and a half later, I had left architecture and was in the business of real estate 
consulting. 
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As it turned out, this was a true beginning. In retrospect, I can see a clear line of 
demarcation between the work I had been doing before and what I would be doing from 
that point onwards. Suddenly, a new notion of practice took root. 
But what made me jump as I did? In hindsight it all appears a little rash. Although I was 
discontented in my work as an architect, there were many other options yet to explore 
within the world of architecture and there was nothing in the moment to provoke me 
other than Mark’s invitation. Yet I do not remember spending more than a passing 
moment in deep reflection.  It would be easy now to rationalize: more money (but not 
that much more); greater responsibility (but not really that, either); why be a mediocre 
architect when I could be an excellent ‘something else’ (but what)? I know now that at 
that moment I was searching for a new path. I needed a call, and even though what I felt 
called to move towards was ill-defined, there was enough substance in Mark’s invitation 
and in my situation at the time to move me to act. 
The struggles of practice 
My experience with Mark provided me with my first exposure to the Montreal real estate 
field: its practices, actors, processes and drivers. Modern real estate, like many other 
fields, demands technical specializations which may become life-long careers for its 
practitioners, as loans officers, brokers, asset managers or project managers. For my part, 
I chose not to become involved in any particular specialization, however financially 
tempting it may have appeared, and headed down a different path. Just what this path is 
resists simple description; it is a path of many different facets and pursuits intermingled 
over time. Not a profession per se, nor a position or positions held, not even a 
circumscribed role inhabited over the long term, this path emerged from many different 
struggles, constantly searching for and being open to opportunities for new challenges in 
a variety of areas at the same time – all leading towards a living practice, or active life as 
I term it.  
The following stories of lived experience of struggle demonstrate the diversity and 
breadth of this active life and expose the nature of my action in some detail. The 
experiences I have chosen to write about reflect three strands or areas of recurrent action: 
urban development, advocacy and governance. In the living of each experience, all three 
strands were likely present at the same time, in forms and in complex relations one with 
the other that are not easily discernable. If these stories appear somewhat anecdotal, that 
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is due to my intent to include enough ‘thick description’ (Denzin, 1989) for this 
complexity to become visible to me as I write and to be sensible to the reader. Writing 
this sort of ‘thick description’, in fact, was a reflexive experience in itself. 
In 1986, just after I had run for election as a city councillor
Action in urban development 
1
But there was vociferous opposition from the church’s neighbours, who considered the 
project too big for their liking. In the face of this controversy, the City declined our 
request. We were stopped dead in our tracks, and there was nothing else to be done. The 
church property could not be sold because the downtown real estate market had gone 
 and was working as an 
independent real estate consultant, a historic church in downtown Montreal burned to the 
ground, killing two firemen in the process. This church was unique in Montreal society: 
an architectural jewel in what we call the ‘Golden Square Mile’ of manor homes, a 
welcome centre for political refugees and Viet Nam War draft dodgers in the ‘70s, and 
the home of a socially progressive congregation. The Members of the congregation, 
deeply shocked at the loss of lives and of their spiritual and cultural home, immediately 
undertook to rebuild the church. At that time, the chair of the congregation – I shall call 
her ‘Nancy’ – was referred to me by a close friend whose services she had wanted to 
retain. Nancy invited me to meet the reconstruction committee (of which Nancy was also 
the chair) to see if I might be able to help them. After some discussion with her and her 
colleagues from the congregation, we decided to work together. 
It was clear from the outset that the choices before the congregation were limited. There 
was not enough money to rebuild a new stand-alone church; the congregation would have 
to move elsewhere, or find some other solution to rebuild on the site. Since moving was 
seen as a last resort, redevelopment proposals were invited over the following months 
from local developers to build a development project on the site (condominium 
apartments, office space), with meeting spaces and offices for the congregation within the 
same complex. A tentative agreement was reached with a developer, and a request for 
approvals was sent into the City. It looked at that point as though we were on a clear path 
to success. 
                                                 
1I ran as a candidate in the downtown riding where I live. It was an exciting campaign, but in the end I lost 
to the incumbent by a very narrow margin. 
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‘soft’; so all the congregation could do was bide its time, keep an eye open for 
opportunities for sale or redevelopment, and continue meeting in the vestiges of the 
original building that were still serviceable – however makeshift that actually was. 
At around the time when these events occurred, I had taken an interesting and well-
paying job with a national railway to manage development of its excess land holdings, 
and I was no longer in the business of independent real estate consulting.  But my 
professional relationship with Nancy, the congregation‘s minister ‘Reverend Ray’ and the 
members of the committee had by that point developed into friendship. Over the next six 
years, I continued to participate in committee meetings as a friend of the congregation, 
voluntary redevelopment advisor and as an unofficial member of their committee. During 
that time, we looked at different ideas, alternatives and proposals that showed up, shared 
our thoughts about how a new church might function and waited. 
Then a chance to construct a future for the church appeared out of nowhere. A foreign 
buyer arrived on the scene, offering a ridiculously low price to purchase the ruined 
church property outright for cash. At first, his proposal seemed too low to even consider; 
Nancy said that the committee was of a mind to reject it outright. 
I thought about that and asked her: ‘Are you in the church business or the real estate 
business? If what you want to do is capitalize on the full value of your real estate asset, 
then you’ll have to wait a lot longer to get the price you want. In the meantime, carrying 
on in this temporary situation is wearing down the congregation, and you might be in 
danger of losing your church in order to keep your asset. On the other hand, if all you 
want out of this asset is enough money to be able to relocate your church into an 
acceptable location, maybe there is something that can be done with the amount of 
money he is offering. Don’t we owe it to ourselves to take a hard look?’ 
Nancy was nervous. ‘This wasn’t the plan,’ she said. ‘What if it doesn’t work? Don’t we 
have to wait until we get our price, and then build a project, with no risk? The church 
can’t sustain any risk.’ Reverend Ray saw it differently: ‘What if there never is an ideal 
solution? There is no such thing as no risk. Does that mean the church will never do 
anything? What does that say about the future of this congregation? I think,’ he said, ‘that 
we must look closely at just what we can put together and see if it can work.’  After 
further discussion, we agreed that we could build a basic, simple church structure in a 
 28 
good location with the amount of the offer combined with the congregation’s other assets 
remaining from the fire insurance settlement. But the money for interior finishings, 
furniture, and landscaping would have to come from somewhere else. The committee 
came up with the idea to supplement the budget with a little fundraising effort within the 
congregation. We talked to the congregation about this, and they decided that it was 
worth the risk. 
Of course we could not accept the buyer’s offer without making a counter-offer. On the 
appointed day, we told him that the cost of rebuilding so as to meet the church’s needs 
exceeded his offer by a half a million dollars. We told him how much we thought the 
property was really worth, and asked him to improve his offer. Without batting an eye, he 
promptly got up and walked out of the room in a dramatic refusal. His local partner ran 
after him, and after some visibly lively discussion between them they came back into the 
room. The local partner topped up their offer by a token amount. We caucused, decided 
that after all it was now or never, and accepted the offer. 
By this time I was once again without a formal job, but up to then, I had still been acting 
on a volunteer basis. When the question came up as to how the church was actually to 
manage the project through to completion, the role was offered to me with remuneration, 
and I accepted. From there on, the process became one of ‘making it work’, and everyone 
pitched in always most constructively – the committee, the congregation Board and the 
various consultants. The project was completed on time, at about one per cent below 
budget, and the new building was quite beautiful in spite of the limited resources 
available to build it. And so, one Saturday morning, ten years after the tragic fire, I joined 
the congregation members and their families, friends and supporters, as we marched 
joyously from the ruins of the beloved old church to the soon-to-be-beloved new one, 
where we held an inaugural ceremony including a tearful commemoration of the two 
firemen who had died trying to save the building. 
For me, my involvement in this project with these people was not merely a job or 
contract that was now coming to an end. It was a passage marked by achievement, mutual 
memorable growth and friendship. In fact, in the years that followed Reverend Ray 
officiated at the naming of two of my children, and I was invited to attend and speak at 
Nancy’s wedding. 
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This ten-year episode, in all its complexity, engaged me personally, intellectually and 
socially. It was a continuously fruitful application of whatever technical skills I had 
mastered by that time in my life. It was a socially worthy endeavour. Although it took 
place over a long period of time, my sense of involvement and commitment grew in spite 
of interruptions and changes in leadership (Ray retired, Nancy was no longer chair, and 
she got married, I had two more children and changed job). It created lasting friendships. 
And I could go on. 
If I reflect on this episode in light of the call I described earlier, I can see that there is a 
larger meaning, which took root at the moment when we made the decision to go ahead 
with the project. There had certainly been alternatives to this decision: hold out for a 
better offer for the property; wait until circumstances combined so as to produce an ideal 
solution – or simply procrastinate. But the ability we shared at that moment, as the main 
actors in the story, to perceive the situation in the same light, made it possible to act. 
When the choice was made explicit – real estate or church? – it must have had meaning 
in our shared reality at that point: our journey together thus far, our present lived situation 
and our anticipated future. Thus it became possible to envisage a course of action towards 
a solution that everyone would share responsibility for and champion to the end. 
Through various connections, I was invited to join the group, which I accepted to do. By 
this time it had already been decided that the preferred approach was to found an 
organization in the form of a non-profit association dedicated to representing the interests 
of the industry in public policy debates. This organization, which I shall call ‘the 
Action in advocacy 
Another strand in my experience is a long-term involvement in representation, or 
advocacy as some would call it. The following is an example. 
In 1986, a new municipal administration in Montreal had made it clear that it was going 
to change the way urban planning was to be done in the city. Faced with the uncertainty 
such a change represented, several important players in the non-residential real property 
industry (owners and developers of shopping centres, office buildings and industrial 
parks), who were all fierce competitors among themselves, decided to organize in order 
to have influence on the upcoming legislative process. Among them were several people I 
knew from my past activities in real estate. 
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Association’, was officially launched in 1987. As one of its founders, I sat on its 
executive committee and served as one of four vice-presidents. 
The first action of the Association was to engage in the public debate over the new 
Official Plan for downtown Montreal. As a volunteer (my work at the time was 
developing property for a railway company) I took charge of preparing the brief that the 
Association would submit during the public consultations to be held on a draft of the plan 
prior to its adoption by the municipality. It was an exciting time. Our brief was 
recognized widely as being thoughtful, constructive and responsibly written, and it 
ultimately had a dramatic impact on the final form of the plan. 
With the benefit of this strong start, the Association grew both financially and in 
influence. We were often consulted by government in the drafting of policy, we were 
present in the news media and we continued to participate very actively in important 
public debates. 
One such debate concerned a bill introduced by the Government of Quebec, allowing 
municipalities to levy a surtax on non-residential properties as a new source of revenue to 
finance public transportation. The targets of this new measure would be none other than 
the members of the Association themselves. Given my experience with the Official Plan, 
I was once again asked to lead our representations against some of the more punitive 
provisions in the law. We presented our position before a committee of the Quebec 
National Assembly. We made a small gain in the process, though the major irritants 
remained in the end. 
However, issues of this sort never really just go away. Our members were intent on 
having the law improved, and so we continued our representations in earnest. As time 
wore on, we came to realize that quick policy victories do not happen in a democracy. 
We had to toil away persistently over long periods of time, amongst a broad range of 
stakeholders, winning and losing little battles through several different government 
mandates and economic cycles. Along the way, I was able to develop strong working 
relationships with senior elected and staff officials in municipal and provincial 
governments.  Ultimately I ended up serving as the Association’s elected president and 
chair of the board for four years until I left the organization in 1995 at the end of my 
mandate. 
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One year later, after the departure of the Association’s previous executive director, at a 
time when I was working at a real-estate industry job that was not likely to last much 
longer, I was asked by my former board colleagues to take over the Association as its 
first paid full-time president and chief executive officer. While the move from volunteer 
leader to paid staff member reporting to my former colleagues within the same 
organization seemed potentially problematical, I felt that it was feasible, given my 
knowledge of the issues and the of functioning of the organization. Then a troubling 
question dawned on me. Here I was now, fighting for the real estate industry as a hired 
hand; would I now lose the legitimacy I had possessed as a volunteer leader and 
practicing property developer speaking on behalf of his own industry? What had I 
become? A lobbyist?  And if the industry now had a paid spokesperson instead of relying 
on the voices of its volunteer leaders, would its credibility be diminished? 
I suppose it could have been; but I do not think it turned out that way. 
For instance, the battle over the municipal surtaxes continued throughout my tenure as 
CEO. But it took a giant step towards a resolution when I was able to convince my board 
of directors and committees to accept the burdensome levels of taxation as a negotiating 
position in order to obtain fairer rules of taxation, which I believed would go a long way 
to solving their problems. A proposal to this effect was put forward during a broad public 
review of municipal financing. This proposal gained considerable support, and parts of it 
were written into the law. This was a real achievement for the Association. It positioned 
us more solidly than ever as a worthy contributor to open public debate. It also 
demonstrated the considerable capacity we had developed over the years to reflect 
together, make difficult decisions and then coalesce and act on specific constructive 
proposals. 
As a way of thinking and acting, I realize now that coming to be able to reflect together 
then act together was in fact the co-construction of the discourse of the organization 
among the participants. The result was concrete, effective commitment to joint action 
among ferocious competitors who were not normally inclined to agree on any given 
issue. There was also a transformative effect: as people continued to participate, they 
came to value the discourse themselves, and this became shared among the membership 
who continued to support the Association and its actions. 
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As the Association’s de facto lead thinker at the outset, and then as its CEO, my role was 
central to this movement. In moving from the first role to the second, my voice did not 
diminish as I had feared. I did not have to change my voice to that of a shrill, combative 
firebrand for the interests of my employer. It remained the same voice, just coming from 
a different position; paid chief executive versus volunteer leader. It reflected the same 
values, knowledge and leadership interests that characterized me all along; but I had 
managed unconsciously to adapt these to my new role and adapt the role, and indeed the 
entire organization, to my perspective. I take solace in this realization. I seems significant 
to my action in the world more generally. 
This level of involvement continued until 1985, and led to participating in organizational 
strategic planning exercises, chairing organization-wide committees, participating in 
national and international conferences and interacting with a broad section of the 
Action in governance 
A third and final strand of experience and influence began very long ago with the 
intention to become fit after eight years of a particularly sedentary university education in 
architecture, and continued through a long series of leadership roles in non-profit 
organizations. 
After university, I decided to get into shape and so I joined the ‘Sports and Community 
Centre’ mentioned above, which is the downtown branch of a city-wide sports and 
community organization. My physical conditioning consisted mostly of participating in 
fitness classes given by volunteer instructors. After participating long enough and often 
enough to be in good condition, I was asked to lead a few classes myself. I had already 
been interested in doing so, and said I would. Thus began a deep involvement with the 
organization city-wide. 
As a volunteer instructor, I was invited to sit on advisory committees overseeing the 
functioning of the physical education department. I quite enjoyed this activity; I suppose 
because I felt useful to the organization, was able to participate in decision making and 
had opportunities to cultivate a broad range of social contacts. It was not long before I 
was asked to chair this committee and to sit on the downtown branch’s board of directors. 
When that led to chairing the branch’s Board, I became automatically a member of the 
city-wide corporate board and sat on its executive committee. 
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Montreal social and political community. Above all, I found myself cast into leadership 
roles and duties that I could not otherwise experience in my working life, and about 
which I quickly became passionate. 
Over time I became so deeply involved in the organization that I found it was competing 
with my job for my attention. I was to be found everywhere, always made myself 
available and got involved wherever and whenever I could. I began wanting to work for 
the organization. Then it got to be too much; the corporate leadership felt that I was 
interfering far too much. Ultimately a crisis erupted between me and the organization’s 
leadership on the issue that my influence on staff and volunteers alike was becoming 
quite negative. This crisis led to my complete separation from the organization itself, 
which interrupted my physical conditioning activities and left a large void in my life. I 
felt disengaged – out on the street, lonely, and quite worthless. 
This particular outcome raises a question: what is it about this type of activity that creates 
such involvement; that is so captivating that even though one is only a volunteer, one gets 
in deeper and deeper, one cannot let it go? How is it that we accept the same degree of 
stress (if not more) in these volunteer roles than we normally tolerate in our personal and 
working lives? 
Here is another example of such a stressful volunteer experience. 
Trying to come back from my painful separation from Sports and Community Centre, I 
decided that it would be interesting to try electoral politics in the imminent city-wide 
election. As my choice for campaign manager, I recruited a community development 
worker whom I had known during my time at the Centre, but who was now the Quebec 
regional director for an international children’s organization.2
                                                 
2 This is an international cooperation and development nongovernmental organization working in ten 
countries within an international alliance of ten similar organizations. 
 Once the campaign was 
behind us, she told me that her organization had kept a position open on its national board 
of directors for a member from Quebec, and that she thought that I would be an ideal 
candidate. My name was put forward, and I was elected to the board in the fall of 1987. I 
served on the board for eight years, including two as national chairperson of the 
organization. 
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While I was vice-chair of the board, we decided to terminate the national executive 
director and search for a stronger leader. I led the search and recruitment process as we 
scoured the country for a new executive director with the high abilities and competencies 
we needed. After what seemed like a thorough process, complete with committee 
structures, search consultants and national advertising, we found a remarkable candidate 
whom we presented to the board and staff as our next great leader. I shall call her 
‘Doreen’. (I should add that while the recruitment process was still under way, I became 
national chairperson.) 
Four months later – I remember the day clearly: it was exactly 120 days after Doreen 
took up her post – I was calmly working in my office in Montreal when a call came in 
from the marketing director, who reported directly to Doreen. He was calling to say that 
he and his colleagues were convinced Doreen had to go: there was no fit possible. 
Crestfallen, I headed to Toronto to take stock the situation. 
When I arrived, the mood in the office was more than grim. I met with Doreen and with 
every staff member individually, to get a feel for the situation first hand. The staff 
complained openly to me about Doreen’s tyrannical management style and her inability 
to listen to any feedback they tried to give her. They also suggested that she was making 
bad decisions. I presented this information to Doreen, who professed to understand how 
the staff could feel this way and promised to try to improve. I then facilitated an 
encounter between the staff and Doreen, and obtained everyone’s agreement that they 
would try to work together. I returned to Montreal at the end of the day, hopeful that the 
problem would now resolve itself. 
My hope lasted for about as long as it took me to get back home. The next thing I knew, 
we had a full-blown staff revolt on our hands. When the board got word of it at its next 
meeting, they mandated me to settle the problem once and for all. This time, when I came 
back to the Toronto office, I obtained the agreement of all parties to engage the help of an 
organizational psychologist, who would conduct a full review of the organization, with 
everyone’s full cooperation. The results of this review were not favourable to Doreen; to 
put it simply, she was not suitable for her job after all. At the very moment that the results 
of the review were being shared with the staff and Doreen, the board members and I were 
in a telephone conference deciding to terminate her contract immediately. That was on a 
Friday afternoon. When I visited the organization’s office the following Monday morning 
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to brief the staff about Doreen’s dismissal, there was relief bordering on jubilation all 
around. 
It took five to six months from the first sign of trouble to that final denouement. It was an 
extremely exhausting and emotionally draining time for the staff, the board and myself. 
The trust level between staff and board and between staff and me (I had been seen as 
Doreen’s defender) was now at an all-time, critical low. 
I did not let the matter rest, however. I believed deeply that this experience could not be 
swept aside as if it had never happened just because Doreen was now gone. Some 
positive change, if not a transformation in the organization, must come out of it. After 
considerable reflection among all of us, it was finally agreed that the board and staff 
together would undertake a collaborative, inclusive and comprehensive review of the 
functioning of the organization in general and the board-staff relationship in particular. 
Through this process, trust was rebuilt over the following year, so that when a new 
Executive Director was recruited through a vast, comprehensive and inclusive process, 
the choice was unanimous amongst all the stakeholders. That appointment worked out 
quite well. 
While experiences such as this one are notable in their own right because of their 
passions, intrigue and stresses, they are difficult to live through; they produce no material 
gain, and yet carry significant personal cost in terms of time, energy and emotions. I 
repeat the question to myself: why take on these involvements, and why do so many other 
people also do so? 
A clue to an answer to this question might lie in examining what actually goes on as these 
experiences unfold. Here, interaction steps out of the ordinary routine of everyday 
working and social life. It consists of conversations in the performance of governance 
functions as joint action carried out by people committed to the organization and its 
mission, each in his or her own way and for his or her own personal reasons – perhaps 
simply out of a passion for governance as an engaging activity. 
I have often heard people say that they engage in volunteer governance because they 
espouse a certain cause, or because it exercises their mind and wits in pursuit of a goal 
they care about. Obviously, the first of these reasons could be satisfied with a lot less 
aggravation simply by supporting the organization as a donor or an occasional volunteer; 
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so it would seem that the second reason is the primary motivation. I have seen much that 
would convince me that this is the case.  I would characterize this type of activity as 
creating self-meaning through direct personal engagement in the real workings of an 
enterprise: investing one’s energies while bringing real resources to the organization 
through personal participation – surprisingly without the power to spend money or 
achieving any monetary gain. Just what ‘self’, ‘meaning’ and ‘power’ mean in this 
context would require further investigation. 
A transformation through learning 
As the story pattern goes, after the struggle, there is transformation. I shall conclude this 
part of Project One with an account of an experience concerning the process of obtaining 
a Master of Management degree in 2002. 
My first contact with the master’s programme took place well before it was actually 
under way. I was at the time still head of the real estate developers’ Association and chair 
of the board of a national coalition of non-governmental organizations. At this time, the 
McConnell Foundation, Canada’s largest private foundation, was in the process of 
launching a new initiative to support capacity building within the Canadian voluntary 
sector, and had chosen McGill University as agent because it proposed to offer a new, 
modular programme of study leading to the degree of Master of Management for 
National Voluntary Sector Leaders. 
The programme of study was to consist of modules based on the notion of ‘mindsets’, 
each exploring a specific area of leadership in voluntary-sector organizations. Frances 
Westley, a tenured professor and academic author of this programme, had decided to 
employ a process of stakeholder deliberation to flesh out the curriculum of each module 
in the programme. Through common acquaintances in my non-governmental 
organization involvements, I was invited by her to participate in a two-day process, 
which would also be attended by leaders of the Canadian voluntary sector and the faculty 
of the programme. I accepted willingly, without really knowing what was in store. 
From the very first moment, I was deeply struck by the scope and meaning that was 
intended to be embedded in this degree programme and the quality of the people gathered 
to participate in the exercise, many of whom I knew well. As the process progressed, I 
sensed that I wanted – indeed that I needed – to get this degree; that it was right for me at 
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this time in my life.  However, the programme was explicitly intended solely for staff 
members who had been identified as actual or emerging leaders within certain national 
voluntary-sector organizations. Although I was involved with one such national 
organization, as a chair of the board serving in a voluntary capacity I did not fit the 
programme’s admissions criteria. But I persisted, and was admitted in June of 2000.  
The experience was transformative. I began for the first time to discern concepts, ideas 
and constructs that helped me make sense of what I was observing every day. The 
reading list presented a wealth of theories and models of organizational and interpersonal 
behaviours in negotiation, collaboration, strategy making, human interaction and ethics. I 
remember coming upon Strategy Safari by Henry Mintzberg et al. (1998), and finding 
that it had all the excitement of a new novel. It was extremely stimulating to read the 
story of the origins, protagonists and deployment of strategy making in Western 
organizations. These ideas had an immediate effect on my action in work and volunteer 
participation: I was discovering that leadership and management were thoughtful, 
reflective learned behaviours, not some mystical insight or subconsciously exercised 
talent. One could improve, even excel with conscious effort and investment in learning. I 
could see theory informing my action as leader and collaborator, and equally importantly, 
reflect on how action informs theory.  And it was during my master’s studies that I came 
into contact with notions such as emergence, complexity, and the present DMan 
programme itself. 
As the master’s programme progressed, I also received unqualified encouragement from 
Frances as my tutor. Frances is an extraordinary teacher and leader of voluntary action in 
her own right. I found this recognition by someone I now knew and respected so deeply 
very moving and provocative. It became the impetus to persist with even more ardour. 
From that moment on, I have known that I had to continue on a learning path both 
informally and formally. This is exactly what I am doing as I write this paper and read for 
the DMan. 
Return in practice 
As I was completing my Master of Management degree in late 2001, out of the mists of 
past and present action and social relations there appeared an opportunity that was a total 
surprise at the time and that I would not have considered without having lived the 
experience of the master’s programme. 
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It was the late fall of 2001. The Government of Quebec had initiated a merger of all of 
the municipalities on the Island of Montreal into one mega-city. There was a municipal 
election, where I had the opportunity to reconnect with ‘Frédéric’, an old acquaintance 
from earlier days at the Association when I was a volunteer and he was the chief of staff 
of a minister in the provincial government. Frédéric was now the campaign manager for 
the leading candidate in the Montreal mayoral elections and would subsequently become 
the new mayor’s chief of staff. 
Just before Christmas 2001, while I was still comfortably set in my job at the real estate 
industry Association, Frédéric announced to me that he and the mayor wanted me to take 
the new job of Deputy General Manager of the City, with responsibility for urban and 
economic development and housing. My department would have a budget of $30 million 
and a staff of two hundred. I was stunned by the invitation, and incredulous at the idea, 
for I had never managed anything of this scope or scale in my life. But I thought it over 
and finally decided to pursue it. I took up my new position in March 2002 on a five-year 
contract. 
The City of Montreal at this point in its history was in the process of creating a new 
administrative organization. I was to be the first holder of my position at the very dawn 
of this new municipal adventure. It was a time of unbridled energy and enthusiasm: we 
were building a new public structure that would directly touch the everyday lives and 
fortunes of almost two million people. I could never have imagined acting at this level in 
any organization so large, with such complexity inherent in every moment, and feel that 
after all I could be up to the challenge. But so it was; I was confident, optimistic, 
committed to building a good organization, and set out to do so. Could I have succeeded? 
I like to think so, but perhaps there were organizational realities that my lack of 
experience made me blind to and would have sooner or later curtailed my chances. In any 
case, it all came to a premature end for me less than two years later after the departure of 
my original superior and his replacement by a new General Manager who decided to 
build a new team of his own, which was not to include me. 
Since leaving the City, I have been working on a new real estate project for a private 
company owned by a wealthy family. I am also active on several non-profit boards of 
directors. And I have just recently reconnected with teaching at a McGill University,  
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having been invited by the school of architecture and the school of planning to help out as 
a seminar leader in an urban design studio of an architectural graduate programme. 
Reflection and questions of inquiry 
What had started with that passing conversation with Mark in his car so long ago – my 
call - was nothing less than a departure from an established profession with its developed 
methodologies, schools of thought, ideologies and imaginable career path, onto a 
trajectory of struggles, transformation and return(s).  But I sense that this is a trajectory 
that is forever shaping and reshaping itself, as new calls arise, as struggles continue. And 
when other transformations occur, as they may at every turn, those of yesterday may 
become just other struggles when seen from tomorrow.  So it is a story being written and 
rewritten a little every day, in the living of it, without discernable beginnings or ends. 
At the outset of this paper I asked: ‘How can I know what I think until I see what I 
write?’ Now, seeing what I’ve written, but also in the very writing of it, brings into view 
how I author my own story and that of those around me as they interact with me, giving 
me some sense of the notion of practice as a process by which we experience the world 
and our engagement with it as something meaningful (Wenger 1995), well beyond the 
daily struggles to earn a livelihood. 
Through the narratives I have presented above, a number of themes emerge: joint action, 
co-constructing discourse, experiential learning, volunteering and paid work, self-
development, social contributing. Do all of these notions, once explained, add up to an 
adequate reflection of practice? 
Wenger (1998) describes practice as action and social relations in the pursuit of meaning. 
Meaning, for him, is constructed through the dual action of participation and reification. 
He posits that practice is enacted primarily in ‘communities of practice’ which can extend 
beyond structural boundaries of organizations. He characterizes community in this 
context as comprising groups of people with joint enterprise, mutual engagement and 
shared repertoires of concepts and vocabularies, wherever they are in time and space. 
Within these communities meaning is constructed, there are shared histories of learning, 
and there are boundaries and landscapes. Members locate themselves in communities of 
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practice in different ways.3
I can see that the DMan programme is the appropriate setting for this inquiry. At the 
residentials, in the readings and even in the shadow conversations, we agonize over 
breaking our implicit entrapment within ‘default’ ways of thinking, towards 
consciousness of how we truly get on in the world. We do so by exploring local 
interaction as a source of meaning, identity and change using our personal experiences 
 And most organizations, whether highly structured or semi-
formal, are generally made up of constellations of communities of practice crossing over 
structural boundaries everywhere.  
My narrative certainly resonates with some of Wenger’s proposals, at least conceptually. 
My narrative describes many instances of mutual engagement, experiences of learning as 
transformative, and joint action within formal and less formal groupings which could 
qualify as communities in Wenger’s terms. But, it is interesting to note that while 
Wenger, in communities of Practice actually did his field work by working on the ‘floor’ 
of insurance adjusters of whom he writes, his account and thesis are not reflexive to any 
great extent. Thus, it strikes me that my experience of practice may be more than the sum 
of Wenger’s proposals. Other themes emerge. The stories of experiences all cover broad 
arcs of time, during which many changes occurred in my life and the lives of those 
involved with me. These arcs intersect and overlap one another, while at every moment 
they contain an attendant reflection of the past and an attendant anticipated future, within 
a living present of communicative interaction (Stacey 2001: 173). At the same time, each 
arc embodies at least the three strands contained in the selection of stories as well as 
many other influences (such as my experience in teaching) which have yet to be 
articulated. Even the idea of being ‘called’ has repeated resonance, suggesting an appetite 
for action in spite of risk. One of my classmates has reminded me on several occasions, 
one cannot look at these stories and the overall narrative without sensing throughout an 
urge or a need to be continually constructing. Might that be what Weick (1995) calls a 
‘constant becoming’? This may well be getting closer to a true experience of practice. 
Which theories related to practice, then, are reflected in my experience, and how can 
exploring and developing them contribute to a wider and deeper understanding of 
practice in general? 
                                                 
3 For instance, Wenger describes peripherality, where a person prefers to act on the boundaries creating 
connections between several communities rather than moving into the core of any community in particular. 
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and studies, in argument with each other and in our arguments in writing. My inquiry has 
emerged directly from this search to date, and will continue to be informed by it. 
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PROJECT TWO:  
CONSTRUCTING AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF PRACTICE 
 
Introduction 
In the first project, I have shown that my practice, in the usual sense of the term, has 
consisted of a portfolio of engagements which has developed as I have moved from one 
type of activity and organization to another – any one of which could have become a 
career path in itself. My involvement in governance functions within a wide variety of 
charitable organizations over the entire span of my working life forms an integral part of 
this portfolio, which thus constitutes what I prefer to call my ‘active life’. 
In this second research project, I explore more explicitly into my portfolio of 
engagements through a close examination of the range of my activities ongoing at the 
time of writing. I begin with detailed accounts of several different experiences, combined 
for purposes of illustration into a single narrative of a week’s activities.  This device of 
relating detailed individual accounts flowing one into the other in a continuous time span 
as they might do in life removes the need to frame artificial beginnings and endings of 
separate narratives, and more readily allows the reality of these experiences to emerge 
through common patterns and themes. 
On the basis of this narrative, which follows below, I will show how dominant 
management literature and discourse do not recognize the full scope or sense of what I 
call ‘practice’. This gap in recognition calls for the development of a fuller, more 
inclusive account of practice, which I then begin constructing on the basis of insights and 
arguments identified through a detailed examination of two scholars’ significant 
contributions to contemporary thought on practice. 
One week in July 
It is a Sunday afternoon in late July and I am on the train from Montreal to Toronto, 
where I shall participate as a volunteer in a two-day process with a special Advisory 
Committee of an organization which I shall call the ‘Adelaide Foundation,’ an 
environmental charity dedicated to the greening of Canadian cities.  The Advisory 
Committee will select planners for the first phase of work on the ‘Adelaide Foundation 
Commons’ development project  in downtown Toronto. The project consists of 
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transforming an abandoned former heavy industrial site, located in an otherwise beautiful 
natural ravine setting, into a vibrant environmental showcase and community centre. 
The project is a major urban redevelopment undertaking, and neither the Foundation nor 
‘Greg’, its young CEO and founder, has ever done anything like it before. Greg is 
confident in the organization’s ability (and his own) to pull together all of the skills and 
funding necessary to carry out the project – about $40 million in Canadian dollars – and 
has already assembled an impressive cast of stakeholder-users in support of it. 
I have known Greg since we were in our Master’s degree program together three years 
ago (see Project One), and have joined the board of Adelaide Foundation as Vice-Chair, 
at his invitation. Since then his interaction with me has been as with any other board 
member. However, now that the Adelaide Commons project became a central 
preoccupation of the Foundation, I have suggested that my experience in urban 
development and real estate projects may be useful to Greg and his team in moving the 
project forward. I have some time at my disposal at present so I have offered to spend 
some of it with them to help think things through. He agreed, and in recent months, I 
have been visiting Toronto more frequently and have begun to interact more closely with 
Greg, some of the staff members and two key members of the board: the chair and 
incoming chair, who are long-time confidants of Greg’s; both are also active in urban 
development in their working lives. Together with Greg we created a Project Advisory 
Committee, which my board colleagues have asked me to chair. 
Since a project of this nature – a large-scale urban development undertaken by a non-
governmental organization working to a social, environmental and financial bottom line – 
is novel in its own right and new to all of us, we are admittedly muddling our way 
through. Conversation informed by experience seems to be the basic strategy for moving 
ahead. In my role of committee chair and as a volunteer with some experience in urban 
development, I have been coaching Greg and his team in working out a project 
development process that should satisfy the requirements of the board, funders and 
stakeholders, and serve Adelaide Foundation’s mission. 
On Monday morning, at the project site, we meet in a roughly finished room with high 
ceilings and old industrial-style windows overlooking the metal roofs of the project’s vast 
derelict sheds. The walls are covered with photographs and other project graphics put 
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there by the Adelaide Foundation team working on site in this room. There are seven of 
us present: the three Advisory Committee members, two expert volunteers from public 
sector bodies, and Greg and his second-in-command. As Vice-Chair of the Adelaide 
Foundation board and chair of the Advisory Committee, I am called upon to chair the 
sessions we will hold with six different groups of architects over the next two days. The 
point of these sessions is to compose a short list of three firms, which will be invited to 
submit a formal offer of services. We are to determine each architect’s understanding of 
the project and get a feel for how each will interact with Adelaide Foundation staff and 
volunteers during the upcoming planning process, which by nature will be iterative and 
highly interactive. 
We meet with each architectural firm for about one hour. The committee listens to the 
presentations and engages in discussion with the presenters. After each meeting, we do a 
half-hour debriefing among ourselves to compare our reactions and opinions – how each 
of us feels about what he or she has just witnessed. During these discussions we discover 
the presence of a wide variety of perceptions within the group. I too have my opinions, 
and try to remain aware of the challenge of appropriately managing the conversation 
fairly as well as expressing my opinions. 
As it happens, my cell phone rings, but I ignore the call and pick up the message at the 
first break. It was one of the consultants I have invited to submit an offer of services for 
an environmental due-diligence study for the large-scale real estate development project 
in Montreal which is my paid work, as one of the project’s managers. This project is now 
in the early stages of land acquisition and preliminary planning studies. Upon receiving 
this call, I have a passing thought about how odd it must seem to others that here I am, 
doing volunteer work on a major project for two days, while I have an important paid 
project to keep me more than busy at home.  
For the rest of the day, the meetings continue positively on all fronts until we break in the 
mid-afternoon. Later on, I try writing some of this paper in my hotel room, but that does 
not work very well, so I find a comfortable terrace in the hot Toronto evening for a 
Guinness and a passable meal. 
On Tuesday the process continues. The last two groups of architects appear before us, 
and then we settle down for an in-depth discussion towards a decision by consensus. Here 
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I have to be careful: my immediate task is to chair the meeting so that we arrive at a 
conclusion we can all accept.  Yet I do have my own opinions, which should figure in the 
mix; this is one of the reasons why I am on the committee in the first place. So I decide 
that I’ll speak last, and state my opinions and arguments at that time. 
I listen closely to all of the others. I begin to feel uneasy that they are giving too much 
weight to qualities of the candidates peripheral to the specific job we want done, however 
important those qualities may be. So when I finally speak, I feel compelled to remind 
everyone of just what the process is that the Adelaide Foundation is engaged in at this 
particular moment in the life of the project. I insist that our reflections should refer to this 
framework. Only then do I give my own evaluation of the presenters. But as I do so I 
recognize that I am in fact presenting an argument. I am defending my positions as 
having been arrived at by some rational, cognitive process that can be demonstrated and 
talked about, and therefore has specific merit. Arguing like this is the way I most often 
engage in decision making in groups. But I can see that clearly not everyone reasons in 
this way. My argumentation sometimes engages others and influences decisions; but it 
can also overpower or alienate others who do not argue as forcefully or who adopt 
positions more intuitively and defend them less argumentatively than I do. 
In any event, we reach a consensus quickly and enjoyably. Everyone seems quite 
satisfied with the choice and the process thus far. We congratulate ourselves for another 
step forward in the massive undertaking of that the project represents. As it turns out, we 
are all pretty much on the same wavelength, in spite of my earlier misgivings. I realize I 
had been anticipating what others would decide when they were merely ‘thinking out 
loud’ while participating in the conversation. I’m thrilled with the outcome and head off 
to the train station in the car with Greg. In the course of our conversation, he remarks that 
it was a good thing that I waited till the end to speak, resisting my urge to take up each 
intervention and instead letting the conversation find its own course. He says that this 
was a good example of chairpersonship – one from which he can learn. 
On Wednesday I am back at ‘PMV’, my employer in Montreal, working on the ‘Citadel’ 
project, a planned 100,000-square-metre multi-purpose development to include the 
restoration of a historic hotel and the construction of retail, office and residential spaces 
on property we are in the process of acquiring from the City. I have joined up to work 
part-time at PMV through the auspices of Mark, with whom I had reconnected when I 
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began working for the City. After the Mayor had asked us senior managers to find 
external collaborators to participate as voices from outside the City apparatus, I had 
involved Mark in certain initiatives within my department. At the time the City was 
freshly into post-amalgamation and Mark, who was quite interested in making the 
amalgamation work, had welcomed this opportunity to play a part. 
From the outset, our collaboration was productive and intense. Mark seemed to genuinely 
appreciate how I was going about my new charge, and I valued the support and ingenuity 
he brought into my work. Throughout my time at the City, the two of us were successful 
in moving several complex initiatives forward, including an innovative theatre-district 
development programme which has truly taken wing. During this same period Mark 
began work on the Citadel venture, and when the time came for me to leave the City he 
asked me to join him. 
Up to now, Citadel has been advancing quite well. Most recently, however, we have been 
called upon to purchase the city property outright on very short notice, instead of at the 
end of a year-long option period we thought we had at our disposal to assemble the 
resources we would need for the project. Now an immediate multi-million-dollar cash 
outlay will be required, which Mario, the owner of PMV, does not have at his short-term 
disposal. Another strategy is now needed quickly to avoid losing the deal and all we have 
put into the project over the last year. 
A meeting is called in the boardroom to discuss the situation. This room is long and 
narrow, with a full wall of floor-to-ceiling windows overlooking downtown Montreal 
from our thirty-third-floor roost. Attending the meeting are Mark (who holds 
responsibility for Citadel), Mario and three of his close internal advisors, and myself. The 
first thing I notice is that Mario is sitting all alone at the far end of the table as usual, 
while the rest of us are crowded around the other end near the door. I’m at the opposite 
head of the table facing Mario, which was the only seat available at this end of the room 
when I walked into the meeting. Mark is sitting on my right. 
I outline how much operating cash we are going to need to bring the Citadel land deal to 
a close, and what we anticipate having to spend between closing and actually launching 
development. The advisors, in chorus, chime in to point out some errors in our 
calculations. An uncomfortable moment ensues. The chorus starts to pick away at our 
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tentative agreement with the City. This line gains momentum and I begin to feel the 
intensity of it building. I resent what I perceive to be a facile, negative critique of what 
we have accomplished in arranging this deal, and begin to fear that the deal itself is being 
threatened. I try to counter their line of attack by arguing that we will be lucky to have 
this opportunity at all, as the City could easily still sell the land to any one of several 
other buyers; we cannot afford to be too demanding. 
It strikes me that this reaction is clearly defensive and that I may be overreacting to some 
simple questions not intended to threaten. I feel uneasy as I see myself this way, 
defensive and closed to others’ suggestions. After all, what is wrong with trying to obtain 
further concessions from the vendor? The City can only say no – no harm done. So why 
is it that I do not even want to ask? I realize that I often find myself in this position of 
resenting being called into question, when invariably it is simpler and more collaborative 
to recognize what might be a good idea and get on with it. I know that I react this way in 
certain types of circumstances and not in others, and I suspect it has something to do with 
my status relative to my interlocutors. In this case I want Mario’s support; I see his 
advisors’ criticisms as threatening that support, and I simply want them to stop. 
Mark then makes his pitch to get agreement to move forward with the purchase according 
to the new requirements of the City. He appeals to Mario’s ego as the eventual owner and 
developer of this signature project, to be recognized for his vision and courage for 
undertaking such an ambitious project.  He downplays the flaws in the calculations as not 
in fact being the issue. Here I see a master at work. Mark has a powerful command of 
language such that his ideas come across in a way that people like and trust – even 
though his words themselves do not form strong arguments and may even sometimes 
seem excessive and exaggerated to the dispassionate listener. I find myself listening to 
Mark’s talk on many occasions and thinking that I could never bring myself to speak 
intuitively as he does, for fear of being caught on the spot saying something I cannot 
defend rationally. I also notice how Mark is never defensive; he has absolute confidence 
in his powers of persuasion.  
The meeting ends with agreement that we must limit our cash outlay and therefore must 
scurry around to find third-party investors who can join us in sharing the risk and cost of 
carrying the project forward. As for the deal with the City, it will be left as is, although 
the discomfort of the advisors’ chorus has not been totally dispelled. 
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When I get back to my desk, there is a message waiting from ‘André’, the lawyer for the 
Citadel project. André wants to let me know that he has suggested my name to members 
of a Toronto development group, who need local advice for a major project they are 
considering in Montreal. A representative of the group calls a short while later, and asks 
to meet me the following morning. 
As the end of the day approaches, I start thinking about my upcoming evening meeting 
with the members of the Church. I have not heard from anyone from the Church for some 
time (for an account of my past involvement, see Project One) , but Nancy has called 
recently out of the blue to ask if I can help a certain committee in its attempts to acquire a 
plot of land for sale adjacent to the Church’s property. This land is to be be sold by public 
tender, and the committee members do not quite know how to go about putting together a 
bid. I agree to help on a volunteer basis; in any event the task should not be overly 
demanding. I arrive at the Church at the appointed time. It is mid-evening, and the 
temperature is sweltering hot outside and in, so the seven of us choose to meet in the 
rather large, air-conditioned parish hall instead of the more comfortably furnished – and 
hotter – meeting room on the second floor. We are seated at a table in one corner, and 
despite the echo in the hall we manage to communicate quite well. This is my second 
meeting with the committee, which is made up of church members from various walks of 
life – people with no particular expertise in the details of the business at hand: how a 
price will be set, how to go forward in responding to the call for tenders and how to 
determine what the overall transaction will cost. 
As our discussion gets under way, we discover that practically every committee member 
has a different idea about how much should be offered for the land. One member 
considers the eventual purchase as just another form of investment, so that it does not 
matter how much money is taken out of bank investments and spent on the land: the 
investment could be recuperated at any time by reselling the land. To this person, the 
strategy would be to bid very high. Another member is preoccupied with the committee’s 
fiduciary responsibility not to waste money, and therefore wants to spend ‘just enough to 
win’. He asks if there is some way that they, as a church, can get special treatment from 
the seller. Yet another member wants to propose that in lieu of money the vendor be 
offered charitable tax receipts or special mention in the Church bulletin as being a good 
corporate citizen. The very last member to speak thinks that as a matter of principle they 
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‘should offer what the professional evaluator says the land is worth, and live with the 
consequences, win or lose’. (What he actually means to say is that they should never pay 
more than what it is worth.) 
As a non-member of the congregation or the committee, I participate in this conversation 
but do not take a position, only suggesting alternative ways of looking at the problem as I 
see them, or commenting on the feasibility of some of the suggestions I am hearing. I am 
keenly aware of the influence I can have with this group, and I want to avoid being 
looked to for a ‘right’ answer. I am also aware that I need some time and conversation to 
sort out my own thoughts. 
Over the course of the discussion, it becomes clear that no one opinion is gaining sway, 
and that no one is in a position to impose his or her will – which, even if possible, would 
not be considered proper in this particular church community. Yet there is no natural 
leadership, nor any idea about a method for reaching agreement on what to offer. But 
time is short since the bid has to be submitted within two weeks.  
I try a new approach on the group. First I point out that Church can never lose all the 
money it may spend on the land, whatever the amount, since the land can always be 
resold for some amount even if they do nothing with it. In other words, their risk is some 
amount less than the total offer they will make. Then I ask if the social purpose for which 
they wish to use this land (for example, a seniors’ hospice or neighbourhood services) is 
worth risking such an amount of money – if so, do they have a feeling for how much that 
might be? This suggestion succeeds in focusing attention on an issue they can discuss 
constructively. With that, we conclude the meeting and agree to meet again the following 
week. 
Thursday morning arrives, and it’s time to meet the representatives of the development 
group from Toronto. I join them and André in a beautifully appointed meeting room in 
the ‘Rialto Hotel’, a significant heritage property on Montreal’s most historic downtown 
street, and the object of the planned development project. The group is made up of the 
presidents and vice-presidents of the Toronto development company and the Rialto hotel 
chain from Washington, DC. 
After the niceties, the meeting begins with the Toronto group explaining their project idea 
to me and to André. As it turns out, the project is nothing less than the purchase and 
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complete redevelopment of the historic Rialto hotel. The plan is for the Rialto company 
to buy back the hotel (one of the three original Rialto hotels in the world, it had been sold 
to another operator some time ago), upgrade it significantly, demolish a part of the 
building and add an eighteen-storey wing of super-deluxe condominium apartments to be 
operated in conjunction with the hotel. They are in the pre-purchase due-diligence 
process and need advice locally as to what will be necessary to bring the project to 
fruition if they do indeed go through with the purchase. 
Entirely of his own accord, André jumps right into the conversation with his assessment 
of the issues and difficulties such a project would encounter in Montreal. I wait to let him 
finish and pass over to me; but he is slow to do so, and in fact is proceeding to cover all 
of the ground that I thought I was there to cover. After he makes a few remarks that skirt 
around what I consider some key issues, I feel compelled to intervene. In the ensuing 
discussion, I enumerate each of the issues a project like this will cause in the Montreal 
political and cultural milieu as I know it; and they are legion. In the process I give the 
group a virtual urban, heritage and political tour of Montreal today, with the necessary 
background. A lively conversation begins about what can be done to ensure success, and 
I find myself suggesting strategies specifically appropriate to the Montreal situation. I am 
vastly enjoying myself in this meeting. I feel as if I am at the top of my game. This kind 
of reflection on strategy is something I revel in: it calls upon every skill and resource I 
have developed in managing urban development issues in Montreal. 
The Rialto discussion lasts about an hour. I then return to the office, where bids were due 
from environmental consultants for the Citadel due-diligence analysis I mentioned 
earlier. At the same time, we are scouting out hotel partners for Citadel, and a report on 
the status of the project must be sent to our financial partners. As the environmental 
consulting offers are coming in, I book a meeting for the next day to go over them with 
our legal counsel. 
I am attending to all of this when I get a call from one of the Rialto representatives asking 
me to make them an offer of services to be the chief representative in Montreal for their 
entire project. He says that he and his colleagues are totally convinced that I would be 
indispensable to the success of their venture in Montreal. However flattering it may be to 
hear such a suggestion, this is a troubling moment because I doubt that this work could be 
compatible with my work at PMV. Although I am employed only part-time at PMV, I 
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doubt that my employer would contemplate work such as the Rialto project on my off-
days, which are intended to be used for my doctoral studies and volunteer work. I decide 
to choose an appropriate time to raise this openly with Mark, and reckon that that will be 
if and when I get a formal offer from the Rialto group. Until then, I do not feel there is 
much to talk about. 
Friday starts with a meeting with our lawyers to review the Citadel environmental file, 
and we lay out a process to choose the best offer. I wish to make sure that the project 
partnership is well covered for environmental risk and that PMV is properly protected in 
the event any legal action against the firm as the operating partner, should environmental 
problems arise in the future. After the meeting, I go to lunch with Fred from the 
McConnell Foundation that had sponsored my Master’s degree program (see Project 
One). 
Fred, who is vice-president of the foundation, is seeking my advice for the second time 
regarding a grant application he is handling from a charitable organization devoted to 
care of the elderly, seeking funds to upgrade a seniors’ residence that they own. Together 
we examine different facets of the situation, ranging from how seniors’ health care 
functions within the social service system to the market for seniors’ residential units. My 
contribution to the conversation is largely based on the knowledge of the health system I 
have gained as a member of a hospital board of directors, the work we are doing at PMV 
on the possibility of investing in seniors’ housing ourselves, and my long-time personal 
friendship with a very knowledgeable director of a local community clinic specializing in 
seniors’ home care. I offer to connect Fred with this person so that he can get a much 
better picture of what is actually at stake in his file. Fred likes this idea. We end our lunch 
and I go home to work on this project for the rest of the day and over the weekend. 
Dominant ways of talking about practice in organizations 
The preceding narrative is a composite sketch of a week of my working life and is, I 
believe, an accurate representation that conveys the true sense of my day-to-day 
involvements, however varied, as one continuum. This narrative also correctly reflects 
the way in which I work: the demands on my time and the types of interactions, settings 
and processes in which I typically engage in the course of both my volunteer 
engagements and my paid work. 
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In thinking about what this narrative has to offer to this inquiry into practice, I ask myself 
first in what way what it portrays represents a ‘practice’ at all. A practice could perhaps 
be inferred from each one of the activities described in the narrative, in that there is 
enterprise and social relations in each case, as Wenger (1998) describes practice; but to 
what extent together do they form a practice? Or is this actually a set of practices? Or a 
practice of practices? 
Practice in organizations takes many shapes and names. 
In Communities of Practice (1998), Wenger writes about people in jobs – claims agents 
in a large insurance company – who derive their practice from their organizational role 
and by affiliating in communities of people doing the same jobs or parts of jobs. In The 
Reflective Practitioner, Schön talks about profession as something practitioners do by 
name, revealing his preoccupation with the comportment of the ‘major, near-major and 
minor professions – architect, psychoanalyst, doctor, manager, engineer – for which there 
is a long-developed tradition in each case as to what in fact constitutes the practice 
(Schön 1991: 23). Schön admits to the ambiguity of the term ‘practice’ as being, on the 
one hand, ‘when we speak of a lawyer’s practice, we mean the kinds of things he does, 
the clients he has, the range of cases he is called upon to handle’ and on the other, 
preparing for a performance, as in practicing for a piano recital (ibid: 60). Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1983) describes Michel Foucault’s analysis as centring on disciplines as 
society-sanctioned roles in bureaucracies or professional cadres, combining knowledge 
and power in discursive practices within broad social contexts of non-discursive 
practices. 
These examples suggest that the dominant way of talking about practice in organized 
activity – other than private, cultural or traditional practices – in Western organizational 
discourse tends to turn upon occupations, professions and jobs, as manifestations of 
publicly recognized roles or functions within organized activity. In fact, this way of 
looking at practice is deeply rooted in the way organized human activity has been viewed 
in the modern era. Consider Elias’s account (2000) of the civilizing process of the 
Western world.  Here, Elias describes regimes of power in the path toward statehood 
needed to be supported logistically by knowledgeable people in highly defined roles that 
became increasingly differentiated as the size and scope of the regimes grew. Likewise, 
according to the Marxist account of industrial production, increasing centralization of the 
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means of production produced ever-greater refinement in the division of labour among 
individual workers required for the production process (Burkitt 1991: 119-120).  For 
Foucault, the rise of social disciplines developed in response to the state’s increased 
control and confinement of the bodies and bodily functions of the populace (asylums, 
prisons, schools, clinics, control of prostitution, for example), which necessitated ever-
increasingly differentiated expertise in the techniques of confinement and control, at the 
same time as the state supplied the research settings to develop that expertise (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow 1983: 130-131). 
The ideas cited above provide all deal with the rise of cooperative human action in the 
modern era. Moreover, it is commonly held that such cooperation ‘always and 
everywhere implies interdependence and divided labour . . . To attain the common goal, 
or complete the common task, each actor necessarily performs a different portion of the 
common effort’ (Kemper 1972: 742). To bolster his position, Kemper (1972) also cites 
Émile Durkheim who in 1933 developed a sociological theory to explain the division of 
labour in society: ‘To cooperate, in short, is to participate in a common task. If this is 
divided into tasks qualitatively similar, but mutually indispensable, there is simple 
division of labour of the first degree. If they are different there is compound division of 
labour, specialization properly called. . . . When men unite in a contract, it is because 
through division of labour, whether simple or complex, they need each other’ (in Kemper 
1972: 739). 
If, then, the prescription of the division of labour and differentiation of roles is at the root 
of organized human action, it follows that some form of alignment between what one 
does in organizations and one’s personality must be achievable, if not already exist. On 
just this point, Filer attempts to develop means ‘to predict which of a number of broadly 
defined occupational groups an individual will enter’ (1986: 412). He has ‘analyzed the 
impact of various personality and taste factors’ (16 in number) on the occupational 
distribution (5 in number) of workers. Those factors were found to have strong effects 
that were generally consistent with a well functioning labour market sorting individuals 
into those jobs that most closely satisfy their individual utility functions’, as captured by 
differences in personality and tastes (Filer 1986: 423). It is worth noting that Filer does 
not mention that differentiation of roles in a well-functioning labour market may in fact 
emerge interactively in relation to the skills available in the working population, and that 
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this may be as important a factor as (possibly even more important than) the rational 
choices imposed by managers and corporate planners. 
Views such as those of Kemper, Durkheim and Filer are systemic take for granted that 
any particular differentiation of roles or division of labour prevailing in the economy and 
organizations must be in tune with the psychological make-up of human beings, aligned 
with the roles and functions prescribed within organizational schema. In fact, research 
quoted in Filer goes a step further, positing that people choose their occupation (i.e. their 
role within the division of labour or the labour market) as the result of an implicit 
cognitive, rational cost-benefit analysis of greatest gain to be achieved over an entirely 
predictable working career. Here again we see the assumption that people can be 
expected to act in organizations according to predetermined roles, and that the proper 
design of these roles will reflect human nature as a matter of course. 
Still other points of view stress practice as a medium of social interaction leading to 
development of identity, through learning or interactive processes. For example, E. C. 
Hughes wrote in 1928 that persons are transformed by their occupational selection, the 
transformation being all the more complete the more technical and occupational their 
training is and the more completely mobility requires leaving behind local, familial ties 
and mores. Once distant from their native home, the ‘person finds a ‘life-organization’ in 
the occupational group, social objects and attitudes, and definitions of his wishes’ 
(Hughes 1928: 754). In a similar vein, Wenger (2004) proposes the added dimension of 
practice as learning. And there are myriad other accounts of the relationship between 
work, practice and occupation, and the formation of identity and personality (Burkitt 
1991; Weick 1995; Wertsch 1985). In the end, though, while the individual may be 
transforming and learning, the assumption is that these processes occur within and are 
comfortably aligned with a preset differentiation of roles or division of labour. 
I am arguing here that the paradigm of the division of labour and role differentiation 
dominates the way in which practice is regarded and spoken about in organizational 
discourse, and that this is rooted in modernist theories about the rise of human 
cooperative action in the Western world. I am also making the observation that organized 
activity as portrayed in my narrative is absent from this dominant discourse. The lack of 
definition of the nature of the various encounters, the movement from encounter to 
encounter inside and outside of defined organizational boundaries, and the way each 
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encounter is taken up without the benefit of clearly circumscribed roles or divisions of 
responsibility in doing so, are several aspects of my narrative which do not appear in the 
dominant account, but which I feel are significant to the account of practice I seek to 
develop. 
Does this mean that what I do is not a practice? Before we allow such a conclusion, we 
must ask: why is it the case in the dominant discourse that practices like mine are 
excluded from it? What is concealed on the hither side of this doxa? 
Towards an alternative account of practice 
My critique of the dominant discourse as I describe it in the preceding section flows from 
the reflexive methodological approach and ontological position which I indicated I would 
follow at the outset of this dissertation. The dominant discourse assumes that people 
interact in the ways that their assigned roles and functions are planned to work as 
interrelated parts of a shared task. Once one accepts this premise, it follows that practice 
must be defined in these same terms: that is, as the application of skills and techniques in 
line with the prescribed tasks, roles and functions. This is a logical conclusion, given that 
the accounts of practice presented in the preceding section look at practice and 
organizations in one particular way, and that is from the outside – how the organization, 
society or investigator sees practice or sees the person in practice. As such, the dominant 
conception of practice maintains a dualism of the social and the individual, and, 
moreover, places the social first. 
For instance, while Wenger may well write about ‘communities of practice’, where 
individuals pursuing enterprise always do so in interaction, so that the resulting practice 
‘belongs to the community’ (Wenger 1998: 45), or that practice ‘connotes doing . . . in a 
social and historical context that gives substance and meaning to what we do’ (ibid. 47), 
it is nonetheless true that the objective of the enterprise or the 'doing' to which he refers is 
inevitably set outside of the individual, is something outside of the individual him or 
herself which the individual engages in, allowing him or her to learn (internalize) or 
develop identity as an interactant  with the organization external to him or herself. In this 
view, the practitioner and his or her practice together form what I term a simple 
enactment of something determined by others, however possibly subject to change over 
time. This is an extension of Kantian philosophy, ‘where practice is an activity seeking a 
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goal which is conceived as a result of following certain general principles of procedure’ 
(Turner 1994: 8). 
In light of this reflection, and as part of my attempt to develop an alternative way of 
talking about practice, I have sought out sources that appear to diverge from the dominant 
view as I have presented it here, perhaps capturing elements that I consider to be absent 
from that view. In this regard, two other accounts of practice bear a close look. Schön’s 
The Reflective Practitioner (1991) is appealing because it looks into the internal 
processes of the practitioner, inferring what they might be from observation. Turner’s The 
Social Theory of Practices (1994), opens up several promising avenues of reflection for 
me by virtue of the author’s dispute with the social theory approach to practice in general.  
The Reflective Practitioner 
As a trained architect who interacts with the design professions on a regular basis, it 
seems to me especially pertinent to account in particular for professional practice in order 
to capture my professional biases in the more general account of practice that I am 
endeavouring to build. Schön’s extensive work in this field offers an excellent source for 
this purpose. 
Schön’s proposals are quite compelling. He points to a crisis of confidence in 
professional knowledge as being mismatched to real situations of practice rightly 
characterized as complex, uncertain and unstable, and attributes this state of affairs to the 
intellectual hegemony of Positivism, ‘the powerful philosophical doctrine that grew up in 
the nineteenth century as an account of the rise of science and technology and as a social 
movement aimed at applying the achievements of science and technology to the well-
being of mankind’ (Schön 1991: 31). The heritage of Positivism is Technical Rationality, 
an epistemology of professional practice which consists of ‘in instrumental problem 
solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique. . . . [This] 
view has . . . powerfully shaped both our thinking about the professions and the 
institutional relations of research, education, and practice’ to the exclusion of artistry in 
practice (ibid 1991: 21). It is so embedded in institutions of professional education and 
self-governance that its dominance is institutionally perpetuated without significant 
challenge. 
Schön responds with a plea for the return by the professions to the philosophy of science 
before Positivism and the ‘Technological Program’ (p. 31), to science ‘as a process in 
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which scientists grapple with uncertainties and display arts of inquiry akin to the 
uncertainty and arts of practice. Let us then reconsider the question of professional 
knowledge; let us stand the question on its head….Let us search, instead, for an 
epistemology of practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which some 
practitioners do bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value 
conflict’ (p. 49). This he calls ‘reflection-in-action’ (p. 49ff). 
Reflection-in-action rests on a basic notion of what Schön calls ‘knowing-in-action’ (p. 
59), which is a form of knowing akin to know-how: a tacit knowledge of what needs to 
be done, which is called upon unconsciously and spontaneously in the doing, as opposed 
to the conscious application of some prior theory. When we are confronted with a 
situation of uncertainty, instability or uniqueness, or with a conflict of values, we find 
ourselves surprised or stymied by the situation itself. In such situations, experience tells 
us that to act spontaneously is risky, that outcomes are unpredictable and may be harmful. 
Thus we reflect on the situation while we are acting into it, though still within the context 
of the particular knowledge we are apt to apply. We use judgment. We seek to make 
sense of the situation in our practical reality. Simply put, this reflective process means 
thinking while doing; thinking about the situation as it is evolving. The thinker still sees 
the situation as apart from him or her, and stops short of thinking about the doing while 
doing, and thinking about thinking about doing, which would be reflexive turns. 
Reflection-in-action is in effect a process of learning. In this way a professional 
confronted with a complex situation in practice inquires according to a philosophy of 
science whereby practice and research inform each other iteratively. They are not 
separate as they must be within the Technical Rationality paradigm, where research 
necessarily precedes practice. The practitioner brings his or her experience to bear, 
without conscious articulation, on a unique situation within a process of ‘seeing-as’4
                                                 
4 Schön derives this expression from Wittgenstein: ‘In reference to examples such as “'seeing the figure as a 
box” and seeing the duck/rabbit picture as a rabbit, Wittgenstein points out that seeing-as is at once, and 
ambiguously, a process of seeing and thinking’ (Schön 1991: 361). 
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doing-as then seeing-as anew, in successive iterations. Experience and education provide 
a repertoire of moves, expectations, images, techniques and language to permit seeing-as 
through exemplars or what Schön calls ‘generative metaphors’ (p. 185) providing new 
perceptions and explanations to keep the inquiry going. Ultimately, a solution, frame or 
set-problem emerges that satisfies the practitioner-researcher according to his or her 
 59 
schema of just what constitutes ‘acceptable’ or ‘better’ – aesthetically, philosophically or 
otherwise. 
There are certain similarities between reflection-in-action and the method of bricolage I 
have adopted and described earlier in this dissertation. It would seem that the repertoire 
of moves, expectations, images, language, metaphors and exemplars can also be seen as 
materials that are useful because they are in fact known; and they become known through 
lived experience in all its dimensions – not only through formal education but as a result 
of whatever exposures the practitioner has experienced over the course of life. In both 
reflection-in-action and bricolage the research methodology and practice mirror each 
other: the wider the scope of experience, the greater and more diverse the repertoire of 
materials that can be put to use in any given situation. 
For the purposes of my argument here, just what does reflection-in-action actually 
signify? On the face of it, Schön’s proposals could be located in single-loop or double-
loop learning-process thinking, where each gesture produces feedback which changes the 
next gesture. But Schön does not refer to this as ‘learning’; instead he calls it a ‘reflective 
conversation’ with the situation or materials (p. 151), suggesting some form of 
emergence through a process of gesture and response interaction. By doing so he is either 
using the term ‘conversation’ metaphorically as a generative technique, or he is getting at 
something other than a single-or double-loop cognitive process. 
I believe that Schön is using the notion of reflective conversation knowingly as a 
generative metaphor to explore reflection-in-action as a concept which goes beyond 
single-loop learning. Schön is seeking to explain in general how novel syntheses arise in 
practice. He understands that a single- or double-loop learning model cannot explain 
emergence or novelty, even within the confines of the practitioner’s mental models (see 
below). He brings the social into his inquiry, although he fails to explore this dimension 
to any significant degree, simply attributing it for the most part to the situation at hand.  
What Schön terms a reflective conversation with the situation or with materials can in 
fact be viewed as the functionalizing of inner conversation, as in Mead’s account (1934) 
of thinking and the emergence of mind and self. According to Mead, thought takes the 
form of inner conversation with ourselves, as object and subject at the same time, and 
with the other or generalized other, which is one’s broader social or cultural group. We 
 60 
can actually take up the viewpoint and feelings of the other and generalized other within 
the conversation, because of the human capacity to take the role of the other. In Schön’s 
terms, in the conversation with the situation or materials as an inner conversation, the 
practitioner is interacting in thought with himself or herself and the generalized other 
which embodies the professional school of thought to which he or she subscribes, as well 
as other aspects of the broader social group, which permits evaluating the emerging 
results within the paradigm – epistemology, ontology, methodology (Denzin and Lincoln 
2000: 19) – of that community.  
By using examples of conversations with persons and materials as he does, Schön is 
rendering inner private conversation public and visible, so that he as researcher can 
observe it within experimental protocols. He is using methodological trappings in order 
to be seen as ‘objective’ and therefore credible in his academic setting. It is interesting to 
note that given Schön’s past ‘working life as an industrial consultant, technology 
manager, urban planner, policy analyst, and teacher in a professional school’ (Schön 
1991: vii), he could just as well have done a reflexive study using his own experience and 
his own inner conversations. Nowhere in the book, however, does he relate his 
conclusions to his own rich experience. 
Nonetheless, by casting conversation as a fundament of professional practice, Schön is 
positing something significant. He is locating practice in the field of processes of 
interaction, effectively opening up inquiry to questions of embodiment, novelty, and the 
formation of self. MacLean and MacIntosh address a similar theme, calling it ‘creative 
action’ (2005: 12).  They begin with the same epistemological position as Schön, joining 
knowing and doing, and critiquing the pre-eminence of normative and purely rational 
approaches. They maintain that creative action can be described as ‘the interplay of 
emergent intentions, embodied expression and interactive relating’ (ibid. 23). 
I interpret from Schön’s proposal that intentions are equally emergent in that ends in the 
form of an interpretive synthesis acceptable to the practitioner and his or her community 
are unknowable from the outset and emerge through the internal processes of interaction 
he describes, captured in the notions of conversation with materials representing a virtual 
world. Interactive relating is reflected in the conversational metaphor. In both cases, 
context and biographies matter in that it is from these that the actor draws his or her 
repertoire of moves, concepts and language, often unconsciously.  As I will explain later, 
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this interpretation begins to suggest areas of exploration in the development of my own 
proposals regarding practice. 
Finally, I would like to call attention to the role of mental models  in Schön’s thinking. 
Schön identifies the locus of the ontological differences between the professions as the 
‘constants’ underlying each individual professional practice: 
• ‘The media, languages, and repertoires that practitioners use to describe 
reality and conduct experiments 
• ‘The appreciative systems they bring to problem setting, to the evaluation of 
inquiry, and to reflective conversation 
• ‘The overarching theories by which they make sense of phenomena 
• ‘The role frames within which they set their tasks and through which they 
bound their institutional settings’ (Schön 1991: 269–70). 
The words Schön uses to describe these constants indicate their character as what Stacey 
(2003) calls ‘mental models’: the tacit perceptual frames from within which people 
encounter the world, and which make efficient action possible. Mental models are 
developed through single-loop learning and require double-loop learning in order to 
change them (Stacey 2003: 108–109). For Schön, keeping mental models tacit has the 
negative effect of reinforcing the mystical quality of artistry in practice, suggesting that 
such artistry is based on some innate capacity of the individual. To counter such recourse 
to mysticism as an explanation, convinced as he is that the capacity for reflection-in-
action can be learned and perfected, Schön encourages reflection on reflection – 
reflecting on how one ought to reflect – suggesting techniques such as repertoire-building 
research, frame analysis, research on fundamental methods of inquiry and overarching 
theories and research on the process of reflection-in-action (Schön 1991: 315–7). This 
‘‘agenda of reflective research’ will support practitioners in the development of their 
mental models as they reflect on them, and will be generated out of dialogue between 
reflective researchers and practitioner-researchers’ (Schön 1991: 324).  
Ultimately Schön makes significant advances in moving thought on professional practice 
out of the Technical Rationality paradigm and into the realm of reflective action. His 
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central constructs – knowing-in-action, problem setting and reflective conversation with 
situations and materials – are appealing ideas. In fact, looking back on my own narrative, 
I could easily identify as problem-setting the moment when I framed the challenge before 
the church committee as determining how much money the social use of the land they 
wished to buy was worth. But I would consider that a technique of practice, not my 
practice itself. I find that, in the end, Schön’s account of practice is nonetheless bound to 
predefined roles, regulated by mental models, appreciative systems, overarching theories 
and role frames. 
The Social Theory of Practices 
I turn to Turner’s book at this point for a variety of reasons. First, his is an important 
contribution to the subject of practice, most notably as an effort to demystify the notion 
of shared public behaviours. Second, given bricolage as my methodology, I felt that it 
was important to explore and appropriate this work so as to be in a position to use its 
strong, well-crafted arguments as helpful tools for my own reflection at this stage.  
Turner does not specifically address the narrower band of meaning of practice which is 
my topic, but which is nonetheless subsumed in his subject. He writes about practice writ 
large, an ambiguous notion that might have any number of meanings in context: shared 
presuppositions, paradigms, embodied or tacit knowledge. Given this ambiguity, Turner 
considers the very concept of ‘practices’ to be flawed, and so undertakes to give a more 
satisfactory account of the concept and its uses. In so doing, he ‘undermine[s] the notion 
of practices, and especially in the form of the theory that practices are embedded in some 
sort of social substrate – the ‘social theory of practices’ of the title’ (Turner 1994: 11). 
His method is deceptively simple: using the tenets of the social theory of practice as his 
starting point, he proceeds to systematically disprove that these tenets can hold 
epistemologically, leaving only one conception possible in the end, as I will describe later 
in this section. 
Turner starts out by showing how the concept of shared practices must function if it is to 
be explained within social theory. First he examines the causal aspect of practice: how 
practices become mental traces causing shared habits of behaviour. Then he considers the 
meaning of practices as shared presuppositions, which should also produce manifestly 
similar behaviours among different people. In both cases, sameness in causes of 
behaviour, which are necessarily tacit, should produce sameness in manifest behaviour. If 
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such causes are in the form of psychological possessions, as in social theory, this would 
signify that psychological possessions also can be shared. 
This logic raises two insurmountable problems for Turner. First, we can never know for 
certain what the unconscious mental causes of behaviour are, since they are necessarily 
tacit and can only be inferred from observed behaviour. Second, the fact that some 
behaviours are the same does not necessarily mean that their causes are the same. In fact, 
for every behaviour, more than one tacit cause can easily be inferred: to suppose that tacit 
causes are the same between people on the basis of similar observed behaviour is simply 
an untenable position. Moreover, inference and interpretation fail because we can only 
draw inferences on the basis of comparisons with our individually held ways of knowing 
and seeing. Turner points to anthropological studies that infer, on the basis of a few 
relics, ways of thinking and acting, ideas and customs, which supposedly must have 
existed in ancient cultures but which may in fact bear no relationship at all to the situation 
or civilization under study. For Turner, even making explicit our own ways of seeing and 
knowing is a dubious exploit: ‘Indeed, in general, we discover our own assumptions, to 
the extent that we do, by standing on the stern of our boat and watching for them in the 
wake, and finding that they become easier to identify the farther they recede’ (Turner 
1994: 32). 
But even if we cannot prove a causal link between certain practices and shared 
psychological possessions, it does not follow that such shared possessions do not exist. 
Accordingly, in a second step, Turner proceeds to consider what it would take for them to 
exist. Here he looks at the constraints on the nature of a possession, asserting that by 
definition a possession is a thing or substance which requires that it be transmitted or 
conveyed in some way to the possessor. He states the problem as follows: 
To explain how they get to the places they must get to – namely, inside some 
people and not others – in order to do their explanatory job seems to require an 
unusual process of transmission. If we conceive of practices as public quasi-
objects, they must get from their public location into persons who act in 
accordance with them. If we conceive of them as dualistic forces, with collective 
and individual aspects, we are faced with the problem of how they can interact 
causally both on the collective and individual level. If we conceive of practices as 
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nothing more than habits, we are faced with the question of how the same habits 
get into different people (pp. 60–61). 
Turner concludes that no model of practice can meet the constraint of conveyance and 
that no account of the acquisition of practices supports the idea that the same internal 
thing is (or can) be reproduced in another person. Ultimately, then, the beginning 
hypothesis of practice – the common possession of a tacit object – may be a myth; and 
after all is said and done the only hypothesis left standing is habituation, ‘the ugly 
duckling concept of habit’.  
If the idea of preserving sameness is removed from the other cases of 
transmission, they collapse into the case of the acquisition of habits, habits which 
may vary in internal structure and produce performances that are externally the 
same, and habits which may produce performances that vary slightly but are 
sufficiently intelligible or sufficiently predictable for the purposes at hand. (p. 77). 
But ‘habits die with individuals’ (p. 78); so what would explain the persistence of certain 
behaviours on a widespread basis through society, and how do they come to change, once 
established? Here Turner examines the explanatory potential of notions such as culture, 
paradigm, and tradition as the locus of practices. He ultimately dismisses the relevance of 
why practices persist as an issue by suggesting that there is nothing unusual or anomalous 
about persistence of common practices within a population, since the process of 
emulation, for example, could on its own lead to the continuance of widespread 
behaviours. 
But if persistence is natural, how does one explain how practices change, especially on a 
large scale? In social theory, the account of change considers that changes or novelty 
occur through systemic processes within society as a closed system. Turner examines 
whether such self-transformation is possible, and points out that systemic frames of 
reference and mental models which warrant practices in social theory will not move on 
their own, as this would represent a change in causality. As is the case in formative 
teleology (Stacey et al. 2000), causality cannot spontaneously change because there is no 
way to move to a new state beyond that which is already embedded or enfolded in the 
system. Systemic change can only happen by the action of some mysterious force or 
accident. Ultimately, Turner rejects closed-system thinking in favour of a more 
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compelling account of change, which holds that successive small changes can add up to 
significant difference over time while still preserving an impression of sameness at any 
given moment. 
In the end, Turner turns to a simple account of practice which steers clear of the range of 
mystical explanations (transmission producing sameness in many people, persistence as 
anomaly, change as accident) that he finds embedded in the social theory of practice. He 
gets to a conception of practice as non-foundational and non-fundamental to common 
manifestations, which in no way requires the presence of a community mind or shared 
tacit knowledge. 
To solve the apparent riddles of persistence and transmission, he turns to the explanatory 
potential of the acquisition of habits through observances, performance and activities, 
leading to continued performance.  
 If acting in accordance with a tradition is acting in accordance with the way of life 
of a community, and if the way of life of a community includes certain 
observances, performances and activities, and individual habits and mental habits 
arise through engaging in the relevant performances, nothing need follow with 
respect to the causal role or status of practice understood as a kind of collective 
fact. All that need follow is this: by performing in certain ways, people acquire 
habits which lead them to continue to perform, more or less in the same ways. 
Observances cause individual habits, not some sort of collectively shared habit 
called practice or way of life, which one may possess or fail to possess . . . 
(Turner 1994: 99–100). 
Turner ultimately equates practices with habituations, which result in individual publicly 
observable behaviour, often instigated by simple observances. In this way, practice is not 
the public manifestation itself. Assuming that many aspects of practice as I describe in 
this project can be assimilated within the broader notions of social practices that Turner 
writes about, Turner’s position would suggest that when we talk about our practice, in the 
sense of professional practice or work, for example, we are actually equating and 
confusing practice as public manifestations of the application of technique or knowledge, 
with the diverse habituations producing such observable activity. 
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This reading of Turner raises some important points to be considered. First, it seems 
apparent that we cannot confidently infer any tacit means of transmission and acquisition 
of practice resulting in observed behaviour, since we cannot know the processes of 
practice from within. Second is Turner’s suggestion to the effect that it is how practice 
may be acquired – first by emulation, then by habituation – that defines the concept of 
practice itself. This latter point has strong explanatory power for my account. Emulation 
is a process carried out reflexively through interaction with others during cooperative 
action; a focus on emulation places processes of interaction at the centre of defining 
practice. This is an important insight which opens up the inquiry into practice to the 
examination of personal interactive experience. I explore the significance of this 
conclusion in the next section.  
In conclusion, in this section I have turned to Schön and Turner as sources to help 
commence reflecting on another way of talking about practice. Both Schön and Turner 
bring the individual in practice into view. Schön presents a thorough portrayal of the 
reflective processes that may be at work as the practitioner engages in action. Schön’s 
focus on these processes, in particular inner-conversational processes as thinking in 
practice, is an attempt to know practice from inside the practitioner’s experience, locating 
practice in processes of interaction. As for Turner, he too arrives at a process view of 
practice, though somewhat obliquely, when he identifies emulation and habituation as the 
process by which practice is acquired. Attention to processes and knowing from within 
experience are important themes for the account of practice I am attempting to construct. 
Return to the narrative 
Let us now reconsider the narrative I presented at the beginning of this project, 
specifically from the perspective of interactive processes. Throughout the week of 
activities and interactions described above, I seem to progress fluidly through a 
streamlined, somewhat sequential process of action from encounter to encounter, from 
Sunday to Friday. But the narrative also shows that the various encounters are not 
isolated one from the other. In the intervals between encounters, thoughts of the one just 
past mingle with anticipation of the one to come. And often one encounter intrudes while 
another is in progress, as when I received a call from the Rialto representative in my 
office at PMV. 
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There is nothing unusual about the succession and intermingling of experiences, whether 
one is speaking of successive encounters in different domains, as in the narrative, or if the 
encounters are all within a single working environment. However, none of these 
encounters (or all of them together) involves or produces the rote application of 
techniques or specialized knowledge to situations needing solutions, or within preset 
roles or functions. Processes, like the reflective processes proposed by Schön, are 
occurring throughout each encounter, as well as in between them.  
The tableau of such processes can be widened yet again, to take account of processes of 
interaction, manifested as conversation. On the face of it, in my portrayal of this one 
week, conversation emerges as a dominant theme. Notwithstanding that the narrative is 
written reflexively, bringing out the conversational nature of each encounter as a matter 
of course, it is nonetheless evident that conversation is central to my way of getting on in 
the world of organized activity. And since every conversational utterance involves 
measures of interpretation and rhetoric, evaluatively speaking and choosing not to speak, 
as I did on at least three occasions in the narrative, there is no such thing as simple 
conversation. Conversation is the enactment of processes of complex lively interaction; it 
follows that complex lively interaction is also a central aspect of practice, just as both 
Schön and Turner suggest in the glimpses that they offer of the role of these processes. 
I shall return to the consideration of interaction as my research goes forward, exploring 
various aspects of interaction as it relates to practice in the next two projects. For now, 
one particular insight about interaction seems important: I am referring to Turner’s 
conclusion that practice is defined by the processes of its acquisition by the individual in 
interaction, through emulation in the form of observances, performance and activity. In 
other words, it could be argued that practice is acquired in the doing of it, very much 
contrary to the Technical Rationality paradigm challenged by Schön. It could also be 
argued that through this process practice is as likely to change as to stay the same, over 
time. So during my week of activity, I could be said to be acquiring practice by virtue of 
all experiences, without hard boundaries, as I live them. While the specifics of such a 
process remain to be described, this statement does point to practice as being emergent. It 
is this notion of emergence which is of interest to me at this point. 
Emergence is a process that entails dialectical movement, as interacting entities shape 
and modify one another and are themselves modified or shaped through the same 
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interaction. In dialectic, two or more entities or constructs are seen as ‘mutually opposed 
(and often contradictory) but mutually necessary . . . in which each . . . helps to constitute 
the other’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 578). Nitsun refers to T.H Ogden as seeing ‘the 
dialectic as a process in which opposing elements each create, preserve, and negate the 
other: each exists in a dynamic, constantly changing relationship with the other. Neither 
has any conceptual or phenomenological meaning except in relation to the other. Each 
relationship has the potential for integration but each potential integration generates a 
new form of dialectical relationship’ (1996: 204). According to Stacey and his 
colleagues, “In this movement . . . there is paradox as there is the possibility of sameness, 
or continuity, and the potential for spontaneous transformation at the same time’ (Stacey 
et al. 2000: 33). 
In order to connect the idea of emergence with my alternative account of practice more 
substantively, it is necessary to point out where the dialectic is located. The dialectic is 
lived in every instance of interaction, when the group and I determine our course of 
action through our palpable engagement with each other in conversation – that is, through 
words and gestures. The quality and nature of my participation in these conversations is 
indicative of my practice: as one of my learning set colleagues pointed out after reading 
my narrative, gestures of persuasion, influence, forcefulness and argumentation are 
juxtaposed alongside worrying over having too much influence, participating only to 
suggest alternative ways forward, avoiding usurping responsibility, or waiting until the 
end, and often holding two opposing positions at the same time. 
These attributes of my participation are in fact gestures or acts of argumentation. Therein 
may lie some further sense of practice. While conversation is a public behaviour, it is 
sustained by practices of argumentation as thought (Billig, 1991), reflecting a discourse 
picked up and developed over time. With this in mind, discourse, as a function of 
argumentation, is also emergent, since argumentation can be dialectical process, ‘seeking 
out the strongest possible “enemies” of our ideas and entering into a process of rational 
argumentation with them’ (Midgely 2000: 137). The ‘enemies’ Midgely refers to can 
exist in our inner conversation as much as in public interaction. Taken in this light, 
practice may be regarded as encompassing dialectical processes of thought, social 
interaction and ‘joint action’ (Shotter, 1993), constantly emerging and transforming 
through experience. 
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Concluding remarks 
The first project ended with an interrogation as to which theories of practice may be 
reflected in my experience, and how developing them might contribute to a wider and 
deeper understanding of practice in general.  At the beginning of this second project, I 
have taken up that question by presenting a more detailed account of my portfolio of 
activities, and then have asked: to what extent do they, together, form a practice? This 
question is, in fact, a challenge to look more closely at dominant conceptions of practice, 
and to discern in which ways my practice, as I understand it, is not recognized in the 
accounts of practice that dominate management literature. In view of these gaps in 
recognition within the dominant account, my purpose has been to begin constructing an 
account that better reflects my lived experience. 
The way in which I have gone about this entails a particular approach to the use of the 
literature – warranted, I believe, by my method of bricolage: I have selected Schön’s and 
Turner’s significant independent contributions to thought on practice, and have examined 
these in detail, in the search of resources which may be put to use in the construction of 
my account. In the two subsequent projects as well, I shall include other such 
examinations intact in the text. The writing of them was an integral part of my research 
activities, and they will be essential in supporting my conclusions. 
These authors’ departures from established ideas about practice point to the need to 
include in our thought about practice the processes which give rise to observable 
behaviours, instead of the observable behaviours themselves. Schön has done this quite 
openly by contesting the Technical Rationality paradigm on the ground that it takes little 
notice of the practitioner’s processes of reflection. Turner, on the other hand, points out 
that the only way practices can be acquired is through emulation and habituation. This, I 
believe, defines and locates the very concept of practice within those processes which, 
according to social-constructionist ontology, are at the centre of the joint formation of 
social groupings and individuals. This is a position I will maintain and deepen in the rest 
of this dissertation. 
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PROJECT THREE:  
THE FRAGILITY OF PRACTICE 
 
Project Two of my research program broadly considered a series of experiences arranged 
as if they had occurred within a one-week time span so as to give a sense of the variety 
and flow of activity that my active life comprises. My use of such an overview for 
reflection and research has made it possible to identify the significance of the processes 
of interaction that shape individuals and groups to the account of practice I am seeking to 
develop. The next step in developing this account involves reflecting in more detail on 
specific experiences in order to clarify how I engage in my active life in terms of the 
quality and nature of my engagement; and this clarification may then form the basis for 
research on the relation of such engagement to the nature of practice more generally.  
The title of this third project with its particular the reference to fragility was prompted by 
a particular experience I had when a process that I had initiated in my organization took a 
surprising turn, contrary to my intentions. At the time, I sensed that this turn of events 
had much to do with the interactions in the room, particularly my own interactions with 
my principal colleague and superior, which had shifted in the moment from being 
collaborative to power-based.  I was struck by how fragile my whole undertaking was in 
this experience, and this appeared to be a helpful starting point for a detailed exploration. 
Because of the socially-constructed nature of experiences in organizations, it seems that 
they can dissolve or change into something new at any time. Roles and methods are 
contingent on the specific interactive circumstances in each case, such that professional 
identities and social (organizational) roles and the relationships which normally inhere 
count for little in ordering a situation. In the absence of adherence to conventions of 
practice, the feasibility and ultimate success of practice may ultimately be related to the 
quality of the interactive circumstances. It is precisely the content of such interactive 
circumstances which I will explore in this project. 
This paper begins with a narrative account of the experience that prompted this particular 
exploration. The narrative contains considerable detail, which may appear anecdotal in 
places; however, I believe it is important to include this level of detail since the writing of 
it exposed the quality of interactions to examination. It is through this examination that I 
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could detect the presence of strong emotions affecting the turn of events. I then explore 
the role of emotions in interaction, particularly with reference to Denzin (1984). From 
this investigation I conclude that the issue for practice is not the personal experience of 
emotion, but the role of emotionality – the process of experiencing emotion – as a 
constitutive aspect of interaction. I then discuss how emotionality contributes to the 
liveliness of interaction, impeding or encouraging the attainment of sought-after goals, 
making the themes of emotionality, engagement and liveliness relevant to my account of 
practice. 
An emotional experience of practice: Moving Citadel forward 
I had come across a paper on Mark’s5 desk about a conference he was to attend in 
Savannah, Georgia, USA, put on by the Waterfront Center, an organization which 
promotes the harmonious and sustainable development of urban waterfronts. Even though 
there was nothing specific on the conference agenda that would apply to our Citadel6
During this same period, I was still very busy with my volunteer involvement with a large 
urban and environmental redevelopment project in Toronto. My counterparts there and I 
were carrying forward a project-definition group process which we had elaborated 
several months earlier. I felt that this method might be interesting to consider for the 
Citadel project at its current stage of development. With Mark’s agreement, I invited 
‘Bryce’, the principal of the firm working on the Toronto project, to join us for some 
 
project, Mark and I agreed that we should invite our primary consultant group to come 
along with us (at our cost); this would give us the opportunity for some intensive, 
unprogrammed time together to reflect on our project. Mark and I had been growing 
increasingly concerned that the design and program for the project which our consultants 
had developed so far did not reflect the real potential of the site or what we hoped to 
accomplish there. In our view, the site called for an innovative project which would 
capture the geographic and historic richness of the location in building forms and a 
combination of different uses which would normally be considered too risky for 
conventional real estate planning and development approaches.  We were therefore 
interested in finding an alternative approach to planning the project. 
                                                 
5 ‘Mark is my colleague in the company where we both work, and is the senior person responsible for the 
Citadel project (see Project Two). .. 
6 ‘Citadel’ is the name given in this dissertation to a major real estate development project we are 
undertaking near the Old Montreal waterfront (see Project Two). 
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exploratory discussions about using the Toronto method on the Citadel project. The 
discussions turned out to be quite promising: so when we learned that Bryce was to be 
one of the speakers at the upcoming conference, we booked him in for some of the 
informal meetings we planned to hold in Savannah with our own consulting team. 
During the three days we spent in Savannah, all staying in the same hotel where the 
conference was taking place, easygoing conversations took place during lunches and 
coffee breaks on lively terraces, at dinners in good restaurants, and while walking 
together along the historic Civil War period waterfront, aided by beautiful warm southern 
sunny weather. At every encounter, the Citadel project was the topic of free-flowing 
conversation. As our visit was coming to an end, I could begin to see how Bryce’s 
abilities at group facilitation could be useful in helping us move forward towards defining 
a truly exciting, meaningful project, organized on a more systematic and productive 
basis. 
At a final stop in the hotel bar on the last night, Mark happened to ask what I thought we 
ought to do next. I had been thinking about this, and suggested that we propose to our 
group of consultants a process of intensive group reflection on the way forward. We 
would all participate in the process as interested persons, as if we were free of 
professional roles and predispositions. The idea then would be to let Bryce, in the role of 
a friendly but disinterested outsider with no specific part in the project, facilitate us 
through the process using his skills in process leadership and his knowledge as an 
architect and planner. Mark warmed to the idea of a process approach and agreed that we 
should go ahead as I proposed. The following day everyone agreed to give this approach 
a try. 
Shortly after our return to Montreal, a meeting took place with the investors, who brought 
some new account managers to see the site and to be introduced to the project. The entire 
delegation was glowing with excitement about the project and was supportive of our 
proposed way of proceeding. Once they had left the city, Mark now wanted some prompt 
and concrete action on our part in response to their enthusiasm – some visible signs of 
movement to bolster their confidence in the project and our management of it. He insisted 
that we must follow up quickly on the process we had discussed in Savannah. 
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We convened a meeting of the consultants in our office on Wednesday of the following 
week. Neither Mark nor I had occasion to speak about the meeting with each other; but 
without thinking too much about it, my understanding was that it was to be a simple 
follow-up to Savannah to prepare for the anticipated process. We would bring the current 
project team together (some new members had been added, while others had not been in 
Savannah) to discuss the process, get to know each other better and plan our next steps. I 
planned to prepare an agenda along those lines on the Monday before the meeting. 
On Monday, I came down with a flu, and had to go home in mid-afternoon. On Tuesday, 
I could not get myself out of bed, and spent the whole day sleeping. At one point, Mark 
did try to reach me, but ended up having to leave a voice message to the effect that he had 
wanted to know what I had in mind for the Wednesday meeting. If I was going to be too 
ill to prepare an agenda, he would take care of everything, he said – but he wanted a 
chance to speak with me before the meeting, if at all possible. 
On Wednesday morning, I was feeling only slightly better, but I believed I would be able 
to attend meeting. I had wanted to get to the office early in order to chat with Mark, but I 
was still feeling too ill to do so.  I arrived at the office just before the meeting was to 
begin, exchanged a few words with Mark in the hallway, and then together we joined the 
group. Because of out-of-town travel conflicts, two of the participants had to attend the 
meeting by conference call; so we had a mix of people present who did not all know each 
other, and two people on the phone who did not know several of the people present in the 
room. In all, there were nine people in attendance besides Mark and me; but only Mark 
and I knew everyone. 
The meeting began normally enough: Mark welcomed everyone, and then asked me to 
explain what we were here for and just what we hoped to achieve. I responded as best I 
could in my condition at that moment: our meeting’s main purpose would be to establish 
contact, talk about the process we had in mind (which I explained) and open up 
discussion about a schedule, additions to the group, and any other matters of importance 
that might arise in the course of the meeting. As I began to speak, it was clear to me – and 
I believed that it must have been to everyone else – that I was out of sorts: my voice was 
raspy, and I was groggy to the point of having difficulty putting two words together in a 
coherent sentence. 
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I should say that this is far from my usual demeanour in these types of situations. I 
normally have a fairly commanding presence in meetings, or so I’m told often enough. 
My confidence in my ability to interact in meetings, especially when I know the people 
present as was the case here, is such that I can go into such settings relatively unprepared 
and still be quite effective. But it was not so in this instance. I was not performing well, 
and I began to sense that the meeting was struggling because of it. I was feeling quite 
self-conscious about this, though not particularly self-critical or embarrassed: I knew that 
this was just the first of several meetings to come, and I felt that everyone present, whom 
I knew personally, would understand. 
The meeting limped along: discussion was not particularly lively, and it did not seem 
clear to anyone really what we were hoping to achieve. We went around the table, giving 
each person the chance to comment on the challenges as they saw them. But everyone 
stopped short of saying exactly what they thought about the major issues facing the 
project, and the conversation seemed to meander around everything and anything except 
the process we were to carry out. Finally, the senior architect of one of the two principal 
firms involved– I shall call him ‘Harri’ – jumped in and suggested we set out once again 
to come up with new creative design ideas for the project. But the process we were there 
to undertake had been chosen precisely to get us away from free-wheeling creative design 
exercises of the sort Harri was proposing. The approach Harri had in mind had already 
taken us as far as it could go; this meeting and the process we were seeking were about 
looking for a new departure.  
I was very put out by what I believed to be Harri’s attempt to sabotage the arrival of a 
new architectural competitor on the scene, namely Bryce. I was convinced that Harri was 
playing to his old friend and collaborator, Mark, and at the same time, hoisting his own 
firm into the lead role on the project. 
What happened next surprised and discouraged me. Mark took the bait; he followed 
Harri’s lead enthusiastically and began taking the meeting with him. I was in turmoil. I 
was moved to speak up against this improvised departure from our agreed-upon process. I 
spoke as calmly as possible and with as much deference for Mark as I could. But my 
demeanour betrayed me. In the best of times I am not very good at veiling my emotional 
state; on this particular morning, with my raspy, hesitant voice and my physical 
discomfort, I must have looked as if I was ready to explode. 
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After another couple of exchanges between Mark and Harri, which were not taken up by 
others in the group, and then a few confused attempts by some of the newcomers to save 
the day, the conversation came back to me. I said again, in more forceful terms now, that 
I thought Harri’s proposal could not work: ‘We’ve already agreed that what we did 
before did not work. I don’t see why it would work any better now. So are we going to 
waste more time and money going this route again, to get us – where?’ There was silence 
as around the table; it was painfully obvious to everyone that Mark and I were now at 
loggerheads.  
Mark knew it too, and he went on the offensive. He shot back me: “So what do we do 
now, besides pout?” I managed not to rise to the insult, and instead I threw the question 
about what to do next to Bryce, who was participating by phone. Bryce fashioned an 
answer of sorts, but again Harri intervened, proposing that several new design scenarios 
be developed. I knew that doing so would contaminate the entire process we were 
undertaking, and render Bryce’s contribution potentially redundant. 
Mark again backed Harri’s suggestions: he decreed that he wanted new schemes to be 
produced rapidly, that we should have the first working session of the group within two 
weeks and commanded that results would have to be presented at that time. His 
demeanour while he spoke was as telling as I’ve ever seen: his eyes moved around the 
table, but his gaze would unmistakably stop at the person next to me, as though he did not 
wish to acknowledge my presence in the room. This was clearly a power move, intended 
to make sure everyone there – especially me – knew he was boss. He then instructed 
everyone present to submit to me a schedule of work and a budget along the lines he had 
indicated; it would then be up to me to give them the go-ahead. Dates for the next 
meetings were set, and the meeting came to an end. 
I felt deeply humiliated after this meeting – not only embarrassed, but diminished 
professionally, put in my place and relegated to menial follow-up chores instead of 
engaged in steering an innovative methodology which could realize the true essence and 
potential of the Citadel site and perhaps even reshape our own organization. Put simply, I 
was being told: ‘Forget all of this silly innovation stuff, Cameron. Let’s get down to 
“real” work instead.’ 
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Examining the experience 
To the conventional real estate practitioner, a group process approach to planning a 
development project as described above would likely appear improvised and inefficient, 
bordering on incomprehensible. Real estate development typically deals in the very 
concrete domain of users, buildings, streets, urban infrastructure and financing. For this 
reason, real estate planning and development is a field rife with people who present 
themselves under the authority of professional expertise and accreditation – people, in 
other words, who normally subscribe to clearly delineated practical approaches, for the 
most part specific to each professional’s area of expertise. Functional roles are always 
clearly circumscribed. When many such areas of expertise are called into play 
simultaneously, they will call it a ‘multidisciplinary approach’; and indeed 
multidisciplinary approaches have by now become virtually another domain of 
professional practice. 
While conventional practical approaches are useful in carrying out determinate projects, 
they are often also attempted in the search for innovative solutions to development 
problems as well. In such cases, if a conventional approach appears to work at all, it is 
usually because one lead professional (such as the architect) provides much of the 
creative input which the others follow in support. This means, in effect, that there is 
really no group process at all. At one point in the Citadel project, Mark and I had actually 
entertained the idea of taking on a world-renowned architect (at the same time as we got 
Bryce involved), but we quickly concluded that this could not lead to the meaningful 
result we were seeking. In other words, we realized that the true potential of Citadel was, 
in a certain sense, unknowable (as I shall explain below), so it would have to be either 
discovered or constructed in some way. 
But ‘discovered’ and ‘constructed’ are not the same. Discovery implies a way of knowing 
in which the participants in a process set out with an intuition or hypothesis, which is 
tested, evaluated and retested repeatedly and iteratively until an answer which is believed 
to be have been lurking somewhere all along is at last found. In the case of real estate 
development, this way of proceeding would entail doing masses of market and design 
analyses to identify unfilled gaps in the market and urban fabric which could be filled by 
the project, and from there designing a strategic response to these opportunities (see 
Mintzberg et al. 1998). This is a common approach in our field, but only rarely, if ever, 
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have I seen it lead of its own accord to truly novel and unexpected responses to situations 
of such high complexity as I considered Citadel project to be. 
Constructing a response to a sensed but indefined opportunity, on the other hand, is an 
attempt to seize and exploit the full complexity of a given situation. Here the term 
‘construction’ takes on a meaning analogous to social construction or joint construction 
of the future (Shotter 1993: Stacey 2003; Gergen 1999), as opposed to the opposite 
connotation of the intentional realization of a predefined future project. In the 
constructionistic view, the outcomes that emerge are specific to a particular situation and 
meaningful in context. Emergence occurs as people interact in the joint construction of an 
unknowable future, with the possibility at every turn for transformation and novelty at the 
same time as persistence and repetition. Since transformation and novelty were sought 
after in the Citadel project, we had chosen to pursue development of the Citadel concept 
using an interactive group process. 
In referring to interactive group processes and joint construction of an unknowable future 
as I do here, I am aware that I am using concepts analogous to those of emergence in 
group processes in order to talk about the development of responses to problems or 
opportunities in the concrete world. This idea merits a brief explanation. Other than 
conventional planning methodologies, there are group problem-solving methodologies, 
often community-based, which can be also used in planning situations. This is what is 
found, for instance, in prescriptive group methods such as Future Search (Weisbord and 
Janoff 2000; Shaw 2002), which employ step-by-step staged events of interaction among 
competing stakeholders, following models of group synergy and organization grounded 
in systems theory. 
There is a marked distinction between such prescriptive methods and what I was 
attempting at this stage of the Citadel project. My intention was to convene an open-
ended process of interaction, with a variety of points of view, to look at the opportunity 
before us from a broader perspective than those of the planning and real estate 
professionals. I saw this process as attempting to precipitate face-to-face interaction 
among experienced and knowledgeable individuals focused on a development 
opportunity which they all cared about. 
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Such a process would necessarily demand that the participants divest themselves of 
claims to the automatic recognition and deference to which they normally feel entitled as 
professionals when participating in conventional development exercises. In conventional 
development, the professional’s interest in the project is intimately related to his or her 
professional status, such that there is often no distinction between what is good for the 
professional as a professional and what is objectively good for the project. More often 
than not, the architect takes over by virtue of the authoritative role he or she plays in the 
conventional project setting. 
In interactive group processes, where professional identities are set aside, as we were 
trying to achieve, no one person can pretend to have unchallenged authority over any one 
area or aspect of the project. Participants are expected to accept some lack of order in the 
relations among them. For the entire process to move towards the desired goal, they are 
called upon to maintain a personal engagement that reflects their commitment to the 
project.  
In retrospect, I believe the principal reason why I took such strong exception to Harri’s 
intervention was that he appeared to be reverting to a conventional professional role, 
contrary to the intended process, hijacking the process into a more comfortable and 
familiar conventional approach, where his influence could dominate. 
What I notice further about this encounter is the way the meeting seemed to descend 
spontaneously into a three-way interaction involving Mark, Harri and myself, leaving 
everyone else on the sidelines. Until that moment, I had been proceeding as if everyone 
present fully grasped the idea of the process. But Harri had not been in Savannah with us 
(one of his firm’s junior architects had attended the conference instead) and so it was 
entirely possible that he simply did not grasp what we were trying to do. Therefore it is 
not surprising that he stayed primarily in role as a professional architect. 
Mark, for his part admitted to me on the day after the meeting that he had not been 
conscious in the moment that he was effectively undoing the agreement we had made. It 
is understandable that, having lost sight of our strategy, he sensed the need to take control 
in his own way as head developer, given the rather uncertain progress being made in the 
moment and my inability to occupy the space necessary to achieve movement.  In view of 
these alternative understandings of Harri and Mark’s behaviour, they may have become a 
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pair, or dyad, reverting to doing things their usual way as the others watched. 
Nonetheless I perceived their actions to be an assault on the process, and I experienced a 
vivid and somewhat visible emotional reaction as a result. 
It is this emotional reaction, in a non-emotional context, which seems important here. All 
too often we hear that human emotions have no place in the business environment; that 
we should deal ‘rationally’ with each other and with the issues we confront. However, the 
intensity of my reaction in the circumstances described above leads me to believe that 
personal emotions are rather more present in everyday practical encounters than 
conventional accounts of practice and cooperation acknowledge, and that they play a 
significant role in practice. 
With this in mind, consider the following short narrative of a very ordinary telephone 
conference. 
Memorandum of a telephone conference 
‘Today, February 8, 2006, we had a conference call concerning a difficult budget 
situation between the non-governmental organization where I serve as a board member 
and chair-designate and our largest funder, a European NGO. The subject was the 
replanning of our board’s retreat weekend coming up in a week and a half, where we 
intended to bring up the issue of future resource contributions by us to the worldwide 
system run by the Europeans. This topic would likely be a surprise to my fellow board 
members. Over the past ten years, they have been mostly passive about the budget. In our 
relations with the Europeans regarding finances, negotiations take place at the staff level 
to finalize a draft budget, and the Board merely ratifies the negotiated proposal. 
‘We pick up the conversation at the point where we have now decided to hold an extra-
day intensive session between staff and board leadership, to include only the Executive 
Director, three of her staff, the Board Chair, ‘Bruce’ (representing the European side – he 
is also a senior manager of the worldwide organization), and me. At the extra-day 
session, we will be deciding how to restructure our organization to meet a serious 
anticipated budget shortfall, and then to put in motion a renewed effort to augment the 
resources which we will contribute to the overall system. 
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‘The call has already been rather long – over an hour, and we are nearing the end of the 
conversation. Our Executive Director signals that she wishes to make a suggestion. She 
anticipates that the extra day will be an engaging one, and that we will all want to be 
involved at all times. She therefore proposes to have ‘Ernie’, a mid-level staffer whose 
job in the reorganization is not threatened in the anticipated change, sit in on the meeting. 
First, he could act as facilitator to keep the discussion on track towards a decisive 
outcome and facilitate full participation. Second, she feels that Ernie enjoys considerable 
trust on the part of the rest of the organization, and so any hard decisions coming out of 
the meeting will have greater credibility if Ernie were able to explain outcomes to his 
fellow staff. 
‘My colleagues on the call make various comments, mostly supportive. I am second or 
third to speak. I say that I feel that it is up to our chair and Executive Director to get us 
through the day, and that we should be capable of managing that way. Then Bruce calls 
our attention to the fact that Ernie will have to respect strict rules of confidentiality 
because of the delicate nature of the discussions. He will not be able to speak to others 
about what will transpire in the session. This seems to pre-empt the second reason for his 
being invited into the room. The Executive Director comes at it again, in her ever-so-
gently persuasive and thoughtful way. A majority is building in favour of having Ernie 
take part. Finally, the question comes to me anew as to whether I can live with this in 
spite of my disagreement. I say that I will rally to the majority decision, but that I am still 
uncomfortable. I am a little annoyed, but I put it behind me. 
‘As the conversation is winding down, the Executive Director makes an impromptu 
comment in favour of Ernie being part of the process, and there, in the moment, the word 
“process” catches my attention. I start to imagine what a process might mean in an 
organization with 30 people. Just what process is she getting at? If there is to be a 
process, why would Ernie be involved now and no one else? 
‘In my opinion, Ernie is not a particularly good facilitator, but all the others appreciate 
his talents, so I keep quiet about that aspect. However, I feel I must speak up on other 
matters. I start to speak quite spontaneously, saying I am feeling emotionally perturbed, 
and that I’m going to think out loud, if they will just bear with me. In the moment I am 
sensing an emotional rush: some tensing, something like mild anger or stress, I do not 
know which. In any case, I start raising questions. Is the outcome of our high-level 
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meeting to be a process or a decisive act of authority? If it is to be a process, why would 
only Ernie be involved and not the entire staff, or at least a staff delegation? 
‘As I talk, I feel increasingly convinced that there are unspoken preconceptions as to 
what this meeting is about. If they were to be enunciated openly, I might disagree even 
more emphatically. In fact, as I speak, I am becoming more incensed about this 
'unspokenness' than I am about Ernie attending or not. I feel that we have to get to the 
bottom of this: just what process are we referring to so obliquely? How do we know now 
what is going to come out of the meeting and how we would probably announce it? What 
am I missing? In the end, everyone rallies to the fact that we are getting ahead of 
ourselves, that we should keep the meeting to ourselves, and that our Chair will manage 
the day. We agree that we will get on with the business of deciding how to proceed 
relative to the rest of the organization when we can see the whole picture.’ 
But what was it I was feeling in the moment about Ernie’s participation? My question 
now is: Are such feelings useful? Do they serve any purpose in interaction and in 
practice? Probably. After all, my rhetorical manoeuvre on the Executive Director’s use of 
the word ‘process’ did reveal a problem on the horizon, and exposed the presence of 
something unspoken and perhaps too sensitive to mention at the time – probably the 
imminent staff cuts which were on everyone’s mind. I sense now that I had let my talk 
articulate what my emotion was referring to. Once the point was decided, my emotional 
state subsided. I was satisfied. 
Emotion and emotionality 
This account of the phone conference is an another instance, albeit more subtle and 
mundane, of the sort of emotion I was feeling when I engaged on the process issue in the 
case of the Citadel project. I had sensed it right away; but I was also prepared to act on it 
and I believe that my awareness of it allowed me to risk an argument in which I let my 
unease do the talking. When I compare this sensation to the emotion I experienced at the 
Citadel project meeting, I can see that both instances are of a similar nature, reminding 
me that this happens to me very regularly. At various times I have attributed this reaction 
to jealousy over power and authority or frustration over lack of recognition. But 
reflecting on the arousal of such feelings within experiences which I claim to be 
reflective of my practice, I am prompted to think that they are more complex than 
jealousy or frustration, and may point to a constitutive link between emotion and practice. 
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What is this which I am calling ‘emotion’? Is it a process or a phenomenon? Is it of the 
mind or is it of the body? Is it inside me or within my interaction with others? Is it a 
feeling, or a physical state, or a particular behaviour? Answering these queries will 
require some exploration. 
Elias (1987a) and Denzin (1984) say that emotion is embodied excitement made up of 
three simultaneous components: physiological affect, behavioural affect and feeling. The 
physiological component occurs within the body and includes changes in heart rate, 
blood flow and muscular tension. The behavioural component involves actions we take to 
discharge the emotion, such as a ‘fight or flight’ response to anger or fear – a visible 
display of aggression or aversion. As regards feeling, emotion is an aspect of 
consciousness wherein we are aware that we feel a certain way – angry, fearful, joyful; 
moreover, we are aware that we are aware of feeling this way, and therefore can exercise 
some measure of control over the feeling if we choose. 
However, neither of these definitions says what emotion means. In that regard, Elias 
(1987a) writes that emotion can take on two meanings. Emotion can signify the feeling 
component only, which when put at the centre of consideration, gives emotion a causal 
function for behaviour. A display of emotion is the individual communicating externally 
that which he or she is experiencing inside. This meaning reflects a spatial conception of 
the human being, where the true self is hidden deep inside an autonomous corporal entity. 
Alternatively, emotion can refer to an entire reaction and interaction pattern, including 
somatic, behavioural and feeling aspects, and is often specific to a situation whether lived 
in relation to others or experienced in thought. 
The difference between the two meanings is important: the first maintains the duality of 
the autonomous individual interacting with a grouping of other autonomous individuals 
called the social and places the focus on the individual, even when provoked by others; 
the second treats emotion as part of processes of interaction in which individuals and the 
group are forming and being formed at the same time. In this latter view, emotion can be 
regarded as having a role in such processes of formation. Given the centrality of such 
processes in the account of practice I have undertaken, in the following pages I will take 
up the significance of this second view of emotion for my inquiry. 
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As I have done with the works of Turner (1994) and Schön (1991) in the previous 
section, I will begin with a similarly detailed examination, this time of Denzin’s On 
Understanding Emotion (1984), a major work worthy of close consideration, because it 
reveals a wide range of ways of seeing emotion. Here, Denzin, who describes his 
undertaking as ‘a social phenomenological and interpretive perspective on the inner and 
outer worlds of emotional experience’ (1984: vii), undertakes a thorough study of 
emotion and emotionality, seeking to determine how emotionality is lived by people as a 
form of consciousness.  
Denzin proceeds in several clearly delineated steps: a statement of his thesis and his 
methodology of ‘interpretive phenomenology’; a methodical treatment of major 
contributions to the subject of emotions over the past century, including those of Sartre, 
Hochschild, Collins, Weber, Durkheim, Marx and Mead, whose ideas he deconstructs so 
as to detect various strands to be incorporated into his own theory of emotions; an 
examination of emotional experience through the lens of that theory, starting with the 
‘inner experience of emotion’ and moving into the outer world to the social experience of 
emotion; a look at problematic emotionality in real life contexts such as family violence; 
and finally a reflection and conclusion.  
Denzin’s point of departure in his study is the human subject who is located in a world of 
intersubjective experience, emotionally, cognitively and interactionally (p. 6). Denzin 
insists that his goal is seeing, inspecting and studying the interiority of emotion as lived 
experience. As such, it must be understood from within emotion, which he proposes to do 
using ‘thick descriptions’ (Denzin, 1989) of various subjects’ emotional experiences, 
collected in a research project he undertook while writing the book, using elaborate 
hermeneutic methodologies of interpretation and understanding. Only on rare and brief 
occasions in the text does he refer to his own experiences of emotion, relying on 
interpretive methods instead of reflexivity to gain access to experience. 
Denzin cites three points of view which could apply to the study of emotion. The 
interpretive psychological approach seeks understanding from within emotional 
experience itself. The phenomenological approach studies emotion as a phenomenon in 
psychology. The sociological or interactionist view locates emotion in the world of 
interaction. Denzin draws on thought from all three viewpoints, concluding that 
‘emotional’ is the term to be given to a particular mode of consciousness and of being in 
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the world. His examination culminates in a new conception of emotion in social 
interaction, leading to a definition used throughout the rest of the book: ‘“Emotions are 
temporally embodied, situated self-feelings that arise from emotional and cognitive social 
acts that people direct to self or have directed towards them by others’ (Denzin 1984: 49). 
For Denzin, the essential pathway in this definition is the self that he calls ‘“that structure 
of experience I call mine’ (p. 51), which arises in interaction. Underlying all aspects of 
emotion is the idea that emotions are self-feelings, where the referent of the emotion is 
the self. Emotions always arise in the field of experience, but are directed back to the self, 
in three increasing orders of reflexiveness: sense of feeling or awareness, sense of the self 
feeling the feeling, and the revealing of the moral inner deep feeling self to the self. This 
third order, that of reflexiveness, is the reflexive turn: ‘The self that is revealed to the 
subject through these feelings [of intersubjective experience], then passes judgment on 
those feelings, finding them appropriate or inappropriate, morally right or morally wrong, 
despicable or attractive’ (p. 244; parenthesis added).  
At this point Denzin arrives at the crux of his thesis. He marries the reflexive self to the 
social, whereby every emotion is a social act and every social act is emotional. Denzin 
maintains that others are always present in emotional experience, and that we call out in 
ourselves an emotional attitude toward the other and of the other toward ourselves. 
Taking up ideas of the self, society and symbolic interaction presented by Mead (1934), 
he sets up a direct parallel process for emotions as for social interaction in general. He 
calls this process, analogous to Mead’s process of sociality, ‘emotional sociality’: ‘Once 
in the field of sharable experience with the other, the principle of emotional sociality 
suggests that emotional understanding emerges as a social object that is part of the 
interaction that attaches the selves of the participants to each other’ (Denzin 1984: 140). 
By sharable experience he means engagement in interaction, and emotional 
understanding refers to understanding meaning, from within engagement itself. Elias 
(1987b) takes a similar position, maintaining that emotions are unavoidable in action in 
the world, and that the presence of emotions indicates engagement in interactive 
experience. I will refer to the process of emotional sociality as ‘emotionality’. 
Notwithstanding his stated focus on interaction and understanding emotion from within 
interactive experience, Denzin still characterizes emotional sociality as being experienced 
first inside the person and then moving outward into the world. He writes about the 
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composition of the ‘person’ in terms of physical body, lived body and life-world, a social 
‘unit’ emerging from its individual history, who must be ‘connected’ with the outside 
world. He takes up Mead in his own way, equating taking the attitude of the other and 
inner conversation, as posited by Mead, to intersubjectivity, which is the awareness one 
subject can have of another or of another’s conscious states (Denzin 1984: 129). In doing 
so, he continually regards persons as self-contained ‘units’, however interdependent, and 
society as groupings of autonomous persons, missing Mead’s central point that mind, self 
and society are simultaneously-formed aspects of the same processes of communicative 
interaction, where the embodied nature of these processes includes emotion (Stacey 
2001). 
Denzin’s recourse to such a spatial metaphor may baffle his stated goal to look at 
experience from the inside, as in ‘knowing from within’ (Shotter, 1993), but he 
nonetheless quite significantly makes a convincing case for emotionality as a constitutive 
aspect of all human interacting. For Denzin, emotionality is present in, if not at the root 
of, all joint experience in the world. Denzin’s thesis opens up inquiry into the role 
emotionality can play in practice, due to the link he establishes between engaging in joint 
action in the world and emotion. 
Elias (1987a) makes the link between emotion and joint action in groups. He talks of 
human beings as being bound to each other in figurations, where the individual and the 
group are defined by the same simultaneously-occurring processes of interaction. The 
dynamics of these figurations have a constraining and compelling influence on those who 
form them and on the outcome of the group’s action, suggesting that emotionality is an 
attribute of the group’s experience and therefore joint action. Because emotions can 
change and reformulate themselves at every turn, emotionality ebbs and flows over the 
course of any given group experience, creating liveliness in the group experience, which 
is a measure of the quality of engagement occurring within the group. As I will argue 
later on, the quality of engagement has a direct correlation with the ability of the group to 
achieve movement as a group, and therefore is relevant to my account of practice. 
Liveliness in the group 
In the narrative of the Citadel meeting presented earlier, one noticeable aspect of that 
experience was my weakened physical condition during the meeting. I was all too aware 
that my condition had a visible effect on my physical composure, in terms of the sound, 
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intonation and force of my voice, and probably my facial appearance and physical 
carriage as well. The state I was in also had a significant effect on my ability to conduct 
the meeting effectively and make my own contribution. It was in that state that I 
experienced the emotions I describe in the narrative. 
Emotions are embodied experiences of consciousness, with elements of physiological 
sensations and display as they are discharged. Emotions therefore affect one’s physical 
carriage in interaction (Elias 1987b; Denzin 1984; Burkitt 1999). The effect does not stop 
at the physical boundary of the person, however. By virtue of the gesture-response 
process of symbolic interaction as described by Mead (1934) as referred to earlier in this 
dissertation and described in some detail in the next project, how one person engages in 
interaction will affect the way the other engages in that same interactive experience, 
which will simultaneously act back on the first person. The experience of interaction will 
be affected by the ability of the interactants to engage in the interaction, including their 
physical ability to do so. Given this embodied nature of interaction, which I shall call 
‘physicality’, the quality of physical presence or carriage on the part of the interactants 
will have an effect on the liveliness of joint action. With this in mind, I think that 
exploring the physicality of interaction may offer insights into the dynamics of liveliness. 
The physicality of interaction is a theme taken up by Goffman, who places interaction at 
the centre of his analysis of observable human behaviours, offering ways of explaining 
the patterning of processes of symbolic interaction by the close examination of small 
manifest behaviours. In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) Goffman offers 
a metaphorical explanatory framework, ‘a rhetoric and a manoeuvre’ (p. 254) within 
which to examine facets of human interaction in its multiplicity of levels, symmetries and 
asymmetries, affects and roles, and language. The book inquires into ethics, moral stance 
and obligation, character, intention, and ideology, such that, if nothing else, it sounds the 
depths of the complexity of human interaction as the locus of thought, self, and reality. I 
shall use Goffman’s work to explore the dynamics of liveliness. 
Goffman maintains throughout this work that interaction is about individuals 
intentionally managing their performances and adapting them in interaction, starting with 
what they think the other expects to witness. Within the engagement process, the 
interactant, like the performer, uses his or her ‘communicative equipment’, meaning 
appearance, gesture and voice, to manage impressions and fulfil the expectations of role 
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and status. How one arranges oneself for performance becomes the structure of the self. 
The self emerges over time through a variety of interactions. In local micro-interaction, 
people manage the impressions they wish to make much the same way that actors do, in 
an attempt to define the situation of the interaction as they think it should be. This 
impression management takes the form of physical and symbolic gesturing formulated in 
terms of the reaction one might expect from the other or others in the interaction. 
Goffman’s Interaction Ritual (1967) is a collection of papers assembled to develop a 
theory of interaction as ritual: each paper looks at some specific aspects of interaction 
which, taken together, constitute a form of ritualistic behaviour. Goffman’s aim was to 
explore face-to-face interaction in natural settings – a field study of which had no name at 
the time but which has since come to be called ‘microsociology’ (Collins 1981), 
‘microdynamics’ (Westley 1990), and ‘microinteraction’ (Kemper and Collins 1990). 
These various names all reflect the focus initiated by Goffman, which is on the very small 
or micro-situation taking place in the moment. As we will see in more detail in Project 
Four, ‘micro analysis’, which rests on the belief that interactive experience is built up of 
sequential moment-by-moment interactions where minute dynamics play themselves out 
between the interactants, is one of the principal paths of inquiry initiated by Mead (1934), 
often referred to as ‘symbolic interactionism’. 
The analytical boundaries for inquiry into micro-situations are not clear, but Goffman 
(1967) does suggest that the boundaries must include some kind of brief time span, a 
delimited space, be limited to those events which must be completed once begun, and 
involve the co-presence of the participants. During interaction, behavioural materials – 
external signs such as glances, gestures, positionings, and verbal statements – are put to 
use. Goffman proposes a close, systematic examination of these small behaviours to 
arrive at natural units of interaction built up from these materials. From there, he posits 
that it should be possible to arrive at a normative order of behaviour through 
ethnographic analysis identifying the countless patterns and natural sequences of 
behaviour occurring whenever persons come into one another’s presence. 
The attempt to arrive at a normative order of behaviour is a ‘“sociology of occasions 
where social organization is the organization of the co-mingling of persons and the 
temporary interactional enterprises that can arise therefrom’ (Goffman 1967: 2), and 
‘social encounter is an occasion of face-to-face interaction, beginning when individuals 
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recognize that they have moved into one another’s immediate presence and ending by an 
appreciated withdrawal from mutual participation’ (ibid. 99). The study of interaction, 
then, is not a study of the psychology of the individual, but is instead a study of the 
‘syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another’ 
(ibid. 2). 
As part of his proposal, Goffman develops the notion of impression management 
introduced in The Presentation of Self (1959), fleshing out a relation between deference 
and demeanour. According to this schema, we play our role in interaction (adopt a 
demeanour) according to the status we think we have or need to have in order to 
accomplish the purpose of the interaction. Status can only be obtained from the other 
through the deference the other accords. Deference cannot be given by oneself to oneself. 
Here the loop closes in the form of a dialectic between demeanour and deference, as 
forming and being formed by each other as interaction takes place over time, each 
acquiring its properties from the other and the properties of both evolving as a 
consequence of their interpenetration (Burkitt, 1999:12). 
Goffman goes on to write briefly about how this relation between demeanour-deference 
recalls Mead’s gesture-response dialectic (1934) in the formation of the self, except that 
in his opinion Mead’s position is inadequate:  
The Meadian notion that the individual takes toward himself the attitude others 
take to him seems very much an oversimplication. Rather the individual must rely 
on others to complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint 
only certain parts. Each individual is responsible for the demeanour image of 
himself and the deference image of others, so that for a complete man to be 
expressed, individuals must hold hands in a chain of ceremony, each giving 
deferentially with proper demeanour to the one on the right what will be received 
deferentially from the one on the left. While it may be true that the individual has 
a unique self all his own, evidence of this possession is thoroughly a product of 
joint ceremonial labour, the part being expressed through the individual’s 
demeanour being no more significant than the part conveyed by others through 
their deferential behaviour toward him. (Goffman 1967: 84-85) 
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Both the Mead and Goffman positions maintain the interdependence between what we 
are projecting to others, and what the other is projecting to us, as a dialectic. Others 
project to us based on how they perceive our projection and anticipate our reactions, and 
that incites us to project as we do. For my purposes here, this means that if I require 
deference or recognition in order to maintain the demeanour necessary for the role I seek 
to play, for instance, as a manager, and I can only get recognition or deference from 
another, then I will try to adapt my behaviour to the requirements of the other, as I 
understand them, to get the deference I seek. I can only do this by anticipation and inner 
role playing as I am formulating and putting forth my demeanour. 
The various moves within this dialectic are not necessarily passive or reactive; they are 
worked at. Goffman (1967) obliquely refers to this fact when he talks about ‘face work’ – 
what we do in face-to-face interaction to keep face, save face, and give face, in order to 
participate in and keep the interaction going. Hochschild (1983) likewise talks about 
‘emotion work’, by which she means the managing of one’s emotions – suppressing or 
calling them up depending on the circumstances – so as to conform to the feeling or 
framing rules which one senses must apply to a given social occasion. Face work and 
emotion work are integral to engagement and to keeping interaction moving and lively. 
The reference to work is this context is pointing to engagement in interaction, as one can 
equate effort expended (work) and level of engagement. 
This reference to work also offers a specific take on power. My need to be recognized by 
others in order to exist fully as a self gives these ‘others’ power over me. And yet, how 
they choose to recognize me is in turn a result of what identity my actions effect in them. 
The effort or work I invest to gain this recognition is a measure of the power others have 
over me, and the intensity in the response to my provocation that occurs within the other 
is a measure of my power over the other. The difference between the two power positions 
signifies the relative power balance between us. It follows that one measure of power in 
interaction is to be found in the amount of work one does to stay engaged in the 
interaction. For example, Hochschild (1983) demonstrates a direct correlation between 
the work women invest in their demeanour and the attainment of status in male-
dominated environments. 
Goffman’s observations and proposals offer valuable insights into the dynamics of 
liveliness. Although they are inferred from observed physical behaviours, these insights 
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have a definite resonance with experience as portrayed in the narratives included in this 
project. Practically speaking, Goffman’s thought points to aspects of interaction which 
we seek to remain conscious of reflexively during interaction, such as paying attention to 
the effect of our demeanour on others and theirs on us, and noticing the link between the 
physicality of interactive experience and the liveliness necessary for the group to achieve 
its aims. Noticing this link also raises the question of the effect the state of liveliness 
would have on the physical comportment and emotions of the interactants themselves. 
Non-liveliness 
In the previous section, I have been writing about emotionality and the nature and 
dynamics of liveliness in experiences of joint action. Of course, although liveliness can 
be achieved in a group experience, it can also be lost once it has been achieved, making it 
a fragile constituent of joint action. Consider the following example of loss of liveliness 
which took place during a routine conversation in our DMan learning set in Israel in 
December of 2005. 
Abu Ghosh 
This was our second day together as a group and the first day of learning set work. Our 
first day together was spent in visiting the Old City of Jerusalem and having a lively 
dinner together at the home of our host, C., in Nataf, a neighbourhood just outside the 
town of Abu Ghosh, not far from Jerusalem. The conversation at this first dinner focused 
mainly on arguing philosophies and issues of educating young boys and men sparked by 
some of the thinking and beliefs held by M., a school master and one of our learning set 
members, about such matters 
After a good day’s work on the second day, we decided to go into Abu Ghosh for supper. 
The five of us were tightly seated around our table, enjoying an excellent spread of food 
and wine. Conversation flourished, as it always does with us – this time having to do with 
the propriety of what one particular biographer had done with his famous wife’s memory 
in publishing his own memoirs. I did not know of this author or his wife and was not of a 
mind to have any particularly strong opinion, but it was our group’s topic of conversation 
at the time, all of the others seemed quite engaged, and that was fine with me. I knew that 
if at any point I was not satisfied with my experience in the moment, I was free to speak 
up and try to influence the course of our talk. 
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At a certain point long into the conversation, C., seated to my left, did just that. Up until 
then she had been quite quiet, but something that was being said at that moment provoked 
her to the point that she perked right up and said that now she was going to get involved. 
Great, I thought, and my attention perked right up too. Then something took place that 
riles me whenever it happens: the group suddenly broke into two completely separate 
conversations. On my left, C. and M., seated directly opposite each other, continued with 
the same subject as before. Meanwhile, to my right, a conversation about student affairs 
started up between one of our classmates, R., and our supervisor, P. This new 
conversation was clearly private, so that for me to show any attention and interest would 
look like eavesdropping. So instead I tried to pay attention to the two-way harangue now 
raging between C. and M., though I had not had much to say about the subject in the first 
place. I could see no easy way in to that pairing; even the body positions - head, 
shoulders, eyes – of the two speakers were intently addressing each other, and so I ended 
up sitting silently pondering one thing and another to while away the time. 
This went on for some time in fact, and I got increasingly frustrated with the whole 
experience as the evening wore on. I could not leave the restaurant because of particular 
travel arrangements we had made to get back home together. At certain points along the 
way, M. must have sensed that I was not particularly engaged – or perhaps he too wanted 
to change the subject - because he would address me directly to see what I thought about 
one thing or another that had come up in the discussion. When I had no response to offer, 
he and C. would instantly re-engage on the same subject as before. 
Admittedly, I could have objected to how the table conversation had broken down, but 
for some reason I did not, as often happens with me in similar circumstances. Instead, my 
reaction was to tune out, resign from the conversation and retreat into my own solitude. 
Although there may seem very little unusual about this as a social encounter, what I 
experienced as the conversation diverged and turned into two more or less private 
discussions was a loss of liveliness in our group as a group. The mode of participation 
spontaneously shifted away from the simultaneous interaction among five people to three 
separate forms, requiring one member – myself – to make some attempt to take control 
by interrupting, butting in, imposing myself, until the group interaction would have been 
restored or until some general shift of attention would have drawn each of us back into an 
engaging interaction as a group. The liveliness as a group of five had gone out of the 
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interactive moment, and to get it back was too much work to invest under the 
circumstances. This meant that even though some may have been enjoying a lively 
dyadic interactive experience and a generally very enjoyable evening, it was clear that 
there was no longer any movement possible for us as a group, without a considerable 
amount of investment from one or the other of us to get back on track. 
Thinking back to my first narrative, this description of Abu Ghosh might just as easily be 
a portrayal of the outcome of the Citadel project encounter. There too the group 
interaction had completely lost its liveliness, and the result was that no forward 
movement on the project was then possible. In contrast to these two examples, the NGO 
group conversation portrayed in the second narrative remained lively and focused, and 
movement was achieved. 
Goffman maintains that conversational encounters are where society’s work gets done 
(1967: 136). They entail the joint spontaneous involvement in the moment – a co-
presence – on the part of participants, where the interaction underway is the main focus 
of cognitive attention and the current talker is the main focus of visual attention, where 
there is called forth and sustained a ‘little social system’ (ibid. 113) with its own 
boundary-maintaining tendencies. Engaging in conversation comes with obligations 
which are considered mutual in that we embark on a continual flow of gesture-response 
which requires that we maintain our own involvement and ensure that of others by being 
able to take the role of others and adapt our own conduct to that, and expect and offer 
reciprocity. 
In the Abu Ghosh experience, the members of the group had relinquished their 
obligations to remain involved in a common purpose and to ensure that others remained 
involved as well. The result was a complete loss of liveliness, and, I argue, the loss of the 
capacity to accomplish any common purpose as a group. This loss of liveliness also had 
an effect on me emotionally, as one participant.  
Liveliness in practice 
With the preceding look into Denzin’s work on emotionality and Goffman’s studies in 
micro-interaction, it is possible to see the great extent to which the liveliness in group or 
joint action entails complex dynamics of dialectical gestures and responses in the 
moment, as participants work to gain and maintain engagement. These dynamics are not 
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merely mechanical in nature; behind them are the emotionality and physicality 
characteristic of engagement in joint action.  
Returning now to the experience reflected in the Citadel story, it becomes possible to 
point out certain attributes of practice.  The process set in motion by that meeting was 
intended to precipitate results that could not be known at the outset. The project was in 
need of novelty, which had not been forthcoming within our approach up to that point. A 
sort of ‘stable instability’ was needed (see also Marion 1999; Pascale et al; 2000), within 
which opportunities for surprise and novelty could open up in continuity with the work 
done to date and the understanding which had been developed over the preceding months. 
Stable instability is inherent in the conditions of interaction with a high degree of 
liveliness, but the liveliness contains risks for its own disintegration, producing a degree 
of fragility in the undertaking. 
At this point, I can begin to see my practice entailing in some measure being part of, 
creating and maintaining the conditions of interaction with the greatest possible 
liveliness. This requires engagement of me as a whole person.  As in the Citadel example, 
my work places me within the interaction taking place, to the same extent as any other 
participant engaged in the process. I am subjected to the interactional dynamics as 
embodied experience as much as any other participant. In addition, as instigator, 
convenor and conductor of the exercise, I also have the obligation to make sure that the 
interaction remains lively. I see my practice therefore as being related to my capacity to 
engage in lively interactive experiences, a capacity acquired over a career-spanning 
portfolio of engagement. However, I also see an inherent fragility in practice looked at in 
this way, contingent as it is on the physicality and emotionality of the dynamics of 
interaction. 
Concluding remarks 
I ended Project Two with the conclusion that practice may be regarded as encompassing 
dialectical processes of thought and social interaction, constantly emerging and 
transforming through experience. This conclusion oriented the next stage of research and 
reflection towards a close examination of the processes which give rise to observable 
behaviours in organized human activity. 
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In this third project, I have examined these processes from the point of view of 
emotionality, prompted by the emotional quality of the experience of practice related in 
the Citadel project narrative. Emotionality, or emotional sociality as Denzin (1984) 
describes it, is necessary for engagement in ‘joint action’ (Shotter, 1993) and therefore 
must figure in any true account of practice. The presence of emotionality on the part of 
all participants creates situations of liveliness in experiences of joint action. The 
dependence on liveliness for the group to be able to progress in its enterprise makes 
progress fragile because of the fragility of liveliness itself. 
The embodied nature of emotions points to the physicality of interaction and of the 
liveliness of joint experience. Some useful insights into the dynamics of liveliness have 
been gained from looking closely at physicality, which Goffman (1967) does through his 
treatment of the role of deference and demeanour among participants in interaction. The 
enactment of the dialectic between deference and demeanour necessary for effective and 
lively joint action, which Goffman relates to local conversation and micro-interaction, 
requires work, signifying engagement. Reflection on these dynamics affords some 
understanding about how liveliness is maintained or lost in joint action, and its effects, 
offering further insight into the nature of practice. 
Taking specific experiences of emotion and physicality seriously, as I have done in this 
project, has provided themes for reflection. I have also used a detailed examination of 
Denzin and Goffman to provide material for further inquiry of these themes. The next 
step in the dissertation leads to an examination of role as a component of practice. As I 
described in my narrative of the Citadel project, I acted as the instigator, convener and 
conductor of the process we had undertaken as a group. I alluded to this as holding a role 
in the process, akin to that of a manager. The next project will look specifically at the 
relation of role to practice. 
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PROJECT FOUR:  
PRACTICE AS ROLE ENACTMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS:  
HOLDING BOTH SYSTEMS AND  
COMPLEX RESPONSIVE ORGANIZATIONAL VIEWS 
 
Project Three has brought my inquiry to the point of substantiating an account of practice 
as being grounded in processes of interaction inherent in joint cooperative action.  
However, this account is not yet specific enough, since it could be taken in broad terms to 
deal with anything and everything having to do with life and living in general.  This is a 
danger. It is true that I object to my active life being pinned down by others as 
comprising one named role, function or job (or worse, being called by a name such 
‘architect’ or ‘real estate developer’, with their connotations of merely conventional 
practice and embedded stereotypes), my discourse ought not to suggest that the notion of 
practice concerns simply how I, and only I, act in a given situation – as if each such 
situation must accommodate my way, without its own reciprocating set of constraints. 
Of course, such unilateral responsiveness is highly unlikely.  In fact, I am always acting 
in situations that are partially defined by others, and no active life would be possible if 
this were not the case. Indeed the very case for engagement and liveliness I have made in 
Project Three argues in favour of some form of mutual accommodation taking place.  
Reflecting on this assertion points to a specific question: am I actually being pinned 
down, after all, in spite of my wishes and claims to the contrary?  It seems that admitting 
that this is at least a possibility should help free my inquiry from the constraints I have 
placed on it until now, and open up the account so as to be more recognizable and 
inclusive of others besides myself.   
Situations involving joint action have some form of definition to them from the outset, 
which acts as a constraint on the involvement of the participants (Habermas 1984).  One 
aspect of this definition are the situation-specific roles attributed by the various players to 
each other and to themselves.  With my own engagement in practical situations in mind, 
it could be said that I am at the very least taking up a role at the specific moment when 
interaction begins.  Pursuing a portfolio-type active life as I suggest I am doing would 
mean that I am frequently and regularly taking up roles in new and different 
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circumstances.  It follows that the very taking up of roles is part of my practice, and that 
this realization warrants some investigation in order to complete my account of practice. 
The exploration I undertake in this fourth project entails an examination of how roles are 
taken up. Are they fixed constraints on engagement in joint action? Or are they are 
shaped over time, and if so, how?  I shall illustrate these questions by a reflection on my 
experience of taking up the role of chair of the board of directors of the Canadian NGO 
CFD mentioned on various occasions in this dissertation, which was ongoing at the time 
of writing. I begin with a narrative of that experience, detailing what transpired from the 
moment of assuming the chairpersonship of the organization through a trip to visit 
programs of the organization in Africa then back to Canada.  I also include events 
occurring at the same time in my paid work as head of the Citadel project. 
The narrative contains a significant amount of detail covering a period of one month.  I 
felt that writing at this level of detail and broader time scale was necessary in order to 
adequately reflect on the experience. The narrative is also presented without interruption, 
or direct comment on certain themes which come into view at particular points. These 
themes are however discussed in the subsequent reflection and analysis, which considers 
my month’s experience as an account of role enactment 
This discussion will make specific reference to role theory as put forward by Sarbin and 
Allen (1968). The theme of engagement, which was developed in Project Three, points to 
role enactment as more than rote fulfilment of purpose, and brings into view a 
problematic lacuna in how enactment is accounted for in role theory.  This lacuna calls 
into question the conventional understanding of the very nature of the constructs that 
support Sarbin and Allen’s role theory, namely role and organization. 
In order to circumscribe and deal with this deficiency, I draw a parallel between role and 
organization, on one hand, and the individual and the social, on the other. I then examine 
in detail three different ways of thinking about the individual and the social. The first way 
considers the individual and the social to be organized spatially in a series of levels 
interacting with one another (Wiley 1994). The second way deals with many of the same 
issues in terms of processes of interaction ritual and interaction ritual chains (Collins 
2004). The third way concerns the processes of communicative interaction (Stacey 2003) 
which result in the simultaneous emergence of mind, self and society. 
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I surmise from this examination that taking these accounts seriously problematizes the 
enactment of roles in organized human activity as being constrained within expectations 
of role enactment emanating from the spatial view of the world, at the same time as being 
experienced as self-organizing through processes of interaction. I am then able to reflect 
on the implications of the problem crystallized in this way, and to bring those 
implications into my account of practice. 
Into the chair of CFD Canada 
On June 24, 2006, after three years of membership on the board of directors of ‘Citizens 
for Development Canada’ (CFD), I became chairperson. As mentioned in earlier projects, 
this organization is part of a federation of similar organizations which places individuals 
into development roles within partner organizations in over 30 countries around the 
world.  The following narrative recounts my first few weeks in this role, starting with the 
moment of becoming chair, through my participation at a meeting of the CFD world 
federation board in London by virtue of holding that position, and then on to an eight-day 
visit to visit CFD volunteers in their placements in Kenya and Uganda.  As this story was 
unfolding, my work situation as the head of the Citadel project continued to evolve, as 
did other board memberships in a variety of other organizations. 
My becoming chair of the board of CFD Canada happened without fanfare, within the 
space of a few moments at the beginning of our incoming board’s first meeting.  The 
outgoing chair supervised the voting for new officers, and I was slotted to the position of 
chair.  At that moment, however undramatically, I was expected to move from being an 
ordinary board member to taking charge as control the meeting was passed to me for the 
rest of the agenda. 
So what did I do?  In terms of overt behaviour, it was pretty straightforward: manage the 
flow of the conversation, set the stage for each new agenda item, call upon staff to 
present an item or recognize a first speaker – all typical of any description of the role of 
chair.  But while these acts describe what I did, they fail to account for the experience of 
taking up the role of chair.  Upon reflection,  I remember that I felt some anxiety that I 
would not perform up to par in the eyes of my colleagues, staff and trustees alike.  I had 
to cope with this emotion.  As I often do in such circumstances, I resorted to humour and 
improvised some light-hearted introductory remarks to elicit laughter from the group.  A 
round of playful teasing and good humour followed; I felt my self-confidence grow, and 
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sensed that I was off to a good start. The rest of the meeting went well and we adjourned 
until our next meeting scheduled for the fall. 
Two days later, fresh from my induction into the chair of CFD Canada, I was back in 
Montreal at my paid duties, as the person responsible for moving the Citadel project 
along.  My impending departure for a planned two-week visit to London for a CFD 
international board meeting and thereafter Africa brought a sense of urgency about 
making certain decisions that were pending for the project.  The project needed a more 
formal organization in place, to oversee the work of coming up with plans and budgets 
and obtaining regulatory approvals.  Although its current organizational setup was only 
provisional, I was nonetheless acting as if I had already been named to the position of 
general manager – handling relationships with our investors, initiating marketing 
activities and instructing a bevy of consultants and suppliers already at work.  In 
anticipation of officially being named to the post, I had already begun unofficially 
recruiting for the various positions of the organization I had in mind to create, had 
selected an office location and had had layouts done for it. 
I had put a description of my intentions in a draft memo to the ownership decision-
makers a few days before I was scheduled to depart for Africa, requesting that they 
quickly agree to my budget and overall plan.  The reply to my request indicated that there 
was some confusion over who amongst the partners was to take on which responsibilities 
in the project, and that any further considerations regarding organization would have to 
await my return.  I realized then that I had been acting as if there was general 
understanding about the organizational setup to come, only to become suddenly aware 
that this was not the case. There was no time to deal with this matter any further, as then I 
was off to London. 
Leaving Montreal, I had much on my mind: Citadel’s latest goings-on and reams of 
unfinished business; a DMan Progression Viva exam to take place almost upon arrival in 
London; and my first international board meeting of the CFD federation, followed by the 
trip to Africa. I can remember the sequence of small gestures of leaving: a harried 
departure from the office at the last minute and the cab ride home; packing, chatting and 
goodbyes; the cab to the airport, urgently passing through security just to sit and wait; the 
restless night flight thinking, daydreaming, worrying, dozing; and then arriving at 
Heathrow – take the bus to Gatwick and a cab to Roffey on the night before the viva 
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(which came off without incident and turned out to be a very positive experience).  As I 
think about this journey, I recall the inner conversations and interactions as where and 
what I was leaving behind faded from consciousness, making place for the anticipation of 
what might be coming next.  I sense that these passages of small gestures and events play 
a significant role in how one moves from one experience to another in active life.  We 
take them for granted, yet they warrant reflection for the role they do play, as I will 
discuss later in this project.  
At the Board meeting, there were about twelve members in attendance and four senior 
managers including the chief executive. The atmosphere was jovial and lively. I mostly 
sat and listened. When the time came to discuss the report, it was Sir Alex who made the 
presentation; Mathenge was silent throughout save for a short statement later on.  After 
describing the situation in the organizations with a certain flair bordering on flippancy, 
CFD International Board of Trustees 
Back in downtown London fresh from my viva, the day before the CFD International 
Board of Trustees meeting, I lunched with ‘Bruce’, a senior manager with the CFD 
federation. We were meeting at my request so that I could get his insights on what I 
should expect on my trip to Africa – especially pointers on avoiding the risks of physical 
illness during my stay. However, Bruce decided to fill me in about an issue brewing, 
regarding a report to be brought forward to the international board the next day, 
concerning the future of relations between two CFD organizations working in Kenya, 
which was precisely where in Africa I would be heading first. 
The object of the report was collaboration (or lack of it) between KFD, the independent 
Kenyan CFD partner agency akin to CFD Canada, and CFD Kenya, which is an in-
country CFD federation programming office reporting to London. The report had been 
authored by ‘Mathenge’, the quiet, wise chair of the KFD board and member of the CFD 
International Board of Trustees; and by a figure I shall call ‘Sir Alex’, a peppy go-get-
’em Londoner who is also a board member. I had read the report but had not reacted 
strongly one way or another to its conclusions, which were that the two organizations 
should merge. But I had felt critical of the quality of the report, in particular its ‘us and 
them’ tone and lack of any rich detail. I thought that I might voice my criticisms at the 
meeting, if the opportunity arose. 
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Sir Alex stated authoritatively: ‘The problem is a structural one, and requires a structural 
solution. Either the two organizations should be completely separated or they should 
merge, and merger seems to be the only solution which makes any sense in the long 
term.’ There he goes, I thought. No messing about; let’s just go ahead and merge them. 
For me, two issues arose in light of his position. First, the content of the report was 
flimsy. Second, Sir Alex’s grandstanding rhetoric was devoid of inquiry, authoritarian, 
and obfuscating in that it almost explicitly sought to forbid further and deeper reflection 
by the group. I felt that board members, including me, were being shut up, pushed out of 
the debate by a play apparently intent on ramming a particular solution through. Many 
thoughts went through my mind. Had this issue been brewing for some time, informally, 
in the corridors or otherwise, unknown to me? Who among the CFD the power structure 
might be complicit with this approach? Had Sir Alex been prompted? If I spoke, was I 
going to seem like a freshman, an innocent newcomer having to have it explained to him 
what the ‘real’ issues were that had initiated the report in the first place, which surely I 
would refrain from questioning if only I understood them? I was conscious of the 
potential for embarrassment, and my anxiety over speaking began to grow. 
I was worrying over how and when I would actually speak when Michael, to my 
immediate left, jumped in. He is a jovial, long-time Board member, a former international 
planning consultancy associate and now a doctoral student in business. He is also an 
intellectually generous man, who has gained the respect of the Board over the years for 
his insights into organizational matters. It was obvious from his way of speaking within 
this group that he enjoyed considerable respect. I assumed that this was because he is 
recognized both as an insider within the group and as an expert in organizational 
management. As it turned out, Michael’s intervention was not taken up per se, but it did 
have the effect of opening up conversation. For me, speaking up became much less 
daunting. When my turn came I did jump in, and laid out my concerns to the effect that 
too much detail was lacking for the board to adopt a final position too quickly. 
In the end, Sir Alex was left somewhat hanging. The discussion which had opened up 
was threatening to become a full-blown debate, so in the mind of the Chair we were not 
ready for a decision. The issue was taken under advisement by the senior management 
team to come back to a future agenda after other alternatives were more diligently 
explored. The agenda item on Kenya wrapped up with some joshing. It came up that 
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because of my impending trip, I would be the first member of the international CFD 
organization to set foot in Kenya following this discussion. Certainly I would be pressed 
by the local leadership and the rank-and-file with whom I would come into contact to tell 
them the upshot of the discussion that had taken place in London. With this turn on the 
conversation focused on me, I now felt engaged and included. I had moved beyond the 
inertia of my position on the edge and was now able to engage in this new group. I had 
engaged and had been recognized. 
This experience cast my trip to Africa in a significantly new light for me. Now, in 
addition to the first-hand experience in the field I was hoping to get in order to 
substantiate my CFD Canada chairpersonship, there was a basis for looking, seeing, 
talking, listening – that is, interacting substantively with others whom I would meet but 
did not know yet other than as names on an itinerary. As a trustee, I would now be 
sharing at least one significant enterprise with some of these people, namely the 
restructuring of CFD in Kenya, which I felt added meaning to being a trustee in these 
particular circumstances. 
The next day it was time to move on. Another marked passage: a flurry of activity to get 
to Heathrow from the CFD offices in central London; an overnight flight to Nairobi, 
dozing fitfully, pondering the eight-days’ journey looming before me, now coming into 
much sharper focus. As one visiting Africa for the first time, I was also struggling to rid 
my mind of preconceptions of dangerous drinking water, invasive parasites and pity-
provoking misery. Although, after the London experience, I had something more specific 
to look forward to, I still did not know what I would say, how I would act and interact, 
what the local customs were, what idea people had about me being there, how I would be 
received, how I would look after myself. It all felt dangerous, lonely, and endless. I found 
myself now and again seriously questioning the wisdom of this journey, and here and 
there longed to be heading home instead. 
I arrived at Nairobi’s Kenyatta Airport early on a Thursday morning. Samuel, a taxi 
owner-driver hired by CFD-Kenya to pick me up, was waiting to take me to my hotel. 
We chatted easily on the way, about the weather, the roads, his work with CFD-Kenya 
and the volunteers who come here, why I was here in Kenya, and so on. The dry 
Africa 
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landscape passing outside the car windows moved from rugged rural to ragged urban as 
we rolled along crowded roads, rough but paved, with low clouds of dust rising from the 
footpaths on either side, teeming with people walking towards their jobs in the city. Once 
in town, we arrived at the Fairview Hotel, a colonial-type layout where one would expect 
to come across an inordinate number of expats. 
I bedded down for a couple of hours, then freshened up and headed out to my first 
meeting, not quite sure at all what to expect. Down in the courtyard, the head of KFD, 
whom I shall call ‘John’, arrived to take me for a lunch. I found John to be quite 
charismatic: tall, fit, outgoing and self-assured.  Right off, we had things to talk about – 
my arrival experience, the people back in London, even John’s visit to Ottawa for a local 
CFD meeting over a year before at the same time as I had been there for another CFD 
meeting, although we had not met at that time. Having readily established familiarity, we 
eased into discussing Sir Alex’s report. I spoke candidly, sharing unsolicited my 
misgivings about what I had heard at the board meeting in London two days earlier. John, 
for his part, freely shared his own and his colleagues’ discontent over the tone of the 
written report, which they felt did not fairly reflect the tenor of the conversations that had 
taken place with the authors, in particular Sir Alex. 
Now here was a solid connection. We shared the same criticisms, so it was easy to 
commiserate, empathize, as if I were an insider – as indeed perhaps I was now. It was not 
difficult to pile on criticism of the report, pick on those who were far away, collude with 
this fellow critic. Was I ingratiating myself, to win my way into his confidence, possibly 
at the expense of those others back in London? Perhaps so; but we certainly did get on 
well, and this was bound to be helpful locally. 
Then John explained the activities of his organization to me in some depth, and 
particularly his recently adopted strategic plan. I shared CFD Canada’s recent experience 
with our strategic plan. I suppose I must have pontificated a bit about my thoughts on the 
limited utility, if any, of strategic plans, but I must have made a few interesting points, for 
John asked me to critique his plan, insisting that we meet again to discuss it before my 
departure from Nairobi the following week. 
The next day and a half covered lots of ground.  I met with KFD staff. On the Thursday 
night of my arrival, I dined with ‘Joseph’, the comparatively low-key senior manager of 
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the CFD program delivery office for Kenya. Friday, I had lunch in downtown Nairobi 
with three development workers – two Canadian and one Dutch – who bombarded me 
with their story of the difficulties they experienced in their placements, blaming CFD 
Kenya staff incompetence for their misfortunes. I wondered if they were playing up their 
difficulties to an outsider because they thought (as one of them said) that I was there to 
evaluate CFD Kenya, based on what they had understood had been the purpose of the 
report. 
Sunday morning I left the by-now familiar urban surroundings and comfortable hotel in 
Nairobi into the distant countryside to Kitui, a township in the east-Kenyan countryside 
three hours away by car-swallowing pot-holed roads, arriving in the market town – a 
crowed, somewhat haphazard agglomeration of one- and two-storey painted-cement 
buildings – around mid-afternoon. In Kitui, I was received by ‘Annie’ and ‘Marie’, two 
American volunteers recruited through CFD Canada, and two other CFD operatives. 
After a very convivial supper at Marie and Annie’s house, I returned to my rudimentary 
but adequate hotel room down the road, where I lay in bed staring anxiously into the 
darkness beyond the medicated mosquito netting and anticipating with a mixture of 
excitement and dread my visitations the next morning, with the forced and awkward 
socializing with complete strangers that was bound to take place. 
Meeting the Grass Roots 
On Monday morning, we started with a visit to ‘Kitui Youth Polytechnic’ (YP), one of 
three making up Annie’s placement, located within a half-hour dirt non-road radius of 
Kitui, riding shotgun on a skittish dirt bike or piki-piki, as they are called there. Youth 
polytechnics are community-based organizations that endeavour to teach skilled trades to 
post-primary teenagers. This training takes place under the most rudimentary of 
conditions: the classroom is four walls and a roof, often without electricity; there are only 
a few desks or worktables, and extremely few teaching tools, consisting mostly of reused 
materials. Adolescent students come from the surrounding villages, and often live on site 
in dormitories without electricity or running water. Sanitation facilities are typically pit 
latrines. The students and kitchen lady fetch water and firewood as needed for cooking 
and washing. 
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At the second YP in the afternoon, the manager, whom I shall call ‘Mr K’, with other 
members of his management committee and staff present, began the meeting. We were in 
the management office, furnished with rickety chairs uncertainly dealing with my weight, 
a recuperated desk and a metal filing cabinet of a sort not seen in North America for the 
past few decades, all lit only by the small window behind Mr K  He spoke softly in 
heavily-accented but very good English. Every now and then he would have a brief 
exchange with his colleagues in Kiswahili to clarify what he should say next. The kitchen 
lady brought us sweet milk-and-sugar tea. 
Mr K had prepared a presentation for me on the activities, data and projects of the YP. 
All I had to do was listen – easier said than done: my anxiety over the constant threat of 
falling ill, the shyness I always feel in such encounters, my self-consciousness of the 
evident physical contrasts – me a ‘soft’, portly white person, and my Kenyan counterparts 
without exception slim, gentle black people – all made it difficult to think straight. While 
trying to overcome Mr K’s heavy Kenyan accent and soft voice in the dim light of his 
tiny office where it was even difficult to distinguish his facial expressions, I was 
intensely preoccupied with coming up with an intelligent, if not engaging, response. It 
was one of those times when my self-awareness is so acute that the biggest challenge 
seemed to be present in the encounter at all; to get out of my self-absorption and into the 
moment; to be with the people who were receiving me, who, by the way, may have been 
feeling just as anxious about the whole situation as I was. 
As the presentation shifted to a question-and-answer session about many of the details in 
Mr K’s report, I felt movement arising. As we continued on together, I could begin to 
hear echoes of personal histories in our exchanges. So I asked questions of this sort: ‘You 
know, I’m a board chair myself in Canada, and I do that because I learn new things and 
meet people in new situations, and hopefully make a contribution to my community. 
What made you get involved in chairing the management committee? How did that come 
about?’ Or: ‘I’m an architect, and I know how valuable trades-people are. Do your 
students go on to work on big projects in the city?’ 
My hosts responded enthusiastically with their personal stories, and one subject began to 
lead to another. I could feel our persons being brought into the moment, family life, other 
activities as volunteers, trustees, job-holders, and now I felt I could have a good time. 
There was felt engagement – humour, empathy, and argument. At one point, the treasurer 
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offered me, with a twinkle in his eye, an African name: Musyoka, which is Kiswahili for 
‘he who returns’. I was touched by the warmth in the gesture and especially in the teasing 
which came along with it. I knew at this point I was finally beginning to feel that I was 
turning a corner.  I started looking forward to further encounters. 
Back in Nairobi later in the week, I found John anxious to meet me and hear my 
comments on his strategic plan. I had read the plan very carefully and I was excited to 
have the opportunity to comment on it. John and I had an excellent exchange on its 
strengths and weaknesses. I also took the opportunity to share with him my concern over 
how CFD-Kenya was actually faring in some of the programs I visited, a caution in light 
of CFD-Kenya’s upcoming merger of his organization and.  
My trip to Africa ended two days later after a stop in Kampala, Uganda, where I was able 
to meet twice with the CFD Uganda staff body and executive director and take in two 
stellar projects working on HIV and AIDS treatment, de-stigmatization and prevention in 
and around Kampala. As I anticipated my return to Canada, I knew I had a new 
understanding of what CFD was all about, having gained insights into the complex 
workings of its worldwide network of program offices and their partners, who receive 
development workers in the field. I did not yet have a sense of how this could affect how 
I would now play out my role as CFD Canada chair and as trustee of the federation board, 
but I was sure that it would crop up in many different ways over time. 
Now, seeing in my mind’s eye my family and job waiting for me in the familiar and easy 
surroundings of home, I looked forward to the long flight back, free of the anxieties and 
doubts I had experienced en route to London and Africa. I returned to Montreal on July 
21, rested over the weekend and showed up at the office on Monday, July 24, one month 
to the day after my induction as CFD Canada board chair. In the immediate offing for 
August 2 was the important Citadel project summit meeting which I had arranged before 
my departure, to get my organizational structure and budget approved. On the evening of 
August 1, the night before the meeting, I was told by the lead investor in the project that 
the investors’ group considered me to be essential to the advancement of the project for 
the next few years, and that at the important meeting to take place the following morning 
they would move to have me named general manager of the new development company 
we were setting up. In that role I would create the new organization and work directly for 
that company reporting to its operating board – a new organization, a new role. 
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What’s in a role? 
As I experienced the events described in the preceding narrative, I could also sense the 
passages as I moved from one episode to another, and these sensations were heightened 
all the more by the major changes of location such as London to Nairobi or Nairobi to 
Kitui. In writing about and reflecting on all of these experiences, it occurred to me that 
the narrative was an account of taking up the roles called ‘chair’ and ‘general manager’, 
within named organizational setups called ‘CFD’ and ‘Citadel’. This lead me to ask: 
doesn’t all cooperative action entail the playing of roles? Perhaps it does; but caution is in 
order here. If cooperative action necessarily entails role playing, then wouldn’t 
cooperative action be about the division of labour after all, in line with the 
circumscription of predefined roles? But such a simplistic conclusion would challenge 
the premise of my work in this programme, and so it seems quite in order, before arriving 
at such a conclusion, to examine the notion of roles in some depth: what they entail and 
how they are taken up. 
Sarbin and Allen define the term ‘role’ as denoting a preset position or unit in the social 
structure coming with expectations that comprise the ‘rights and privileges, the duties and 
obligations, of any occupant of a social position in relation to persons occupying other 
positions in the social structure’ (Sarbin and Allen 1968: 497). Furthermore, ‘A role is a 
set of behaviours that belongs to an identifiable position, and these behaviours are 
activated when the position is occupied’ (ibid. 545), whence expressions such as ‘in role’ 
and ‘out of role’. Drawing on a theatrical metaphor, the authors suggest that roles belong 
to the part or position rather than to the players: roles such as these are ‘achieved’ roles, 
as opposed to socially ‘ascribed’ roles such as male, female, adult. 
Achieved roles are roles taken up because of some particular set of circumstances due to 
specific competencies, experience, and capabilities, and have a programmed and a 
discretionary component (Cyert and MacCrimmon 1968). In the world of organizations, 
these roles are most often laid out as part of an organizational schema designed by the 
people with influence over the organization, whether formal or informal. In this way of 
thinking, the content – the ‘what’ – of achieved roles is prescribed in terms of their 
functional position within this schema, and appropriate people are sought to take up these 
prescribed functions. The preset role is then enacted by the incumbent. 
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My narrative does not particularly attempt to elucidate the ‘what’ – the list of tasks and 
undertakings implied in the role – of the roles of chair or general manager. Instead, as a 
reflective narrative, it seeks to show how I take up my role or roles over a specific period 
of time. To understand this ‘how’ a certain distinction is in order. Spender (1994) 
maintains that how something is done refers to the knowledge of the person 
accomplishing the action or task. ‘Knowing how’ something is done means having the 
knowledge necessary to do it, gained first through some process of learning, and 
afterwards applying this knowledge to a role, function or task. In a positivistic way, we 
know how to read, write, knit or drive, and then do so.  Instead, here I am suggesting an 
alternative meaning for how. I am proposing that there are interactive, evaluative and 
communicative processes which constitute how it is that we go about that which we do. It 
is these processes which I am pointing to in my inquiry into practice. I believe they 
should figure prominently in a full account of enactment of role. 
When I examine Sarbin and Allen’s (1968) theory of role enactment, only a partial 
account of enactment appears.  Sarbin and Allen identify six variables of role enactment 
that were developed by grouping data taken from observations of overt conduct occurring 
within interactional frameworks (organizations), and then making probabilistic inferences 
using quantitative and qualitative research methods:   
• Role expectations  – actions and quality expected of the person occupying the role  
• Role location – what it is and what it is not relative to others 
• Role demands – norms and mores for specific role enactment 
• Role skills – motor and cognitive aptitude, appropriate experience, and specific 
training possessed, which result in effective and convincing role enactment, 
including “role-taking” (Mead, 1934) 
• Self-role congruence – seeking out roles whose requirements are congruent with 
self qualities, which develop by virtue of the roles we take on 
• Audience effects – remaining alert to others, inner or real, and their actual or 
anticipated reactions to one’s behaviour 
(Sarbin and Allen 1968: 000) 
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Sarbin and Allen’s theory of role enactment holds that there should exist a predictable 
and lasting fit between stable, knowable individuals and fixed, defined roles, set within a 
determinate schema called organization. Success in achieving the fit would be assured 
with prior careful analysis and implementation of the six variables of the theory. For 
example, as regards the variable of self-role congruency, the self is portrayed as a bundle 
of characteristics additively acquired over time, which make up a person who will either 
fit the defined role or will not. In assessing the probability of such a fit, one need only be 
able to get to know and evaluate these characteristics. 
Sarbin and Allen’s insights are limited to those which can be interpreted from 
observations of overt conduct. While interpretation provides valuable insights, it is 
nonetheless a purposive, context-bound cognitive activity, which ‘applies a particular 
perspective to what it interprets, a perspective that shapes in large part the 
interpretandum’ (Bohman et al. 1991: 11–12). The six variables which Sarbin and Allen 
identify as constituting an account of role enactment are descriptors which have been 
established by categorizing data. These categories flow from the singular ontology of role 
as a defined function within an organizational schema established according to a designed 
structure of production. The authors detail the functional linkages between the role-holder 
and the organization, and refer to their findings as enactment. 
However, my narrative everywhere demonstrates that much more was actually taking 
place than an observer could actually have been seen or interpreted and categorized in 
into a fixed set of variables. For example, at the beginning of the narrative, when I quit 
the role of board member and took up that of chair, I acted in the moment. Beyond the 
mechanics of chairing a meeting, I made gestures, likely in response to what I anticipated 
to be the expectation of the board. What I was feeling was an increased level of anxiety 
as I took up and held the chair, making me more self-conscious than otherwise, or at least 
self-conscious in a different and specific way. I became aware of myself chairing, and 
this occupied my consciousness for the duration of the meeting. And then there was my 
use of humour. The inclination to turn to humour arose in the moment. The urge to be 
playful was felt; it was physical, it was not solely an act of cognition or a chairing 
stratagem. That it got a laugh from the others would suggest engagement by them in the 
moment.  This became the tone of the meeting as we went about our business, and 
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ultimately became part of the story of the meeting for all of us who were there, a story 
also of the meaning of my role and theirs and of the organization. 
Then, as I travelled later on, I found I could not be just another ‘innocent abroad’. What I 
had not grasped until I was in various destinations was that complete itineraries and 
schedules had been prepared for me, implicating significant numbers of individuals, 
requiring them to change their agendas and travel distances to meet with me while I was 
passing through. No one had requested that I be given this treatment, not even me. Each 
individual along the way had decided on his or her own to do so when they heard the 
chair of CFD Canada and trustee of the CFD federation board was visiting, even though 
none of them had a clear idea why I was there and only had their own idea of what those 
terms mean. So in each encounter I and they started at a given beginning, conditioned by 
what we presumed our mutual roles were. But invariably we touched upon on-going 
purposive activities of one sort or another, sometimes peripherally as far as I was 
concerned, sometimes involving me intimately. Before long, personal connection 
occurred but was also necessary, whether that was commiserating as I had done with 
John or sharing personal histories as with my counterparts of the management committee 
of the Youth Polytechnic. It was only through this ‘process’ that my and their ‘role’ took 
on any meaning to speak of to each of us. 
Finally, as the trip progressed, I experienced interludes between encounters, usually 
involving changes in locale. During these particular interludes, however, I experienced 
strong bodily feelings and emotions due to the circumstances of strangeness, felt danger 
and fatiguing travel. I was blocked by my feelings of apprehension and could not think 
ahead to the next encounter with any confidence. It was difficult to plan ahead to any 
degree. Normally for me these interludes would form part of the ebb and flow of the 
passing of an active day, moments of recuperation from the intensity of one encounter or 
engagement and simultaneous preparation for the next; lapses from order into disorder 
before returning to order again in a subsequent encounter, so that every encounter feels 
like a new enactment, continuous with past enactment but different at the same time. 
Coming to grips with role and organization 
Starting from the moment I took up the position of chair at the CFD Canada board 
meeting, the narrative can be seen as portraying processes of enactment through very 
local experiences of interaction with others. While I felt compelled to engage with others 
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and invest my energy and emotions, I believe they were in much the same position 
relative to me. Through this process, our roles and organizations seemed to come to be 
defined locally in the moment, among those of us who were interacting, by virtue of the 
very interaction taking place. The emotionality, physicality and complex interaction 
which appear throughout the narrative bespeak complex processes of personal 
engagement and emergence. 
The more closely I look at my entire experience of enactment, and in light of my 
comments on Sarbin and Allen, the clarity of the constructs of role and organization 
dissolves, and the constructs themselves become highly contestable.  The meanings of 
‘chair’, ‘CFD’, ‘Citadel project’ and ‘general manager’ are no longer fixed and 
predictable as they may appear to be to the objective observer.  There is a volatility and 
effervescence in them by virtue of the enactment of them, which offer an exciting 
opportunity for exploration. 
Here I am pointing to a split between how enactment would be described theoretically, 
and how it is experienced in joint action. Sarbin and Allen’s description uses a dualistic 
and spatial metaphor, in which role is enacted according to expectations set outside of the 
individual within the interactive framework of the organization. In this view, role could 
be considered a non-reducible unit (Wiley 1994; Di Tomasso 1982) situated in relation to 
other roles in a bounded organizational structure. The other portrays shared experiences 
which in the living of them ultimately define role and organization locally amongst us 
who are engaged with one another. Formal arrangements and structures, however present, 
appear more as background information. 
Such a split is no small matter. It falls within a long-standing dichotomy between ways of 
thinking about and speaking about role and organization, and ultimately bespeaks a 
commensurate split in the way organizations are generally governed or managed versus 
the way they are experienced by their members. ‘Role’ and ‘organization’ in this sense 
are merely parallel constructs of the individual and the social, and the contrast here is 
between how the individual and the social are viewed as joined in a system or structure 
and how they are experienced and talked about from a processual, emergent point of 
view. 
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At first glance, these two ways of seeing the same social constructs appear to be mutually 
exclusive, which poses a significant difficulty for organizational thinking in general and 
management thinking in particular. Once acknowledged, this difficulty must be taken into 
account. So I now ask: what does recognizing this split mean for my attempts to build an 
account of role enactment and ultimately practice? Regarding each view as if it were 
mutually exclusive of the other makes it tempting to take one side over the other and 
defend that position de rigueur thereafter. This is what I have been doing, implicitly, in 
the lead up to this project, believing that I was moving towards espousing some kind of 
truth in the form of the processual view, and thereby eschewing the spatial view, once 
and for all. 
In addressing this split, it does not seem adequate to simply declare that one side is right 
and the other wrong. Instead, the implications of the split must be explored, and each side 
of the split understood for its contrasts, contradictions and similarities with the other. 
Only once such an exploration has taken place (as we shall see in the following section) 
can the value of any position be known and taking a position be warranted. 
Exploring the split between the spatial and the processual view of role and 
organization 
I will carry out this exploration by examining in detail three books which explore in 
depth the theme of group or social behaviour and local, intersubjective action. The three 
books examined here in particular take up the theme of the individual in society 
specifically to articulate the link between the local interaction of individuals and the 
formation of broader patterns of interaction in groups. In choosing the theme of the 
individual and the social, I am drawing a parallel with role and organization respectively. 
Drawing such a parallel is appropriate because in considering organizations to be 
organized groupings of interconnected roles or functions each of which is filled by 
individual persons (see Sarbin and Allen1968), it follows that these individual persons 
are interacting according to social practices of interaction common to the functioning of 
groupings in society. Literature on the theme of the individual and society therefore has 
much to say about role and organization.     
The first book I shall consider is Wiley’s The Semiotic Self (1994), a work focused on the 
theory of the self, which I found significant for its clearly expressed and unequivocal 
faith in the validity of the spatial view of the individual and society, while attempting to 
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integrate processual ideas about social organization. The other two books examine 
different theories addressing questions of how patterns of social behaviour emanate from 
local interaction. One is Collins’s theory of  Interaction Ritual Chains (2003) which 
portrays social organization on the basis of microsociology deriving especially from 
Goffman’s theories of interaction ritual (1967; see Project Three), as well as Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology (1967). Lastly is Stacey’s Complexity and Group Processes (2003), 
which delves into complex responsive processes of relating, derived from notions of the 
dialectical and paradoxical aspects of relating found in the work of Mead and Elias, 
among others. 
In the following pages each work will be presented in some detail.  I proceed in this way 
for three reasons. First, according to the methodology explicated at the beginning of this 
dissertation, it was in the act of detecting and recording the logic model and 
argumentative moves of each author that I myself assimilated an understanding of each 
position as well as its roots in thought. For me, it has been important to capture that 
understanding and submit it to examination by my readers as part of this exercise. 
Second, the most evident points of convergence and divergence of each author’s position 
appear in the details of their respective works. It would be impossible of course, in so 
short a space to call attention to every single point of divergence; however, the reader 
will find enough detail to be able to fathom the true differences between these authors. 
Third, my reflection on the significance of these differences for my own work, which 
follows this presentation, is made more understandable and subject to critique by having 
seen these positions and what I have noticed in them. 
For instance, one object of reflection for me has come from observing how these authors 
have taken up, each in his own way, George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), one of the 
preeminent twentieth-century thinkers on the individual and society. Wiley (1994) takes 
Mead to be a pragmatist, defining a universal autonomous self considered so essential to 
American-style egalitarian democracy; in so doing, he seeks to make up for the deficient 
faculty-psychology language of the Constitution, which he maintains was also the central 
purpose of Pragmatism. However, it is my view that Wiley rhetorically manoeuvres 
Mead’s ideas into the taken-for-granted spatial view of the individual and the social.  
Collins (2004) suggests that Mead’s philosophy of the self as co-emergent with mind and 
society is simply a metaphor, which Collins then uses to supplement his own position. 
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Stacey (2003) take up Mead for the insights he provides on how society and the 
individual self emerge simultaneously through paradoxical processes of interaction, 
eschewing the spatial metaphor favoured by Wiley. 
The Semiotic Self 
In this work, Wiley attempts to integrate Mead’s reflexive self so as to mediate the 
categorical spatial view of society. Wiley’s conceptualization of the self imposes a very 
specific interpretation of the individual and society. He maintains that it is widely 
recognized (though not universally so) that ‘reality is stacked into a system of 
organizational levels’ (Wiley 1994: 134) patterned from the most simple to the most 
complex; i.e.  physical-chemical (substance), biological (body), psychological (self), 
interactional (face-to-face), organizational (social) and cultural. Within this schema, the 
self is sui generis, autonomous unto itself in mechanical and processual interaction with 
other levels. This self is non-reducible into other levels of society, upwards or 
downwards. 
Wiley’s self is defined by ‘inner conversation’, or thought; this, in turn, has a particular 
structure, which he develops by synthesizing the inner conversation as depicted by Mead 
with that of Charles Sanders Peirce, reconciling the discrepancies between the two, using 
three assumptions common to each: inner conversation defines the self; the present self is 
the ‘I’; and only the ‘I’ can utter, act and speak to the other or itself as an object (make 
gestures). He arrives at a triadic inner conversation of the ‘I’ with itself in three different 
temporal phases: past (me), present (I, inaccessible to itself), and future (you). At any 
given time in any given thought or experience the ‘you’ would be coming into the present 
as an emerging ‘I’ and the ‘I’ would be fading into the past as an appearing ‘me’, at the 
same time as a new ‘you’ is coming into view. 
Wiley metaphorically calls this self a structure, shared by all humans as part of their 
nature.  
I am using the word structure to refer to the general relationship among the 
present, future and past aspects of the self.   These temporal phases can be called 
the ‘I’, ‘you’ and ‘me’, and they can be semiotically mapped as sign, interpretant, 
and object.  This gives the structure of the self three parts, which I will variously 
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refer to as clusters, regions, roles, poles, and agencies: the past-me-object; the 
present-I-sign; and the future-you-interpretant. 
Metaphorically I am viewing this structure as a ‘container’ within which there are 
‘contents’ . . . The containment, however, is not physical or spatial but semiotic 
and meaningful. (p. 27) 
With the structure of the self so defined, Wiley turns to inner conversation as the way the 
self works as semiotic process, beyond only thought, but as any and all the modes of 
interior meaning. Along with verbal conversation these include sensations, emotions, 
non-linguistic thoughts, habitual practices, and perhaps even such subtleties as body 
language, and tone of voice (p. 40). In so doing, Wiley synthesizes Peirce’s and Mead’s 
different concepts of time and participants in the inner conversation, grounding the self in 
thought as cognitive semiotic process. With this he can relinquish the spatial metaphor, 
except that part which inheres to the self as a sui generis level.   
Having defined the form and function of the self, Wiley maintains that meaning exists for 
humans in the form of signs (whence the semiotic self) whose meaning arises for us by 
virtue of the uniquely human capability of reflexivity. He then claims that both Pierce 
and Mead considered reflexivity inherent in all ‘human communication or semiotic 
simply in the way it operated’ (p. 81). According to Wiley, for both Mead and Peirce, all 
thought is the self talking to itself, and all meaning is in reference to the self, even as 
regards simple inanimate objects. 
In claiming that the self is sui generis, Wiley must then be able to show how it works not 
only within itself but also in relation to other levels of society. In doing so he moves 
away from cognitive understanding into notions of emotional attachment and engagement 
– the self being emotionally powered – to link the micro with the macro, i.e. the 
individual with the group. Here he turns substantively to Durkheim, in particular to his 
notions of solidarity. 
‘Semiotic power’ is my name for the energies that underlie and empower signs.  
The kinds of signs that Peirce called ‘symbols’ have interpretants that are abstract 
general meanings. These meanings may sometimes be connected, e.g. in 
propositions, in ways that are true, good, or beautiful, or at least seem so. These 
attributes of meaning – generality, truth, goodness, and beauty – all have what I 
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am calling semiotic power. This notion has the same semiotic function as Lévi-
Strauss’s ‘mana’, Lacan’s ‘phallus’, or what I will take to be Durkheim’s 
‘solidarity’. ... The structure of the self . . . is the basic source of semiotic power. 
... The reflexive structure of the self originates and generates semiotic power. (pp. 
34–35) 
It appears that here Wiley is lowering Durkheimian sacredness and solidarity into the sui 
generis level of the self, via the micro-sociological process of interaction, after Goffman 
(1967), Denzin (1989) and Collins (1981). He arrives at the conclusion that through 
semiotic power and reflexivity inherent in the process of inner conversation, individual 
self-sacredness is achieved mirroring the same phenomenon of the social level, and 
through this the self achieves inner organic unity and attachment to the social. With inner 
organic unity and attachment to the social through phenomenological substances like that 
of solidarity, Wiley arrives at mind, self and society, referring to Mead’s thought to 
explain the workings of the autonomous self, while maintaining the spatial separation 
between the individual and the group. 
Interaction Ritual Chains 
The argument for interaction ritual chains as a conception of how group patterns of 
behaviour come about from local interaction among individuals, was put forward by 
Collins as a paper in 1981 and fleshed out as a full-blown proposition in the 2004 book 
Interaction Ritual Chains. Collins is a micro-sociologist, who holds that local interaction 
is the basic unit for the organization of society. Interaction is a sui generis entity; not I, 
not you, but the space between us where all social activity takes place. 
A theory of interaction ritual is the key to microsociology, and microsociology 
is the key to much that is larger. The small scale, the here-and-now of face to face 
interaction, is the scene of action and the site of social actors. If we are going to 
find the agency of social life, it will be here. Here reside the energy of movement 
and change, the glue of solidarity, and the conservatism of stasis. Here is where 
intentionality and consciousness find their places; here, too, is the site of the 
emotional and unconscious aspects of human interaction. In whatever idiom, here 
is the empirical / experiential location of our social psychology, our symbolic or 
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strategic interaction, our existential phenomenology, our arena of bargaining, 
games, exchange or rational choice. (Collins 2004: 3) 
Interaction transpires through rituals of interaction (Goffman, 1967), which Collins 
describes as having two main axes: ‘participants develop a mutual focus of attention and 
become entrained in each other’s bodily micro-rhythms and emotions’ (Collins 2004: 47). 
He develops a ‘Mutual Focus / Emotional Entrainment Model’, which is an ‘explicit 
model of processes that take place in time: a fine grained flow of micro-events that build 
up in patterns of split seconds and ebb away in longer periods of minutes, hours and 
days’ (ibid. 47). He defends this position by referring to microsociological research into 
ultrafine details of conversation as the primary mechanism for entrainment. This research 
measures actual time lapses of beats and fractions of seconds in turn-taking and turn-
making, including pregnant pauses, for example, and claims to demonstrate that 
successful conversational rhythmic entrainment in the flow of emotion and feeling is 
empirically observable. 
Interaction rituals are constructed from a combination of ingredients which together 
produce ‘ritual outcomes of solidarity, symbolism, and individual emotional energy’ (p. 
47). Somewhat after Goffman (1967), such ingredients include conditions precedent such 
as the co-presence of two or more people, boundaries for inclusion and exclusion of 
others, and a single focus of attention for all interactants. From these initiating conditions, 
a process of ritualistic interaction proceeds through feedback mechanisms, and the 
interaction rituals tend to intensify by virtue of the rhythmic entrainment the interactants’ 
effect on one another, producing a collective effervescence which characterises the 
interaction. 
Collins maintains that rhythmic entrainment is an embodied facet of participation in 
ritual, and is made possible by the fact that evolution has bestowed humans with central 
nervous systems which can become mutually attuned. For instance, ingestion of food and 
drink in the company of others is an example of bodily co-participation, as are some 
consensual sexual activities which are indulged in, notwithstanding the apparent absence 
of any direct physical sexual stimulation for the persons performing them. Given that our 
physiology has this capacity to be mutually attuned, we naturally seek out rituals which 
succeed in providing us some measure of effervescence. 
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Collins also includes a mutual focus aspect in his model, meaning the creation of shared 
symbols by virtue of joint attention on a common social object. Citing Mead, he equates 
this process with the manipulation of symbolic representations by the participants in the 
interaction, until significant symbols are created, referring specifically to symbols which 
have the same meaning for everyone, ‘symbols (e.g. personal name) which get charged 
up with significance through the momentary effervescence of conversations in which 
they play a part’ (p. 85). Part of this process is the internalization of external conversation 
to arrive at thinking and inner role play that Mead (1934) writes about. However, Collin’s 
view of Mead is that  ‘self’ and its parts (‘I’, ‘me’, the ‘other’ and the ‘generalized 
other’), taken together, are merely a metaphor which can be replaced by a model of 
shared focus of attention and the flow of energy in internalized interaction rituals in the 
form of inner conversation (Collins 2004: xvi). According to this view, the self is 
considered an autonomous entity, similar to that of Wiley, within which processes take 
place. 
From the aforementioned mutual focus comes group solidarity and membership by 
common devotion to the same sacred object or objects. This solidarity can be short-lived 
or sustained over the long term; in either case, it manifests itself by a collective 
effervescence which results in emotional entrainment or shared emotional experience on 
the part of the participants. For Collins, humans are emotional-energy-seeking:  we seek 
the attachment of group membership because it gives us emotional energy, the need for 
which precipitates our urge to interact in the first place. Once membership in a group is 
established, it is propagated as emotional energy carried in symbols charged with 
emotional meaning, in particular symbols used for talk. From one interaction to another, 
we carry the histories of our past interactions, primarily in our emotional responses to 
certain types of situations or relations. Emotions are transformed in the interaction 
process from ingredients to outcomes as they flow across situations in micro to micro 
sequential linkages called interaction ritual chains, which concatenate into macro 
patterns. 
With the preceding proposals in hand, Collins now has the beginnings of a discourse on 
social order and human organization, in the form of observable social stratification 
involving groups of autonomous individuals. 
 120 
The most important of these macro-patterns of IR chains is what from a macro 
view point appears as stratification. Social order is produced on the micro level: 
that is to say, all over the map, in transient situations and local groups, which may 
well be stratified by class, race, gender, or otherwise divided against each other.  
Interaction ritual produces pockets of moral solidarity, but variably and 
discontinuously throughout the population. Now if we trace individual human 
bodies moving from one encounter to the next, we see that the history of their 
chains – what sociologists have conventionally referred to as their positions in the 
social structure – is carried along in emotions and emotion-laden cognitions that 
become the ingredients of the upcoming encounter. (p.105) 
Because of variations in how strongly participants become attached to membership 
symbols (hence in intensity of emotional attachments), ‘interactions are stratified: some 
persons have the power to control others through rituals, while others are passive or 
resistant; some persons are in the centre of attention, while others are marginalized or 
excluded. These are the two dimensions of power and status’ (pp.111–113). This view of 
power and status translates into the distribution, according to one’s power and status 
relative to others, of chances to interact in the way one wants or needs to, in order to 
obtain the emotional energy one seeks. In other words, according to Collins, social 
stratification can be seen as stratification in the distribution of emotional energy. 
To generalize the emotional energy distribution idea across society, Collins invokes the 
analogy of emotional energy markets, on the premise that emotional energy seeking is 
analogous to the seeking of material goods or economic benefit. As in all markets, there 
is a function of luck as to how one’s chances will stack up to those of others. Collins 
takes the market analogy to the extreme, using notions of funds of emotional energy to be 
invested by individuals, return on investment of emotional energy, emotional energy 
loading, and people with more emotional energy than others enjoying more power or 
status. 
Collins pursues the market idea for insights into mechanisms of patterning. His account 
of the individual and the social shows the social to be an accretion of micro events 
enacted by individuals into structures of distribution of emotional energy flowing into 
and out of individuals. Collins’s account suggests that organization is a ‘pocket of 
solidarity’ (p. 105) amongst individuals, the form of which manifests the distribution of 
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this energy as patterns of power and status. The distribution of this energy is a matter of 
good luck and endeavour on the part of individuals, as emotional energy flows to them in 
interaction rituals by virtue of emotional entrainment and mutual focus. The individuals 
Collins talks about are the product of their personal history of interaction ritual chains. 
While he admits that individuals are unique, this is not the ‘result of enduring individual 
essences. . . . Individuals are unique just to the extent that their pathways through 
interactional chains, their mix of situations across time, differ from other persons’ 
pathways. . . . In a strong sense the individual is the interaction ritual chain. The 
individual is but the precipitate of past interactional situations and an ingredient of each 
new situation’ (pp. 4–5). 
Microsociology in general, and interaction ritual chains thinking in particular, endeavours 
to explain the emergent aspects of experience otherwise unaccounted for in spatial or 
systemic thinking. However, Collins effectively denies this possibility: ‘With more 
analytical refinement, the sociologist can examine the ingredients for making rituals that 
individuals have accumulated, and thereby predict what their combination of ingredients 
will bring about’ (p.142). This is tantamount to saying that all outcomes of human 
interaction are predictable and therefore programmable, if only one has access to enough 
data and the necessary theories to interpret it. Such predictability of human conduct is 
precisely one of the central premises of systems thinking (Midgely 2000; Jackson 2000).  
It is teleological and is antithetical to the idea of emergence. 
I make this particular point here because, whatever else Collins’s work may have to offer 
for my inquiry, his apparent inability to break free from a preoccupation with positivistic 
predictability and programmability in human activity is in stark contrast to to the idea of 
complex responsive processes of human relating discussed in the following section, as is 
Wiley’s preoccupation with levels and functional linkages. 
Complexity and Group Processes 
Ralph Stacey, Douglas Griffin and Patricia Shaw (Stacey et al. 2000) have put forward a 
way of thinking about individuals, groups, organizations and society, termed ‘complex 
responsive processes of relating’, which draws on non-spatial, processual ideas of the 
individual and society. Where micro-sociological thought as portrayed by Collins (2003) 
follows a deductive approach to explain sociologically observable phenomena, complex 
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responsive process thinking is inductive, producing an understanding of the individual 
and the group by reflecting on the complex nature of local interaction and its role in the 
simultaneous and dialectical formation of the individual and the group as different facts 
of the same processes of relating. 
Complex responsive processes of relating is intended to account for the broad number 
and variety of moves, surprises, emotions, time conceptions, inner and interpersonal 
conversations, and the innovation and novelty inherent in interpersonal interaction at 
whatever scale. The central premise is that systems-type approaches and spatial 
metaphors cannot explain all of these characteristics of human interaction satisfactorily. 
Instead, by using as analogies the ideas of emergence and self-organization found in the 
complexity sciences, Stacey et al. (2000) reorient thought in favour of processes of 
emergence, embracing the paradox where the individual and the social are both aspects of 
one process of forming and being formed at the same time. Stacey and his co-authors 
trace human systems thinking and thought on the dialectical formation of the individual 
and the group to their philosophical roots as Kantian systems or Hegelian dialectic, 
respectively, and show that they are two ontologically equal but mutually incompatible 
ways of conceiving of human being. The first espouses a dualistic spatial view of the 
person with the mind inside and the social outside with processes and structural devices 
connecting the two, while the other adheres to the simultaneous and dialectical emergent 
formation of the two through complex processes of interaction. Here Stacey and his 
colleagues have definitely shown the fork in the ontological path, challenging thought to 
either choose one side of the fork or the other, or at least acknowledge which fork one is 
on, because depending on which it is, conceptions of the self, interaction processes, 
organization, role, practice and ethics are radically different. 
In Complexity and Group Processes (2003) Stacey develops these positions further, 
which is of particular interest at this point of my inquiry. His stated purpose is the 
application of these ideas to group analysis, but at the same time he admits to the 
possibility of application to other domains such as management. 
Stacey presents Mead’s self as co-present with the social, and also turns to Elias in favour 
of his thought of the group as a figuration. Here Stacey combines two theories, Mead and 
Elias, not one to complete the other, but together to open new areas of inquiry. 
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What Mead presents in his theory of symbolic interactionism is complex, 
nonlinear, iterative processes of communicative interaction between people in 
which mind, self and society all emerge simultaneously in the living present. 
Elias’s theory of process sociology presents processes of power relating in which 
social structures (habits, routines, and beliefs) emerge at the same time as 
personality structures ways of experiencing ourselves. Both Mead and Elias are 
concerned with local interaction in the present in which widespread, global 
patterns emerge as social and personality structures, as identity and difference, as 
human ‘habitus’. (Stacey 2003: 66). 
While avoiding biological determinism, Stacey engages a discourse of the body as the 
embodiment of the self in thought, such that humans are physiologically social. 
According to Stacey, when I feel, my body does the feeling; when I think, I can only be 
conscious of my thought by virtue of the conversation I am having with myself, which is 
made possible by the functioning of my physiology. I could very well have such 
conversation with myself out loud, but the civilizing process over the centuries (Elias 
2000) has had the effect of keeping inner conversational gestures silent in the form of 
thought, creating the impression in modern times that there is an internal world, 
confusing a privately held, silent self-conversational process with the existence of an 
interior space. However, the conversation I have with myself is no less physical than a 
vocal one I may have with others. Both require physical capabilities – central nervous 
systems, bodily capabilities for some type of speech and hearing – making thought as 
embodied as any physical, visible gesture (see also Burkitt 1999). These attributes are 
common to the entire human species; it is in the social exercise of them that one person 
becomes differentiated from others. 
This particular treatment of the social evolution of the person is what I would call 
Stacey’s ‘Eliasian’ turn, whereby society is emergent and unplanned, emanating from the 
very process of how individual people get on with themselves and with one another. Elias 
suggested that the social took the form of self-regulating and self-organizing ‘figurations’ 
(Elias 1978) of interdependent people, interacting according to the organizing influences 
of those very interdependencies expressed as power relations. Speaking of how order can 
arise in society when no one instance can plan it or impose it, he writes: 
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It is simple enough: plans and actions, the emotional and the rational impulses of 
individual people, constantly interweave in a friendly or hostile way. This basic 
tissue resulting from many single plans and actions of men can give rise to 
changes and patterns that no individual person has planned or created. From this 
interdependence of people arise an order sui generis, an order more compelling 
and stronger than the will and reason of individual people composing it. It is the 
order of interweaving human impulses and strivings, the social order, which 
determines the course of historical change. (Elias 2000: 366; see also Stacey 
2003: 40). 
This sui generis order to which Elias refers is not the sui generis level of Wiley (1994).  
It is rather an all-encompassing order in which the actions of the individual and the group 
emerge together into a state of order or disorder which could never have been planned or 
laid out in advance by some central authority. This order cannot be reduced to that of the 
individual or the group.  It is a property of both taken together. It is the identity of the 
individual and the group. Here we find Elias the sociologist, intuiting that within a 
philosophy of human free will acting within a web of interdependency (figurations), any 
order that is observable must be self-organizing and self-regulating to be sustainable. 
Clearly, the larger the group becomes, the more the complexities of these self organizing 
processes increase. 
Such a theory of self-emergent order requires some satisfactory explanation of what 
Collins (2003) would call micro processes of the formation of the self and the patterning 
of human interaction across groups. Elias came at these issues through theories of the 
emotions, power relating and the use of symbol in communication to bond the ‘I’ and the 
‘we’ as engaging of the self and the other. In addition to espousing Elias’s explanation, 
Stacey turns to Mead and the simultaneous emergence of the self and society. 
Human society is emerging simultaneously with human minds, including selves.  
Mead consistently argued that one is not more important than the other; that one 
could not exist without the other. The social, in human terms, is a highly 
sophisticated process of cooperative interaction between people in the medium of 
symbols in order to undertake joint action. Such sophisticated interaction could 
not exist without self conscious minds but neither could those self conscious 
minds exist without that sophisticated form of cooperation. (Stacey 2003: 63) 
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By identifying the fundamental importance of communicative interaction through the 
medium of symbols to explain local, short term processes, Stacey, like Elias, establishes a 
continuum of interaction from the inner conversation of individual selves to the dynamics 
of group figuration, as one complex order. 
Again referring to Mead, Stacey points to the social act as the gesture that calls forth a 
response from another, and gesture and response together constitute the meaning of the 
social act for both. Gesture and response cannot be separated.  Meaning lies in the entire 
singular social act, in the social object or relation created by the gesture-response 
interaction. It is continually transforming as interaction transpires over time with 
response as new gesture acting back on the earlier gesture creating new meaning in the 
moment. At every turn we can know the meaning of the social act because we are 
conscious of our own presence within it and we experience the embodied reactions (for 
example, feelings of happiness, sadness, and fear) it provokes. This resulting and 
emergent meaning taken part in together and simultaneously by the participants, makes 
the gesture-response couplet a significant symbol in Mead’s terms. 
In interaction, our responses are not just reactions in the form of feelings – instinctive or 
automatic reactive gestures ritualized with reference to sacred objects. They are new 
gestures taken on the basis of what we have come to sense as the meaning of the social 
act taking place. We think before gesturing anew; our thought process takes the form of a 
silent conversation with ourselves, in which we envision a new social act. In a silent role 
play, we take the place or attitude of the other toward our self. As we silently enact the 
anticipated gesture, it calls forth in us the same response it will likely call forth in the 
other, making us able to anticipate the consequences of our gestures (actions) and to 
sense the meaning of the emerging social act even before gesturing. These thoughts are 
not then stored as a representation, they are spontaneously re-enacted at every turn and 
lead to new action or inaction. Each iteration is a new meaningful experience, identity 
recreated in a new feeling state. Repetitive patterns can occur, but with the possibility of 
change and surprise at every occasion. 
I would describe this process of gesture-response in the following way. As I think, I play 
a role and conduct an inner conversation in the context of what is transpiring around me. 
As this occurs, I am already experiencing feelings as the object of others’ gestures toward 
me. In that feeling state, an intention to act arises in my thought, in the form of an 
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envisioned responding gesture. In moving to act, I see and hear in thought me making the 
responding gesture toward the other. At this point I become a ‘me’, an object of my own 
thought, and I experience a reaction as an ‘other’ or the ‘generalized other’ would likely 
do. In other words, my gesture calls forth in me the same response – disgust, laughter, 
excitement – as it would in the other. In light of this response, I can foresee the other’s 
likely gesture toward me because I can take the attitude of the other. Then I chose to act 
(make a gesture) knowingly or spontaneously. However, I cannot really know how I will 
act until I actually do so, at which point I will see myself as ‘me’ having acted. In the 
spur of the moment, it may happen that I act contrary to all of my prior thought, 
surprising even myself. Also, it may be that my understanding of the other or the 
meaning of the social act was faulty, in which case my gesture may be completely 
unexpected or incomprehensible, setting off a whole new direction in interaction and 
creating novel meaning of the social act. 
What I have described above is the ‘I’ – the one who acts – being called forth in the 
process of interacting with the other. The ‘I’ is being enacted as the next step in the 
emergence of a future mutually constructed with my interlocutors. Such enactments are 
lived evaluative experiences, and through them we learn how to anticipate the 
consequences of our gestures in familiar or recurrent situations. As we continue to 
socialize, we ‘develop the capacity to take the attitude of the whole group [Mead’s 
generalized other] . . . not just toward one’s gestures but also toward one’s self. What has 
evolved here is the capacity to be an object to oneself, a “me”. A self, as the relationship 
between “me”, “I” and the other, has therefore emerged, as well as an awareness of that 
self, that is, self-consciousness’ (Stacey 2003: 63; parenthesis added). Contrary to Wiley 
(1994), the self would not be a level or a structure, semiotic, reflexive or otherwise, but is 
a state of consciousness or thought emergent in the reflexive dialectic of ‘I’ and ‘me’ 
occurring within processes of social interaction. 
In discussing the physiological basis of complex responsive processes of relating, Stacey 
refers to the vicissitudes of separation from and attachment to the other or others, as a 
result of our particular physical-chemical make-up. He demonstrates that all of these 
processes refer to our physiology in one way or another, though physiology alone cannot 
explain them; rather emotions and senses are stimulated through action into the world, 
both as inner role play and as public gesture, and such action is stimulated by a biological 
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need for interaction to regulate our body’s chemistry and our anxiety responses to 
chemical imbalances. 
The patterning of significant symbols occurs primarily through conversational exchanges, 
gestures and responses in the form of utterances, body movements and facial expressions.  
The vocal form of gesture is the most powerful because of our capacity as humans to hear 
our own voices, which calls forth in ourselves the same response as it does in others, as 
we silently role play and then vocalize. Vocal gestures take place in sequences of turn-
taking and turn-making, as pairs of question-answer, request-response, invitation-
acceptance or provocation-counter-provocation, which urge the conversation forward, 
with a felt quality of liveliness due to emotional engagement. The sequencing process is 
oriented by variances interjected as they arise in the thought of one or the other, creating 
conditions for novelty and consistency at the same time. A narrative of the interaction 
emerges with story lines and propositions, constructing the relationship or relationships at 
the same time as the relationships construct the storylines. The complexity of such 
interactions increases as patterns emerge from the local to the global and as specific ways 
of speaking and thinking take hold in the wider group in the form of shared values or 
ideologies. These ways of speaking and thinking become patterns of behaviours, making 
sophisticated cooperation possible among two or more persons, collaborating, negotiating 
or competing. 
Many themes of Stacey’s position on complex cooperative action in human organization 
can also be found in Habermas (1984), despite his sometimes divergent conceptions of 
the self and society. Habermas (1984) distinguishes cooperative action as a move away 
from simple, cause-and-effect, means-end action, where the outcome is generally 
predictable since it is enfolded within the very nature of the action itself. Such action is 
teleological, strategic action. As such, it is lowest on the scale of social complexity. 
Moving up the scale through what is described as normatively regulated action and 
dramaturgical action, Habermas  arrives at the most complex of human action, which he 
terms ‘communicative action’, wherein human actors cooperate to achieve tacitly or 
explicitly agreed-upon outcomes (1984: 94). Stacey refers to such collaboration as 
‘sophisticated cooperation’ (2003: 63). This is the action which characterizes the human 
organizations that managers are called upon to manage. 
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Habermas draws on a broad lineage of systems and constructionist social thought 
including Weber, Mead, Durkheim and Parsons. He develops the idea of communicative 
action to explain how people get along in situations of sophisticated cooperation. 
Communicative action requires shared definitions of a social situation, ‘contexts  . . . 
ordered in such a way that agreement will be reached about what the participants may 
treat as a fact, or as a valid norm, or as a subjective experience’(ibid. 70). Reaching 
agreement among the participants is itself a cooperative process, achieved through taking 
the other’s situation definition into one’s own using language made up of utterances as 
speech acts oriented to reaching agreement. ‘Every action oriented to reaching 
understanding can be conceived as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming 
at situation definitions that are subjectively recognized’ (ibid).  
Stacey’s process-based account, building on Mead and Elias, sheds considerable new 
light on the subject of sophisticated cooperation, including the nature of role enactment 
and practice in organizations. Stacey and Habermas, together provide important insights 
into how experiences of sophisticated cooperation function. They all point to aspects of 
experience that we take for granted as the shared situation when we engage in such 
cooperation, which I find to be analogous to the values, ideologies, practices strictures 
and boundaries we take for granted in organizations. They all also point to processes of 
interaction as the way we engage in cooperative action, and all three point to cooperative 
interaction as emergent and unpredictable. Taken together, these ideas make a compelling 
case for the centrality of social interaction in understanding practical engagement in 
organized settings.  
Reflection on role enactment in organizations as practice 
In the preceding section, I took up the examination of three different inquiries into the 
same question of how individuals and groups relate to one another, to explore by way of 
analogy the concepts of role and organization. In my view each of these inquiries may be 
considered an exemplar. Each is a thoroughly developed but significantly different 
attempt by a recognized thought leader to explain the functioning of the individual and 
the social. The scholarliness, breadth and scope of each endeavour demonstrate the 
intensity of the ongoing struggles towards understanding the individual and the social, 
and the functioning of human cooperation. 
Laying out the thought within each of each these works in this project as I have done 
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exposes the thinking of each to the reader, and has allowed me not only to observe the 
struggle I have just mentioned, but also to perceive the significant differences between 
them and ultimately to identify further issues relevant to my purpose of developing an 
alternative account of individual practice in organizations.  
Wiley (1994) maintains an unshakable confidence in the self as a non-reducible entity, 
above, below and within which mechanisms act to connect with other selves to form 
groups, such as organizations, and society. Seeking to renew American pragmatism as 
pre-eminent in sociological thinking (Joas, 1997; Wiley, 1994), the author rhetorically 
manoeuvres Mead’s and Peirce’s thought on reflexivity and emergence into spatial 
thinking. 
Collins (2004) proclaims that it is the interaction between individuals which is the non-
reducible kernel of society, and builds up a model of groups and society on the basis of 
interaction rituals. Of course, these interactions require that individual persons partake in 
them. These individuals have a physiological make-up which seeks emotional energy, 
pushing them into interaction with others, so that their psycho-social formation is the 
result of the accretion of interactive experiences over long periods of time. Chains of 
these interaction rituals across diverse groupings in the population produce patterns of 
social behaviour, including social stratification. This view is quite mechanistic, and 
despite the author’s attempts to ground human relating in flows of emotional energy, his 
view perpetuates the duality of the individual and the group as spatially differentiated 
with insides and outsides. 
Stacey et al. (2000) and Stacey (2003) eschew any such formulations altogether, and 
instead espouse Elias’s notion of one sui generis social order made up of individuals and 
groups which are different facets of the same processes of the formation of mind, self and 
society. These processes, which they call complex responsive processes of relating, are 
grounded in the human physiological capacity to perceive the meaning of gesture-
response interaction in the form of significant symbols, which are experienced in the body 
not only as thought but also as different intensities of emotional excitement. Here, the 
significant symbol is created jointly by the interactants in a group, contrary to Wiley 
(1994), where the semiotic content is held within the unitary self, or shared within the 
group with reference to some external sacred object, or Collins where the individuals 
forming the group achieve emotional effervescence. Complex responsive processes of 
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relating make communicative interaction possible, which in turn enables sophisticated 
cooperation typical of organized human activity (Stacey 2003). Because every social act 
is a new enactment of the dialectic formation of mind, self, and society through complex 
responsive processes of relating, patterns of behaviour and shared values emerge over 
time and across populations as a result of on-going communicative interaction in the 
everyday life of society, always with the possibility of change or consistency at the same 
time. 
The exploration of these three exemplars allows me to see the narrative of role enactment 
presented at the beginning of this Project in a different, more specific light.  For example, 
in the account of the scene of the meeting at the youth polytechnic in the office with Mr K 
and his colleagues, an observer may well perceive the powerful donor from the rich north 
sitting in the rudimentary office, meeting with the meek southern recipient. This may in 
fact have been the starting point of our interaction together, as evidenced by Mr K and 
company’s sensed obligation to make formal presentations to me. Then, as free-flowing 
interaction proceeds, we discover something about each other. Our gestures and responses 
meld into one interactive experience, with a sense of authenticity and shared knowing, 
which then becomes the meaning not only of our interaction but also of our respective 
roles. This meaning emerges through the communicative interaction taking place, and 
will be recreated in some form, much the same or quite differently, in every subsequent 
moment of interaction. It can only be interpreted from outside of the interaction itself. I 
could recount much the same portrayal of my move into role of CFD Canada chair that 
afternoon in Ottawa in June, and a narrative of my current activities as general manager 
of Citadel would reveal much the same thing. 
All three of the works examined in the previous section could provide some measure of 
explanation as to what was transpiring in these encounters. For instance, the various 
encounters related in the narrative began against a presumption of some social 
organizational form containing roles and anticipated ways of relating, easily envisioned as 
those to be found in Wiley (1994) or Collins (2004). In fact, Frances Westley does just 
that with Collins (1981) in her application of his idea of interaction ritual chains to 
strategy-making in organizations (1990). 
Wiley and Collins would be considered a structural-spatial way of seeing the interaction 
and social organization. One cannot discount the influence this view must exert as a 
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starting point on the nature of the enactment to follow, if only to acknowledge that it 
provides clues as to expectations of the interactants in terms of power relations and 
performance which will affect behaviours. At the same time, the reflexive aspect of the 
accounts reveals that as the interactions evolved, roles changed, multiplied and took on 
local meaning in the enacting of them notwithstanding starting assumptions, and this 
began to reflect back on expectations, as the processual view of Stacey (2003) would 
suggest. 
Habermas (1984) obliquely deals with this same issue by arranging different parts of 
interaction spatially. His philosophical undertaking is to combine the internalist 
perspective of the participant and the externalist perspective of the observer, in order to  
rehabilitate rationalism by bringing into a renewed philosophy of rationalism the very 
critique of it, emanating primarily from social constructionism. In so doing, he describes 
‘lifeworld’, which incorporates the presupposed background knowledge and self-evident 
unquestioned presuppositions forming the ground necessary to reach agreement among 
several subjects communicatively coordinating their action: ‘I can introduce here the 
concept of the Lebenswelt or lifeworld, to begin with as the correlate of processes of 
reaching understanding. Subjects acting communicatively always come to an 
understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld. Their lifeworld is formed from more or less 
diffuse, always unproblematic, background convictions. This lifeworld background 
serves as a source of situation definitions that are presupposed by participants as 
unproblematic’ (1984: 70).  
Paradigmatically, however, the structural-spatial and processual views of organizational 
life and roles are mutually exclusive: one can be prescribed and manipulated according to 
rules or power, the other is emergent through processes of interaction. Prior to embarking 
on the exploration contained in this project, I believed that I would have to declare a 
winner in the struggle between them, choosing one as the true way to explain individual 
and social life, and was expecting to do so in developing the alternative account of 
practice I am attempting here. Now, while I do find Stacey and colleagues’ proposals 
compelling because they add important new understandings of human interaction and 
social organization, I must also acknowledge that the spatial-structural account as I now 
understand it has and will continue to have enormous currency in social and 
organizational thought. This is the dominant discourse which usually conditions all 
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settings of cooperative action. I feel, therefore, that it is essential that both accounts be 
taken seriously in considering role, organization and practice. 
As a consequence, I now can see role enactment problematized in a particular way. The, 
practitioner is in a dichotomous situation, where he or she is continually reconciling 
within him or herself the struggle between the processual and structural-spatial ways of 
approaching organizational life. When I think of my practice as engaging in and often 
being called upon to manage sophisticated cooperation, I can see that the roles I enact are 
generally conceived of by me and others abstractly from the way that such cooperation 
actually takes place. Enacting these roles as part of my practice therefore entails living in 
this ambiguity and somehow muddling through. Or so it would seem to be muddling 
through. Reflection on my experiences reveals practice looked at in this light to be much 
more complex than that. Instead, at every turn I am conscious that I am acting within the 
strictures of a formal organizational set up, which hypothetically define my role, but I do 
not stop at the strictures, because at the limit I know they prescribe the ‘what’ of role, but 
are generally silent as to the ‘how’, which is the communicative action of sophisticated 
cooperation necessary if we wish to achieve our cooperative purpose. 
To accept this dichotomy is not to evade the difficulty of deciding in favour of one 
position or another. The more compelling way to consider this new position is now to 
identify holding these two contradictory positions as a paradox central to practice in 
organizations, to understand its significance and to incorporate it in the alternative 
account of practice that is the object of my research. In so doing, we may open up rich 
territory for exploration and inquiry, based on both points of view, in order to see new 
horizons more clearly. 
Concluding remarks 
In Project Three I explored the engagement in joint action, and the liveliness that 
characterizes such engagement, as significant aspects of practice in organizations. At the 
beginning of Project Four, I asserted that joint action always entails the enactment of 
roles within a situation of cooperation among persons.  This assertion, if left unexplained, 
might lead the reader to suppose that division of labour is the basis of cooperative action 
after all, contrary to the central premise of my research.  To prevent such a mistaken 
supposition I undertook a close examination of role theory, beginning with a detailed 
narrative of how I took up roles in CFD Canada and the Citadel project over a month-long 
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period.  Through the examination of role theory, in particular with reference to Sarbin and 
Allen (1968), I pinpointed a lacuna in the way the theory accounts for role enactment, and 
this in turn necessitated a closer examination of concepts lying at the root of thinking on 
role enactment, namely role and organization. 
These concepts were examined through  reflection on three positions:Wiley (1994;); 
Collins ( 2004); and Stacey et al.( 2000) and Stacey ( 2003), chosen as exemplars of ways 
of thinking of the individual and the social, which I argue to be parallel constructs to the 
role and the organization, respectively.  Reflecting on these positions in reference to the 
narrative has led me to conclude that there is a paradox inherent in the enactment of roles 
in organizations. As we engage in the interaction inherent in all cooperative action 
through complex processes of relating, as Stacey et al. (2000) claim to be the case, we are 
nonetheless confronted with roles and organizational structures conceived of and often 
managed according to the structural-spatial dualistic view of the individual and the social, 
which must also be taken into account. 
In the synopsis to follow, I will explore the significance of this paradox and how it may 
be taken up in practice. This will complete the elaboration of the alternative account of 
practice which is the object of my thesis, 
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SYNOPSIS 
 
This dissertation has sought to develop an alternative account of practice in 
organizations. I was moved to do so because in my active life it has been my experience 
that my practice in organizations is not recognized as such in terms of the dominant 
discourse – the way ‘practice’ is normally spoken and written about. Here I am referring 
to discourse on practice typically turning upon occupations, professions and jobs as 
manifestations of publicly recognized roles or functions within organized activity, 
established as a function of prescribed divisions of labour and the application of skills 
and techniques. The dominant discourse assumes that people interact in the ways that 
their assigned roles and functions are planned to work as interrelated parts of a shared 
task. While there are also processual accounts of the relationship between work, 
occupation, career, identity and practice, the predominant assumption still is that such 
processes will align with a preset differentiation of roles or division of labour. 
Reflecting on this gap in recognition, within the context of doctoral studies on 
organizational change, produced the insight which launched this research; namely that 
exploring my practice reflexively could produce thought and ideas which could 
contribute to the elaboration of fuller account, changing the dominant discourse on 
practice and thereby making a contribution to knowledge about organizations. 
Each of the four projects through which I pursued this insight has added to an overall 
account of practice: not in a linear, sequential or patterned way as in one unitary arc of 
argumentation planned ahead of time, but rather as an object to be taken on its own terms, 
informed by themes from preceding projects while taking up new themes as they arose in 
the context of the project at hand. The production of this dissertation has therefore been a 
journey of research and inquiry, and this dissertation itself reflects that journey. 
At this stage it is fitting to summarize and explicate my overall proposal. First, I present a 
brief summary of the arguments and determinations I have made to date, which constitute 
the nature and substance of the left-hand side of the title of this dissertation: practice as 
role enactment. Then, in order to bring my arguments and proposal into sharper focus, I 
develop the right-hand side of the title: managing sophisticated purposive cooperation.  I 
then summarize what I believe to be my original and distinctive contribution to 
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knowledge, present a brief review of the effectiveness of my methodology, and end this 
dissertation with a concluding reflection. 
Practice as role enactment 
I have argued that practice in organizations is a communicative process that is intimately 
linked to role enactment. My argument is based on three central findings arrived at over 
the course of my research.  
First, the general notion of practice, whether social, cultural or professional, can be 
expanded to comprise the processes of emergence which are central to the joint formation 
of social groupings and individuals, and cooperative action. Contrary to the dominant 
view of practice as described above, practice may be regarded as encompassing 
dialectical processes of thought, social interaction and joint action (Shotter 1993) which 
are constantly emerging and transforming through experience. Conceiving of practice as 
occurring through processes of communicative interaction with others, my inquiry opens 
into those processes as they appear in themes detected in the narratives about my 
experience.  
The second central finding in this research came about through an examination of the 
theme of emotionality in one such group experience of practice. Emotionality was shown 
to be essential to engagement in group processes, and therefore central to practice. 
Moreover, it is the emotionality of engagement which ensures liveliness in a group, 
making it possible to engage with one another towards chosen goals. Emotionality is an 
embodied process, and examining physicality in interaction also provided insights into 
the dynamics of interaction one might expect to characterize practical cooperation. The 
claim that emotionality is essential for practice and for effective group processes is in 
stark contrast to the dominant business and management discourse, which eschews 
emotion in favour of a privileged claim to rationality and objectivity. The clear relevance 
of emotionality and the dynamics of engagement to an alternative account of practice also 
confirms that practice falls in the area of communicative interaction. 
Writing detailed narratives about the new roles I was moving into in my life at the time 
raised the theme of roles in general and role enactment in particular. This theme was 
pursued in project four, in which I critically explored role enactment as it is 
conventionally understood in role theory. As a result, I reframed enactment as a process 
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of emergence in which the role and the organization emerge simultaneously through 
dynamic dialectic processes analogous to the theory of the formation of mind, self and 
society postulated by Mead (1934) and developed further by Elias (2001), Stacey et al. 
(2000) and Stacey (2003). Thus the nature of the link between practice and role 
enactment becomes the third major finding of my research. 
If, as this finding suggests, practice is definable as engagement in processes of enactment 
of roles in co-emergent organizations, a further question then arises: should the contrary 
conventional view of practice, role and organization be rejected entirely in favour of this 
alternative account? Although we might well promote the process point of view over the 
conventional, objectivist stance, it seems certain that the conventional view of the 
enactment of role and organization will continue to play a part in the practical world, if 
only as a dominant discourse. 
Accepting that these preconceptions will persist points to a significant attribute of 
individual practice in organizations. We must acknowledge that there is a paradox 
inherent in the enactment of roles in organizations. As we engage in the interaction 
inherent in all cooperative action through complex processes of relating, as Stacey et al. 
(2000) claim to be the case, we are nonetheless confronted with roles and organizational 
structures conceived of and often managed according to the structural-spatial dualistic 
view of the individual and the social, which must also be taken into account at the same 
time. Habermas (1984) attempts to resolve this paradox by proposing a dualistic approach 
of communicative action against a background of shared realities called lifeworld, which 
may well incorporate the dominant discourse. I believe instead that this paradox further 
problematizes practice as role enactment and must be acknowledged in that light, as I will 
discuss below. 
Managing purposive sophisticated cooperation 
The next step in this synopsis is to elucidate the meaning of practice as role enactment as 
presented in this dissertation. I will do so in the following pages through the use of a 
concrete example to be found in the literature, that of managing, whence the right hand 
side of the title of this dissertation. 
In his work as a teacher and prolific writer on management, Henry Mintzberg has long 
sought to correct what he considers to be serious deficiencies in the conventional view of 
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management practice. He has made a significant contribution to management thought 
through his research, writing, and initiating management educational programs. I 
consider Mintzberg to be an important and influential voice on management practice, and 
so I refer to his proposals here for the comprehensive portrayal they offer of management 
as a practice, allowing me to see even farther than I otherwise could have done, even 
though I am critical of his epistemology. Looking closely at this portrayal in relation to 
my own proposals will also allow me to comment on the nature of my own contribution. 
In 1973, Mintzberg developed a contingency theory of managerial work, founded on 
observed practices of managers, on the principle that ‘[e]very manager stands in the same 
basic relationship to his organizational unit and its environment’ (Mintzberg 1973: 110),’ 
as if they were following patterns and structures inherent in human organization. By 
1994, Mintzberg had developed a model of management as a way of tying all of the 
various parts of the job of managing together into a conceptual whole. This model holds 
the person to be at the centre of a frame, with his or her values, experience, knowledge, 
competencies and mental models for seeing the world. The model is described as ‘the 
person in the job with a frame manifested by an agenda[,] embedded in … the milieu in 
which the work is practiced’ (Mintzberg 1994: 15). The context has an inside, an outside 
and a within space, and management occurs on three levels – information, people and 
action. 
On the basis of his earlier thinking, Mintzberg (2004) specifically pursues the practice of 
management, which he believes is ‘going off the rails with dysfunctional consequences 
for society’ (Mintzberg 2004: x). Here Mintzberg’s central idea is that synthesis is the 
essence of management:  managing is not just an art (for example, as attributed to the 
manager as hero), in a culture of exploration as entrepreneurship and vision, nor just a 
science, with its culture of exploitation. It is actually all about craft, the balancing of art 
and science. As craft, it can only be learned in the doing of it, and so Mintzberg insists 
that it can only be appropriated as a practice from the bottom up, on the job, and not 
stepped into at the top on the sole strength of cognitive knowledge as proponents of the 
MBA would have it. 
Mintzberg completes his portrayal of the practice of managing by attributing a key 
function to reflecting on experience as the way to achieve the synthesis he considers so 
central. People may learn little from their experience unless they can classify and analyze 
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information, observations and insights gained through experience. ‘We don’t carry 
around reality in our heads; we carry around theories and models, whether we realize it or 
not’ (ibid. 249). These models must be accessed, and continually developed into better 
ones, specifically by reflecting on experience, making sense (Weick 1995), getting the 
meaning; that is to say, understanding the moral or emotional significance of what one is 
doing, not only the outcomes or impacts. 
For Mintzberg, reflecting on experience is intended to uncover assumptions, reframe 
them on the basis of theory and practice and allow testing of new hypotheses leading to 
further, more enlightened action. It is an inductive and exploratory cognitive process 
which follows a cyclical pattern of action-reflecting-learning-new action, reminiscent of 
Schön (1991).  
Reflecting does not mean musing, and it is not casual. It means wondering, 
probing, analyzing, synthesizing, connecting – ‘to ponder carefully and 
persistently [the] meaning [of an experience] to the self.’ And not just what you 
think happened but ‘why do you think it happened?’ and ‘how is this situation 
similar and different from other problems’’ . . .  All of this requires struggling. As 
noted earlier, implicit theories or models have to be surfaced and disbeliefs 
suspended so they can be put under scrutiny – not an easy thing to do. (Mintzberg, 
2004: 254) 
Mintzberg’s ultimate focus on the soft skills of management such as reflection is 
certainly an important step forward. But his model of the manager’s head embedded at 
the centre of a surrounding frame, however reflective, takes the social world as 
. . . a spectacle presented to an observer who takes up a ‘point of view’ on the 
action, who stands back so as to observe it and, transferring into the object the 
principles of his relation to the object, conceives of it as a totality intended for 
cognition alone. . . . This point of view is the one afforded by high positions in the 
social structure, from which the social world appears as a representation and 
practices are no more than ‘executions’, stage parts, performances of scores, or 
the implementing of plans. (Bourdieu 1977: 96)  
In the end, we are still left with only a partial picture of practice, as a functionalist 
application of skills, in this case the skill of reflecting on experience. 
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Acknowledging paradox 
Ultimately, Mintzberg stops at an objectivist idea of practice of management. He reduces 
reflection to another form of knowledge (Spender 1994: 392). In ‘experienced reflection’ 
(Mintzberg 2004: 264), experience is considered in the light of conceptual ideas building 
to a linear chain of knowledge, oscillating from tacit to explicit and back to tacit in 
endless cycles. Concepts-plus-experience lead to reflections, which in turn lead to 
insights and learning which have impacts on the job, which are then reflected on, to be 
better equipped to undertake subsequent experience. Mintzberg’s account lacks 
understanding from within joint action (Shotter 1993), and thereby cannot see the 
unresolved paradox of the practitioner. There is little to account for how the managerial 
role is to be found in the often imperceptible ‘network of beaten tracks and paths made 
ever more practicable by constant use’, as opposed techniques of management occupying 
‘the geometrical space of a map, an imaginary representation of all theoretically possible 
roads and routes’ (Bourdieu 1977: 37–38). I do believe however that Mintzberg’s focus 
on reflection is an attempt in that direction, but to suffice it would have to take a reflexive 
turn, which I shall discuss below. 
In Charlebois (2003), I describe my travails of trying to achieve cross-boundary 
collaboration within a diverse, multifunctional bureaucratic unit of the administration of 
the newly-merged City. As a manager inexperienced in large bureaucracies, I naively 
believed I could get to this result by instating a culture of collaboration, banking on 
notions of self-organization to be achieved through promoting free-flowing conversation 
amongst my employees. In retrospect, I see that I was attempting what I suspect most 
managers attempt (and which Mintzberg does not disavow): to control, direct and 
mandate self-organization; in other words, to mandate the communicative practices of 
sophisticated cooperation, from the position of observer. While I was trying to do this, 
little did I consider that my own role as manager was being enacted, however normative 
the public sector organizational environment was. 
This example shows that the manager is caught in a significant dichotomy related to 
taking up the role of manager. On the one hand, he or she is expected to direct, to a 
purposive goal, cooperative group action, as we can see in Mintzberg’s formulation of the 
manager’s job. But, as I have shown, group cooperation occurs through self-managed 
communicative processes intrinsic to sophisticated cooperation and the enactment of 
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roles. At the same time, the manager’s enactment of his or her own role is co-emergent 
with the organization he or she is attempting to manage. The enactment of the role of 
manager is therefore characterized by many contradictions and complexities, which can 
also be looked upon as paradox.  Within this paradox, the structural-spatial stance on 
organizational life and the processual nature of enactment as presented earlier co-exist in 
time and in experience in all the various areas of endeavour. In this way of thinking, one 
would be paradoxically acting into situations by virtue of complex processes of relating, 
while at the same time taking into account that the situations one is acting into have been 
cast and managed as if the levels, units and systemic functioning of the spatial metaphor 
were actually the case.  
Vaill (1989), like Bourdieu (1977), has pointed out that the objectivism of management 
thought, as represented by Mintzberg for example, confounds the undertaking of fully 
understanding management practice as practice, holding it instead to be the domain of 
masterminds who cognitively design and implement organizational plans and strategies.  
[T]wo key functions run through all degree programs in management and all 
management development programs: the task is to understand the system better 
and get it to do what you want it to (that is, control it) more effectively and 
efficiently . . .  All the content we have been teaching and all the experiences we 
have been fostering come back to these two objectives: comprehension and 
control. (Vaill 1989: 77)  
Where Mintzberg fails to deal with the split between how organizations are objectively 
thought of and managed on the one hand, and what it actually means to manage within 
experience on the other, Vaill considers it to be a paradox: 
The . . . chronic and intense paradox that may transcend a system model is the 
action taker’s own presence in the model. The leader or manager is always part of 
the system being acted upon; this individual is certainly no more fixed an element 
than any other and, indeed, may be more variable just because of possessing 
action responsibility. Just how the consciousness of this person is going to ‘dance’ 
with events in the system cannot be known. It cannot be known by an external 
observer in any very complete way, and it certainly cannot be known by the 
person him- or herself. This means that ‘understanding of the system’ 
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(comprehension) at any moment and ‘action in the system’ (control) at any 
moment cannot be known. (Ibid. 79) 
Vaill’s characterization of the manager acting within the system and managing outside of 
it at the same time, which I had also articulated in slightly different terms in Project Four, 
is of some use here. While Vaill is referring to management, he is pointing to the idea 
that the paradox is innate in the very fact of the working person participating in a social 
grouping reified as an organization with its organization charts, authority structures, 
prescribed processes, regulations and enabling legislation, and where the objectivist-
positivist view reifies the person as a job or a position in the reified organization, taking 
both as if they were interrelated components of a broader system. As I have maintained 
throughout this dissertation, unacknowledged in this account are the presence and actions 
of natural persons in natural social relationships, which cannot be subjected to abstraction 
and do not follow the rules implied within the organizational model. 
Vaill argues in favour of putting systems thinking in its proper place, and his assertion 
about how we cannot know how we’re going to “dance with events in the system” until 
we actually do so is a useful acknowledgement of emergence. But Vaill’s position, much 
like that of Schön’s ‘reflective practitioner’ (1991), ultimately falls short. He 
acknowledges that the unresolved problem of ‘man and organization combined [is] a 
recipe for pain’ (Vaill 1989: 80), but his solution to assuage the discomfort is less than 
convincing. He proposes that the manager must develop a mentality that is ‘friendly to 
paradox…good at and comfortable with muddling through’ (ibid. 81), and that training 
and development of managers would look very different if we understood that ‘the 
manager’s values, the manager’s comprehension, the manager’s actions, and the nature 
of the system are four kinds of interdependent phenomena, all affecting each other, and all 
evolving together’ (ibid.). 
Vaill’s proposal attempts to break the relationship of man and organization down into 
cognitively explainable and learnable phenomena, the interdependence of which can 
presumably be articulated and cognitively managed. Even at that, he recommends 
recourse to a mysterious ability to change one’s own mentality, and to looking upon 
management as art.  Nowhere to be found is there any reference to processes of role 
enactment. 
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Taking up the paradox: The role of reflexivity 
The practice of managing must contend with both acting as if action may be directed 
from the outside, while acting communicatively within cooperative action, at the same 
time. Instead of recourse to art and changing one’s mentality, other explanatory tools as 
to how this paradox is taken up are needed. Because all managing relates to human 
cooperative action, accounting for the nature of cooperative action within management 
thinking therefore is essential not only to defining managerial practice in general, but also 
how the paradox outlined above is taken up in particular. The investigations I have 
conducted throughout this research, notably in the area of communicative interaction 
derived from the work of Mead and Elias, lead me to believe that it is done through the 
reflexivity inherent within all processes of communicative interaction, as present in 
situations of sophisticated cooperation. 
Practice consists of thoughts and actions as embodied gestures within the enactment 
process. When done with intent to direct or instruct others to act, or to precipitate the 
action of others towards a goal, they are gestures of managing. The making of such 
gestures is a telling moment: an idea, a spark of initiative, an intention. Even if conceived 
of by the manager perhaps as teleological cause-effect type intention, it ultimately must 
then be implemented communicatively. 
When I intervene in my organization, at every turn I think, I plan and I develop the 
intention to act. I reflect. Then I move to action. This is the basic schema held by 
Mintzberg. However, from the reflexive point of view, at the same time I am aware that 
as I think about action, I am acting it out in my inner conversation, taking the role in turn 
of those whom I know or imagine I will be interacting with as I imagine them interacting 
with me. I also know that once I begin to act, interaction with others begins and 
engagement of my self in the interaction becomes tangible. Engagement is felt 
emotionally. Action, however planned beforehand, now becomes emergent and 
unpredictable and intentional at the same time, open to change and surprise in every 
moment. As I and the others advance, our interaction takes on meaning created between 
and among all of us, and reflects and becomes part of our individual and shared identities 
in the moment, relative to each other. As the situation continues to develop, the challenge 
persists as to what extent I and my collaborators can stay fixed on the purpose (the 
 144 
intended meaning or direction of travel) of the action as it was considered at the outset, 
and how constant our shared conception of roles and organization will prove to be. 
The management gesture, like all communicative gestures, is reflexive in nature. In 
Project Four I described how Stacey (2003), following Mead (1934) points to the social 
act as being reflexive, consisting of the gesture by one person, calling forth a response 
from another: the gesture and the response together constitute the meaning of the social 
act for both persons. At every turn we can know the emergent meaning of the social act 
specifically because we are conscious of our own presence in it. So, in interaction, our 
responses are not just unilateral reactions in the form of feelings, nor instinctive or 
automatic reactive gestures ritualized with reference to external sacred objects, nor purely 
cognitive interventions. They are new gestures made on the basis of what we have come 
to sense as the meaning and forward direction of the social act taking place. This is the 
enacted nature of reflexivity as per Mead (1934). Human social interaction rests on the 
human capacity for reflexivity.  
According to this way of thinking, it is reflexivity and the reflexive turn which can be 
shown to be essential to role enactment as I have reframed it in my dissertation, and thus 
to the practice of managing in particular and to practice in general. It is the central 
function of reflexivity in human relating that makes it possible for managers in particular 
and organizational role-holders in general (i.e. practitioners) to hold the paradoxical 
position of interacting communicatively at the same time as acting under a shared 
perception that action may be directed from the outside according to the objectified 
boundaries and structures of the organization.  
Rosenberg defines reflexivity as the mind’s capability of taking itself as an object of its 
direct control. The text lays out two types of reflexivity: cognitive and agentive. The first 
is the idea that one can take oneself as an object cognitively, while the second refers to 
intentional self-regulation through the process of self-reflection: ‘…regulating what we 
do and shaping what we are’ (Rosenberg 1990: 8). To a similar end, in contesting the 
‘extended reflexivity thesis’ of Giddens, Adams (2001: 230) maintains that Giddens 
erroneously maintains that this reflexivity disembeds, detraditionalizes the self from 
tradition and culture, mistakenly championing reflexivity as ‘transcending tradition’ and 
language, and takes the contrary position to Giddens holding that it is precisely 
reflexivity which gives access to the effects of tradition, culture and embeddedness. 
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Combining Adams’ position with Rosenberg’s definition of reflexivity as allowing the 
self to be an object to oneself including taking the attitude of the other, making culturally-
embedded self-regulation possible, shows the reflexive turn to be that which enables the 
practitioner to hold the paradoxical position I have been describing. 
Enactment: an area for further exploration into the manager’s practice 
So what becomes of the archetype of the manager as isolated, autonomous responsible 
individual?  
First, and most critical, every manager must be held accountable not only for the 
work of subordinates but also for adding value to their work. Second, every 
manager must be held accountable for sustaining a team of subordinates capable 
of doing this work. Third, every manager must be held accountable for setting 
direction and getting subordinates to follow willingly, indeed enthusiastically. . . . 
In order to make accountability possible, managers must have enough authority to 
ensure that their subordinates can do the work assigned to them. (Jacques 1990: 
130) 
This is management as ‘naïve artificialism recognizing no other principle of organization 
than conscious coordination of a conspiracy’ (Bourdieu 1977: 80), promoting confident 
action as if communicative action, regulated improvisation, or sophisticated cooperation 
can be made to happen – planned, staged, formalized and then implemented – in the same 
way as strategic or teleological action. But there is a more serious problem; for if the crux 
of managing is accountability through the exercise of power, then the manager as 
described by Jacques is in a dilemma, where he or she, as the person accountable, must 
somehow affect the behaviour of others who then will act from free will using knowledge 
gained from within their personal experience. 
Here is the nub of the problem: often it may seem that the accountability agenda wants to 
trump all else. We seem to believe, or in practice behave as if we believe, that the 
‘accountable’ manager really does take the organization cognitively to be a predictable 
and ordered schema of specified roles and processes. He or she espouses this setup of 
organizational values and norms and proceeds to set targets and plan action according to 
that understanding, as if it were equally understood and shared by others; and finally 
takes responsibility for success or failure. The more sophisticated manager may think in 
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terms of systems. He or she will fathom the complexity of a system due to its human 
composition. The very sophisticated manager will apply critical thinking and tend 
towards critical systems intervention (Jackson 2000).  At the same time, as I have 
described in some detail, the role the manager is enacting is emerging through an 
intensely communicative, interactive process wherein reflexivity is a central feature.  
Others have also taken up the theme of enactment in managing and practice. Fondas and 
Stewart refer to ‘an enactment perspective or ‘emergent model’ (1994: 98), based on 
‘expectation enactment’ which refers to ‘the impact the manager has on the expectations 
to which he or she will be held subsequently – impact that occurs as the result of the 
manager intentionally initiating opportunities to shape role expectations and as the result 
of automatic feedback and mutual adjustment between focal manager and role senders’, 
i.e. the manager’s primary interlocutors, who convey role expectations through their 
actions and responses (Fondas and Stewart 1994: 88). Weick (2001) concurs, positing 
that the organization and the roles within it are jointly products of enactment, socially 
constructed out of action, under the guidance of shared preconceptions of the situation at 
hand. ‘The term “enactment” is used to preserve the central point that when people act, 
they bring events and structures into existence and set them in motion. People who act in 
organizations often produce structures, constraints, and opportunities that were not there 
before they took action. . . .  Enactment involves both a process, enactment, and a 
product, an enacted environment . . . the social process by which a material and symbolic 
record of action . . . is laid down’ (Weick 2001: 225–26).’ 
Perhaps surprisingly, the outcomes of enactment, when made sense of after the fact 
(Weick 1995), give rise to metaphors and models of the organization which then become 
self-fulfilling as they occupy a place in the shared definition of the situation. Weick 
(2001) talks about the self-fulfilling nature of metaphors (see also Morgan 1998), and 
models (as different schools of thought on management and the organization, see Perrow 
1986) held in action, whether as regards organizations or the roles within them. As these 
models and metaphors take the shape of a shared understanding of the organization or 
situation definition, people act as if the related structures and strictures existed in the 
concrete world. They make an ideology of these conceptions such that they become a 
source of self-control in line with the self-control exercised by their collaborators. They 
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become self-fulfilling, and this diverts thought and conviction to the objectivist 
perception of regulated structures organizing the real world. 
But I maintain that roles, organizations and their environments are constantly being 
redesigned by virtue of their very enactment. Even the most obstinate attachment to the 
position of manager as autonomous accountable outsider will therefore inevitably be 
mitigated by the very process of enactment of the role the manager is called upon to play. 
It is not even enough to characterize the practice of managing as that of group conductor 
as portrayed by Stacey (2003), Bion (2004) and Nitsun (1996). 
Managerial practice must be paradoxically cast as maintaining control and accountability, 
at the same time as engaging in, freeing up and legitimating communicative interactive 
processes which are unavoidably part and parcel of sophisticated cooperation. This 
occurs through reflexivity and the enactment of the managerial role, reframed as 
discussed above. Both reflexivity and enactment so reframed certainly merit further 
research and debate. 
Articulating my contribution to knowledge 
My stated intention in producing this dissertation was to develop a fuller, more inclisuve 
account of practice, from that which currently dominates organizational discourse. In so 
doing, I sought to make a contribution to knowledge in the area of practice in 
organizations, specifically as regards management practice. 
I arrive at the conclusion that, ultimately, practice in organizations is communicative in 
nature and entails the enactment of roles. Here I reframe enactment as a path forward to a 
new account. Enactment is often taken to mean that the role-incumbent fulfils 
expectations of the role as set by the organizational decision-makers acting as if 
behaviour conforms to pre-set organizational and role structures. In experience, however, 
role enactment is more accurately described as a dialectical process of co-emergence of 
role and organization, by virtue of the local social interaction of the persons involved. 
Because both accounts – the spatial-organizational metaphor and the processual approach 
– continue to exist in the practical world, they cannot practically speaking be mutually 
exclusive. It is therefore essential to take both into account in thinking about practice, 
roles and organization. In so doing, role enactment and practice become problematized, 
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in the sense that practitioners can be seen to be holding a paradoxical position within 
organized human activity. 
The paradoxical position of the practitioner is particularly relevant to the practice of 
managing. Present-day predominant management thinking espouses an objectivist view 
of the organization, according to which managing entails accountability for the results of 
communicative interaction of others. I contest the adequacy and exclusivity of this 
position, and maintain that the practice of managing is also thoroughly communicative in 
nature. The co-presence of both the objectivist and emergent accounts in the practice of 
managing requires that the manager paradoxically holds both positivist and emergent 
views of role and organization at the same time in experiences of managing. This paradox 
can never be resolved, and is instead taken up by the practitioner by virtue of the 
reflexivity central to all processes of communicative interaction. It follows that 
acknowledging processes of enactment and the centrality of reflexivity in the practice of 
managing and bringing that to the attention of managers and management educators will 
enhance how managing sophisticated cooperation is understood and carried out. 
A review of methodology 
I have characterized my methodology as both reflexive and as bricolage, and this 
dissertation is an expression of this approach. In the first instance, the writing of 
narratives of ordinary active life experiences suggested that practice, as I have been using 
the term, is complex in ways that discourse on practice does not address. Addressing this 
apparent void has proved to be a complex challenge; the answer, if there was to be one, 
lay in my own experience. My methodology therefore required linking narrative, 
literature and argument to provide insights that would fill the void and form an alternative 
account.  
The reflexivity aspect of this approach is to be found, first, in the writing of the 
narratives, which produced insights and themes of interest in relation to the broader 
theme of practice; and second in the reflexive reading of literature on subjects related to 
experience in organizations and organized activity. By the term reflexive reading, I am 
suggesting that it is the closely attentive writing about whole arguments in published 
works which made it possible for me perceive themes such as habituation, conversation, 
emotionality, liveliness, enactment and reflexivity as being related to practice and 
therefore relevant to the account I was in the process of building. These themes stand in 
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stark contrast to the dominant objectivist account of practice, and it is by exploring the 
nature of this contrast that we can see that the void mentioned above is due to the absence 
of an account of communicative interaction in dominant accounts of practice. 
The reflexivity of the writing process, whether in narrative or expository mode, has made 
it possible for me to recognize that practice entails communicative processes of role 
enactment, to identify the paradox that this entails, and then to perceive the omission of 
reflexivity from the dominant accounts of practice. I have arrived at this position by 
adding pieces iteratively in a building process over the course of the dissertation. The 
method of bricolage has allowed me to add parts because I came to know of them as I 
progressed: as more came to be known, more could be added, so that my account may be 
viewed as open-ended and susceptible to further development in the future. In this light, 
bricolage entailed setting a direction of travel for the research at the outset, and being 
reflexively attentive to themes emerging and creative in the use of materials that came to 
be known as progress was made. 
The final point to be considered involves the issues of validity and generalizability which 
I raised early in this dissertation. First, I have suggested that validity rests largely on the 
verisimilitude of the accounts of experience, both as regards the narratives but also as 
regards the conduct of the research and the production of the dissertation. I am confident 
that the scope, variety and straightforward accounts of the experiences covered in the 
narratives, as well as the clear linkage to practice of the themes I have evoked and 
addressed, do constitute sufficient verisimilitude and therefore do warrant the validity of 
the research. Second, I believe that adequate generalizability also obtains, due to the 
ordinary nature of the experiences I have written about; that they were all experiences of 
cooperation among several people for whom the experience was also ordinary; and that 
the positions I have arrived at in this dissertation have all been developed with reference 
to published accounts of experience in organization and thought on experience in 
organizations. 
Conclusion 
At the very beginning of this dissertation, I made reference to Parker Palmer’s notion that 
the active life consists of contemplation-and-action. To me, now, this appears to have 
been an intuitive statement in favour of the central importance of reflexivity in action 
generally and practice and role enactment in particular.  
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Reflexivity and the reflexive turn are largely absent from management thinking and 
discourse. To the extent that it is representative, Mintzberg (2004) refers to a particularly 
instrumental form of reflection on events and outcomes, as a way to look deeper for hard-
to-detect positivist explanations of events and (teleological) actions to take. This kind of 
reflection ‘progresses through four distinct stages: (a) articulation of a problem, (b) 
analysis of that problem, (c) formulation and testing of a tentative theory to explain the 
problem, (c) [sic] action (or deciding whether to act)’ (Daudelin 1996: 39). This is first 
order reflexivity as posited by Wiley (1994). It contains no account of self-reflection or 
the reflexive turn, and reveals such management thought to be grievously deficient. 
I believe this lack of acknowledgement is widespread in organizational management 
thinking, thanks to the dominance of objectivist-positivist ways of casting the world of 
organized action. This dominant position puts this way of seeing beyond question, 
locating it on the hither side of inquiry, taken for granted and self evident in practical 
relating. But one cannot engage in the social world of organizations without being 
reflexive through and through. Managers are reflexive at every turn; but neither they nor 
the pundits recognize this fact. 
Would it matter if managers did recognize the reflexive dimension of their activities? 
Speaking from my own experience of producing this thesis over the last three years while 
I have gotten on with my own practice, of which this research and writing were very 
much a part, there is no doubt that awareness of the reflexive position changes the way I 
manage. The reflexive turn is over and above all a constant effort to remain conscious in 
every moment of how one is forming and being formed in the pursuit of organizational 
goals, and to remain open to the effect that this has on oneself and on organizational life. 
The reflexive turn is not instrumental or functionalist, and therefore is not a strategy for 
greater operating effectiveness or efficiency. Enhanced reflexivity then can only be a 
pathway, to greater sophisticated cooperation. 
Finally, I would consider my contribution in this field of practice and management also to 
touch upon the overall understanding of the debate amongst the holders of the divergent 
and contradictory spatial-structural and processual views of organizational life. In fact, it 
is this very divergence that is significant. These concepts have to do with organized or 
semi-organized human activities in much the same way as they concern aesthetics, 
religion and politics. Notions such as these are what W. B. Gallie has called ‘essentially 
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contested concepts’ because they give rise to disputes which ‘although not resolvable by 
argument of any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and 
evidence. This is what I mean by concepts that are essentially contested; concepts the 
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the 
part of their users’ (see Shotter 1993: 170). 
To paraphrase liberally, and much along the same lines of Habermas’s ‘communicative 
rationality’ (1984), Shotter goes on to argue that the character of such concepts must be 
open and prospective such that their development can take place along different lines, and 
that the holders of one line contest that of others while their own is equally contested by 
those others, each using their own in the dispute with the others. In addition, it is this very 
competition that enables further development of the concept and also prevents the ending 
of the contest, thus allowing new developments to take place. This puts ‘essentially 
contested concepts’ beyond simple disagreements because there is something about their 
nature to motivate a dispute; each claim in favour of a certain solution or line of 
development only makes sense in relation the rival claims it has been developed to 
counter. Likewise there is no elimination of rivals since neither side can claim victory 
because of the prospective or continually open character of the subject. An important 
example is the way in which the concept of democracy is developed in civil society 
(Shotter 1993). 
It seems worthwhile to regard organizational life as an essentially contested concept in 
this same way. It is the dispute between different lines of development, as in the case of 
systems thinking versus complex responsive processes thinking, that will allow the entire 
concept to develop. Thus I have found it interesting, in considering my own narratives, to 
reflect the concept of complex responsive processes of relating more often than not in 
opposition to systems or other positivist thinking. In fact I did so as if the systems 
thinkers were an other who was holding a counter line of argument. This was important 
because, to paraphrase Shotter, it is important to consider the positions which are being 
criticized, otherwise the argumentative meaning of one’s position will be lost. 
Each of us, in an important sense, has a special relationship to organizational life in the 
context of our active lives. The contest between opposing, though valid, claims to 
knowledge about organizational life is grounded in their de facto co-existence in 
experience within organizations, making practice, role and organization essentially 
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contested concepts. The point is not to eliminate debate and ‘win’ the argument or end the 
contest, but to continue the development of the essentially contested concept of 
organizational life in all of its possible facets and thus grow the social fund of knowledge. 
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